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‘Mister Jagielski, will there be good weather?’ they ask.
The raftsman looks around at the sky (he reads the sky,
they say) and, pushing hard on his pole until it bends like
a bow, pronounces: ‘There are clouds, but they might go
away.’
‘An optimist!’ the lecturers marvel.




Bruno de Finetti (1906-1985) was one of the most prominent writers
on probability in the 20th century. He was one of the founders of
the subjective school in the philosophy of probability and, in a pro-
lific career in academia, actuarial science and insurance, influenced
a variety of fields, including mathematics, economics and philosophy.
In this thesis my main focus will be on his philosophy of probability,
concentrating in particular on some of its more influential and contro-
versial aspects. My aim is to contribute to the debate in two ways: in
the first half, I provide a new insight into how certain aspects of de
Finetti’s thought, particularly those regarding pragmatism and objec-
tivity, are to be understood, discussed and integrated in contemporary
philosophical debates. In particular, I discuss his pragmatism and his
objectivity. To do this, I shall take a historically informed view of de
Finetti’s ideas and apply a version of them to current debates, thus
suggesting a potentially productive direction these debates can move
in. This will not be done in a primarily historical context; in fact,
some of his ideas will be analysed ahistorically (i.e. using arguments
not from de Finetti’s time) in order to bring to the fore their rele-
vance to current debate. The emphasis in the text, therefore—where
useful—will be on the contemporary perspective, but hopefully with-
out distorting any of de Finetti’s ideas. In the second part of the thesis,
I move on to specific aspects of de Finetti’s philosophical programme,
with the aim of contributing to the debate on these themes; the first
half looks to the past for inspiration, whereas the second aims to be
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forward-looking. Two main topics are discussed: countable additivity
and the betting definition of degrees of belief, taking de Finetti’s posi-
tion as a starting point but moving on to encompass broader questions
in their conclusions.
1.1 Introducing de Finetti’s probability
De Finetti was mainly a mathematician, but one who had strong and
influential philosophical views on the subject of mathematics. The
conceptual starting point for his theory of probability is the feeling of
uncertainty we humans experience. What de Finetti saw as our good,
shared intuitive knowledge of this feeling should, he thought, be the
target that a mathematical theory of probability models. In order to
do this, we need to be able to record numerically the level of uncer-
tainty, or degree of belief, that a given agent has in a given situation.
The mathematical theory of probability, then, can operate on these
numerical degrees of belief and help us see the full consequences of an
uncertainty state. For de Finetti, the theory of probability is a logic
of the uncertain. It does a similar job, for example, as the one done
by propositional logic: there, we start from a set of propositions, each
of which we take to be true or false, and tease out the consequences
on the basis of given inference rules. Each all-or-nothing belief can be
associated to a 0, if (we believe that) the proposition is false, and 1 if
(we believe that) it is true. In probability, on the other hand, we start
from a set of degrees of belief, and so we will have numbers between 0
and 1 (including the extremes, because we can still represent certainty
about things) instead of 0s and 1s, and the rules of probability will
help us tease out the consequences of that set. For example, proba-
bility shows us how our degrees of belief about the different possible
outcomes of an event, or about the correctness of different hypotheses,
should be combined; or it can show us how to update our opinion as
the situation evolves and we collect new evidence.1
1Combining deductive logic and probability is, in fact, no trivial matter; I
have included this juxtaposition simply to explain the role that de Finetti saw
probability as playing: an equivalent one to deductive logic, in cases where we
can’t have 0-1 beliefs.
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One of the possible bridges between the qualitative feeling of un-
certainty, the numerical values needed for mathematics, and the rules
of probability is based on the realisation that it is if, and only if, these
numerical degrees of belief respect the basic rules of probability that
we are not open to systems of bets which lead to a certain loss. This is
not a starting point of the theory, but a theorem: the Dutch Book the-
orem shows that betting quotes must be probabilities; and the Dutch
Book argument concludes from this, via the interpretation of degrees
of belief as betting prices, that the former must be probabilities as
well. This argument is compelling but not obvious, and at various
points in my thesis I will discuss de Finetti’s requirement that prob-
ability be operationalisable and examine and criticise the purported
link between betting prices, subjective feeling of uncertainty of agents
and the numerical degrees of belief that reflect them. These numerical
degrees of belief, which, at least in principle, can reflect an agent’s
uncertainty, can be called subjective probabilities.
De Finetti accepts only these subjective probabilities as a mean-
ingful2 understanding of the concept of probability. His stance is anti-
metaphysical, and he rejects any reference to the presumed existence
of chance in a mind-independent world, or to the idea that the long-
run frequency in repeated trials of an experiment is an indication of
an existing, but unknown, underlying probability of the phenomenon
in question. He is against the classical conception of probability of
Laplace and others, in which the starting point is equal-probability
events: he sees that definition as circular, in that it contains a concept
of probability right from the start; he argues against the logical prob-
ability that began with Keynes, which saw true rational probability as
being dictated by the evidence. And he also railed against measure-
theoretic probability (the school of thought that now holds sway, at
least in mainstream mathematics).3 While rejecting the above posi-
tions as interpretations of probability, he did however give importance
to relative frequency: this is factual evidence that can help us make
2Meaning here is a technical term connected to a pragmatist theory of meaning:
this will be one of the topics dealt with in 2.
3I will treat some of these arguments in more detail in what follows; for the
positions sketched here see, for example Gillies (2000), de Finetti’s arguments




up our mind as to what our degree of belief is—but frequency is not
constitutive of probability itself. The reason why frequency is treated
differently to the other concepts is that it is verifiable data: this is
of crucial importance in de Finetti’s view, and it informs his whole
approach.
1.2 The impact of subjective probability
The rejection of all non-subjective interpretations of probability is one
of the ways de Finetti swam against the current; his rejection of count-
able additivity (more on which below), is another. It could be said that
de Finetti eventually lost his main intellectual battles: the focus on
verifiable concepts, which, as I will argue in Chapters 2 and 3, implies
the exclusive adoption of subjective probability, has somewhat faded
from the broader philosophical discourse, while countable additivity
has been adopted in the vast majority of today’s mathematical texts
on probability. On the other hand, however, his influence is great and
enduring: subjective probability is seen as one of the leading inter-
pretations of probability (see Hájek (2011); there are many different
forms of subjective probability, and there is no need to be as radi-
cal as de Finetti in this, of course); and his mathematical results, of
which his work on exchangeable probabilities (see de Finetti (1928)
and de Finetti (1937/1964) ) is the most famous, are an important
part of the probability curriculum (Von Plato (1994, p. 240)) and an
active area of research beyond mathematics (Von Plato, 1989, p. 264).
Indeed, a notable aspect of de Finetti’s writing is that, through-
out his career, even as his ideas evolved and his tone and emphasis
changed, he largely stuck to the philosophical tenets that he seemed
to have developed by the late 1920s. Overall, de Finetti’s intellectual
project is remarkably consistent, and the mathematical and philosoph-
ical aspects of it well integrated. I think this must be one reason for
its enduring appeal. At the same time, however, the deep roots of
de Finetti’s opus in the philosophical ideas of the 1930s, 1920s and
earlier are often enigmatic to contemporary philosophers, and tend to
clash with their own view of what is important in a philosophical ap-
proach to probability. Ideas such as behaviourism and operationalism,
6
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seemingly abandoned in broader philosophy after the era of the Vi-
enna Circle, are still discussed today in the philosophy of probability,
perhaps due to the enduring influence of de Finetti (Eriksson & Hájek
(2007) take this view). In mathematics, de Finetti’s opposition, on
conceptual grounds, to countable additivity, which makes the theory
simpler and more powerful, might puzzle scholars in the field who see
adherence to strictly philosophical views as less of a priority. I shall
now say a bit more about countable additivity, and how it fits into de
Finetti’s overall project.
1.3 De Finetti’s project
There is an important change in the third edition (2006) of Howson and
Urbach’s influential book Scientific reasoning: the Bayesian approach:
the authors no longer accept the mathematical rule of Countable Ad-
ditivity as an axiom of probability; they have been convinced, they
write, by de Finetti’s famous arguments against the principle. I deal
with this in more detail in Chapter 5, but it is worth mentioning here
because it provides a striking example of de Finetti’s philosophical and
mathematical thought in action, and gives us an initial idea of what
a theory of probability is for de Finetti. Countable Additivity is a
rule governing the behaviour of the probabilities of countably infinite
incompatible events. It is a strengthening of Finite Additivity, which
says that if events A and B are incompatible, with probabilities P(A)
and P(B), then the probability of their union A or B is P(A) + P(B).
Countable additivity imposes that this be true also of a countable se-
quence of incompatible events. Kolmogorov (1933/1956) included an
axiom equivalent to this in 1933, and this made probability into a
measure, so it could be studied in the well-developed branch of mathe-
matics called measure theory. Studying probability as a measure, with
the powerful limit theorems that this makes possible, can be said to
be the beginning of the modern mathematical theory of probability.
Amongst mathematicians, the adoption of Countable Additivity is by
now uncontroversial (although a theory using only Finite Additivity
does exist). Given the power and the convenience of the rule, a refusal
to adopt it might seem rather strange. But this refusal lies at the
7
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heart of de Finetti’s conception of probability. Although his opposi-
tion to Countable Additivity can be found in various writings of his,
I see his 1930 response to French mathematician Fréchet (de Finetti
(1930)) as the best formulation of the deep-seated reasons underlying
this choice.4 In the 1930 paper, which I discuss at more length in
Chapter 2, de Finetti compares probability to weight. While we need
an operational definition of weight in order to conduct any sort of ap-
plication with it (and even just to speak meaningfully about it), weight
has certain characteristics which are simply its own, which we cannot
modify by changing the axioms of the mathematical rules we use to
operate with it formally. The same is true, according to de Finetti,
of probability. In this context, it is our intuition that dictates the ba-
sic features of probability, and our intuition, de Finetti argues, does
not require countable additivity. Therefore, it should not be included
when we model our intuitive idea of probability into a mathematical
object. The addition of this rule restricts the ways in which degrees of
belief can be combined, and it has no right to do this, since it comes
from the wrong place: not from our basic idea of what probability
is, but from the technical convenience we gain in the model. This
kind of attention to the conceptual foundations of his formal theory is
something that de Finetti applies throughout his writing. I think it is
a valuable method, that can be adapted and applied also to debates
that lie beyond what is normally considered de-Finettian territory. I
propose such an application of this methodology, as I interpret it, in
Chapter 5.
Although I wrote above that probability has certain basic features
dictated by our intuition, I have been careful not to argue that it has
real-world features, bearing in mind the well-known opening phrase,
in capital letters, of de Finetti’s book (1974/1990): PROBABILITY
DOES NOT EXIST. Perhaps, on reflection, that some confusion would
have been avoided if he had stated that probability, while not exist-
ing as a mind-independent phenomenon, definitely has some sort of
existence: it exists as a mental phenomenon, as the feeling we hu-
mans have when we are not absolutely certain of the truthfulness of
4The more technical reasons are, amongst other places, in de Finetti (1972)
and de Finetti (1974/1990).
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a proposition, or of whether or not an event will occur. And while
the modelling of this concept in mathematics will add some artefacts
which do not belong to the intuitive core concept itself (for example,
we do not really have real-valued degrees of belief), it should not alter
or restrict it (hence the rejection of countable additivity). Further-
more, the rules should not alter the content of our beliefs at all: these
mathematical rules of probability do not purport to be an attempt
at a theory of rationality. If we accept the basic mathematical rules
of probability, it follows that - given the probabilistic assessment we
start out with - such-and-such will be the consequences; but this, as de
Finetti remarks, is a conditional offer (de Finetti (1974/1990)). The
usual rules of probability are well motivated, de Finetti thinks, but
we are not forced to accept the motivation. I write more on this in
Chapter 3.
De Finetti’s project in probability, then, is ambitious, but in a way
that doesn’t chime in well with most of the writing on the subject pub-
lished after, or indeed during, his career. In his writings on probability,
he wanted to capture the real thing, by using the only philosophical in-
terpretation of probability that vindicates our intuitive understanding
of it, making it a meaningful concept, and modelling it in a prop-
erly designed mathematical framework that respects these features.
This is exceptional for a mathematician, especially when compared to
the ones that came after him, who generally studied probability as a
purely formal concept. In this light, his ambition is vast. But in the
branch of philosophy where de Finetti often nowadays ends up being
located, formal epistemology, his project seems bizarrely unambitious
and laissez-fare. De Finetti’s degree of belief conception of probabil-
ity fits very well into some branches of formal epistemology (I explore
this in Chapter 3): let us suppose that rational agents have partial
beliefs that take the form of probabilities (this is de Finetti’s starting
point); what, then, should these probabilities be, in a given situation?
This seems the logical next step in the theory, and one which, broadly
speaking, interests many contemporary writers in the field. But de
Finetti pointedly refused to give any sort of answer to this, insisting
that any combination of degrees of belief that respects the rules of
probability is fine by his theory; indeed, countable additivity is re-
9
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jected precisely on the grounds that it adds content to what should
be a content-less theory. By these contemporary standards, then, de
Finetti’s theory is lacking. Surely a theory of rationality cannot allow
people to believe anything they like, and still be called rational! This
is the criticism often levelled at the theory of de Finetti.
The simple answer, which I defend in 3, is that his is not a theory of
rationality, but a theory of probability in which the mathematical and
the philosophical aspects are developed together, at the same time. It
is true that, in his earlier writings, de Finetti expressed a strong rela-
tivism, famously writing that there are no privileged grounds for defin-
ing as crazy the belief that eclipses cause wars (de Finetti, 1931/1989,
pp. 179-180). Later, de Finetti takes the more moderate position that
while we have arguments to support our belief states, these are usually
too subtle to be expressed in mathematics, and should be left out of the
theory (see Berkovitz (2018) on this). However, I see this is a change
in tone and emphasis rather than a substantial change of message:
probability, as seen by de Finetti, is an empty, content-less formal sys-
tem that can help us draw out the consequences of our probabilistic
assessments, or update these assessments according to relevant infor-
mation. It is simply not in the business of adjudicating which belief
states are better than others. Having outlined de Finetti’s main ideas
on probability, the most important features of his project and aspects
of the impact it had, I will say a few words about his philosophical
background, which I think helps give a more rounded picture.
1.4 Inspiration and milieu
De Finetti mentions his sources of philosophical inspiration in various
places (for excellent discussions of this see Von Plato (1994) and Jef-
frey (1989)), the more important of them being David Hume, Ernst
Mach, Mauro Calderoni and Giovanni Vailati, Adriano Tilgher, Al-
bert Einstein and Percy W. Bridgman. Tilgher (1921/1923), who is
abundantly quoted in de Finetti’s essay Probabilismo, wrote a booklet
describing the various relativist positions in philosophy, the first edi-
tion of which was published to mark the occasion of Einstein’s visit
to Italy in 1921. Amongst those discussed in the booklet and referred
10
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to by de Finetti are Hans Vahihinger, Oswald Spengler and Einstein
himself. The current of thought I shall concentrate on here, which, I
feel, had the most lasting influence on de Finetti, is the idea, originat-
ing from Mach, Einstein and then Bridgman, that concepts need an
operational definition in order to be meaningful, and his subsequent
amalgamation of these ideas into a pragmatist view heavily influenced
by Vailati and Calderoni’s treatise on pragmatism, which was itself
a discussion of Charles S. Peirce. Reading Tilgher (1921/1923) can
help us understand the ambitions of the younger de Finetti. Tilgher
starts his chapter on Einstein with an accurate sketch of the physi-
cist’s results and innovations (1921/1923, pp. 37-47), and makes it
clear that Einstein intended his results to be strictly mathematical-
physical, and not part of a broader philosophical relativism. Tilgher,
however, then proceeds (1921/1923, pp. 47-54) to place Einstein in a
broader historical context which includes trends such as philosophical
pragmatism, the rise to prominence of finance capitalism, imperialism
and titanism5 in art. I do not intend to go too deeply into this as-
pect of de Finetti’s thought, although, on reading his Probabilismo, it
becomes clear that Tilgher’s writing made an impression on him. My
point here, quite simply, is that de Finetti too felt part of a broader
movement that had rejected the metaphysical fallacies of such things
as absolute truth, epistemologically privileged points of view and abso-
lute time and space. Like Tilgher, he found Einstein to be a powerful
example of what heights can be reached if we cast aside those old
flawed ideas and embrace radical relativism and his own probabilism:
he urged that we take “a living, elastic, and psychological logic as the
fundamental instrument of scientific thought, instead of the ordinary,
categorical, rigid and cold logic. The logical instrument that we need
is the subjective theory of probability” (de Finetti, 1931/1989, p. 172).
De Finetti is anti-realist, pragmatist and empiricist (see Galavotti
(1989)), but while his ideas sometimes seem close to those of the Vi-
5“An attitude of rebelliousness, held even in the knowledge that it will fail,
against all the superior forces (divinity, fate, nature, despotic political or socio-
economic power, etc.) that dominate man and oppress his vital impulses, his




enna Circle, he developed them independently.6 In addition to the
authors mentioned above, he considered himself to be inspired by, and
continuing with, the work of David Hume. Comparing their basic
views on probability is interesting. Here is Hume on probability in
An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding : “Though there be no
such thing as Chance in the world; our ignorance of the real cause of
any event has the same influence on the understanding, and begets
a like species of belief or opinion” (Hume, 1748/1993, Section VI -
Of Probability). And de Finetti: “Probability does not exist. [. . . ]
Probabilistic reasoning [. . . ] merely stems from our being uncertain
about something” (de Finetti, 1974/1990, p. x). Notwithstanding the
similarity between these two passages, I do not mean to suggest that
these are the words that actually inspired de Finetti; we need to con-
sider also that the (1974/1990) book is a mature expression of de
Finetti’s thought. But the affinity is clear. As for continuing with
Hume’s work, de Finetti thought that his theorem on exchangeable
events, together with Bayes’ theorem, vindicated and made precise
what Hume meant (Galavotti, 1989, p. 250) when he wrote the follow-
ing:
A wise man [. . . ] proportions his belief to the evidence. In
such conclusions as are founded on an infallible experience,
he expects the event with the last degree of assurance [. . . ].
In other cases, he proceeds with more caution: He weighs
the opposite experiments: He considers which side is sup-
ported by the greater number of experiments: To that side
he inclines, without doubt or hesitation; and when at last
he fixes his judgement, the evidence exceeds not what we
properly call probability.” (Hume, 1748/1993, Section VI -
Of Miracles)
The philosophical success of that theorem, for de Finetti, lay in its
showing that we are justified in aligning our degree of belief to the
frequency which emerges from repeated trials of a certain experiment,
thus expecting the future to resemble the past. This is done without
6See Jeffrey (1989, pp. 225-226, 234-235) for differences between de Finetti and
Carnap.
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invoking objective real-world probabilities or independent events: it is
a purely subjectivist justification of Hume.
This concludes my description of de Finetti’s philosophy of prob-
ability. I shall now conclude this introductory chapter by briefly out-
lining the themes taken up in the rest of the thesis.
1.5 Outline of the thesis
The main body of the thesis is in four chapters. Each of these can be
read as an independent piece of research (for example, a reader can
skip to Chapter 4 and understand it without reading the rest). The
chapters contain cross-references: a concept mentioned in one may be
dealt with more fully in another. Although the chapters can be read
independently, however, many of the arguments in the thesis can be
seen in the context of the coherent global view of de Finetti’s work
that I intend to construct - as outlined above and to be returned to
in my concluding remarks in Chapter 6. Some strands, on the other
hand, grow out of this view and end up in other philosophical fields
and debates. The chapters are structured as follows.
Chapter 2 takes a recent article by Eriksson & Hájek (2007) as
its starting point. In it, the authors defend a position they call prim-
itivism about degrees of belief: this is the idea that the best thing
to do is to leave ‘degree of belief’ as an unanalysed primitive con-
cept, a building block for our conceptual frameworks. A major reason
why they propose this is that all the existing analyses of the concept
of degree of belief fail, they argue—and so perhaps we should (tem-
porarily) abandon the attempt to analyse the concept. Having it as
an unanalysed primitive is not, after all, a bad direction to take. A
particularly interesting aspect of their argument is that they depict
de Finetti as a strict operationalist with regard to degrees of belief
(i.e. as seeing a degree of belief as identical to the result of the op-
erations which, by definition, measure it), but they also wonder why,
then, he worried about having good operational definitions of degrees
of belief. This would suggest that there is something behind mere
operations after all, and de Finetti seemingly wanted to measure this
‘something’ accurately. My view, in fact, is that de Finetti himself is
13
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also a sort of primitivist about degrees of belief, albeit of a different
sort to Eriksson & Hájek (2007). In arguing this conclusion, I trace de
Finetti’s operationalism and paint a new (to my knowledge) picture of
his pragmatism, as it emerges from a comparison with the pragmatism
of Peirce.
In Chapter 3, I deal with the concept of objectivity in de Finetti’s
subjective probability. De Finetti’s theory is often interpreted as an
‘anything goes’ approach, because he refuses to add any formal rules
that might influence the content of a person’s degrees of belief. My
main argument will be that this criticism, even though it is widespread
in the literature, is misplaced. De Finetti is not interested in construct-
ing a formal theory of rationality, and his theory has ended up being
criticised for doing, purportedly badly, something which it was never
intended to do. A crucial factor in the vein of criticism I examine is
the perceived lack of objectivity in de Finetti’s theory. But, on reading
his work one realises that objectivity plays a central, motivating role
in the whole approach. I think this arguing at cross purposes has led
the current debate down a blind alley. I map out the senses of objec-
tivity employed by de Finetti and his critics, to put them on the same
page with regards to the usage of the concept, and allow the debate,
potentially, to progress in a productive direction.
In Chapter 4, I discuss an operational definition of probability
given in de Finetti (1974/1990). In this, a degree of belief is measured
by proposing a special kind of bet to a person and observing which
odds she accepts. In this bet, the agent does not know whether she
is betting for or against the event in question in question, which, in
theory, forces her to give her honest opinion. I argue, however, that it
is in fact a powerful distorting factor. The position that I will defend
is that, in order to make the definition work, we have to make assump-
tions so powerful that they render the betting definition redundant.
This chapter moves on from de Finetti in two ways: firstly, it does not
attempt to enhance his arguments in the context of contemporary de-
bates, as Chapters 2 and 3 do; secondly, de Finetti himself abandoned
bets as an operational device in his later writing. But the link between
bets and degrees of belief has lived on in the literature, and so has the
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debate about it. I propose that my arguments in this chapter can be a
good reason for abandoning the betting definition of degrees of belief.
In Chapter 5, I apply the de Finettian philosophical methodology
outlined in Section 1.3 to the formulation of a proposed way to move
the countable additivity debate forward in a broad sense, and attempt
a specific contribution in that vein. The specific contribution will be
to propose reasons for why two of the major approaches in objective
Bayesianism (I will look at Edwin T. Jaynes and Jon Williamson) are
justified in adopting countable additivity as an axiom; these reasons
are different from the ones they give themselves which, I feel, can be
improved on. My broader point will be that a general solution to the
debate on CA, capable of satisfying everybody, is impossible. And
my general methodology here is inspired by de Finetti in this sense:
he takes seriously the fundamentals of what he takes probability to
be, and what he expects from a formal model of it; this informs his
mathematical choices throughout. This method of relating fundamen-
tals to formalisations will be the guide throughout the chapter. My






Bruno de Finetti (1906-1985) gave major contributions to the study of
mathematical and philosophical aspects of probability and statistics.
He is in one of the founders of the subjectivist school in probability,
sometimes also known as subjective Bayesianism, a leading philosoph-
ical interpretation of probability. This chapter addressees the founda-
tional aspects that lie at the very basis of his philosophical thought,
with particular reference to the role of pragmatism, referred to in the
existing literature, but not sufficiently explored; here, I shall attempt
to paint a more faithful and detailed picture of it. The reason for this
is twofold: firstly, I think that the foundational ideas of an influential
thinker such as de Finetti are of historical interest in and of themselves;
secondly, an exploration of his pragmatism is the best way to counter
a widespread—and, I will argue, mistaken—reading of him in which he
is depicted as a strict operationalist. In a somewhat ahistorical way,
I will compare de Finetti’s position to the recent view on degrees of
belief expressed by Eriksson & Hájek (2007), called primitivism, and
argue that de Finetti is a primitivist of sorts: he thought that proba-
bility existed as a psychological phenomenon, but that we needed an
operational definition of it in order to speak meaningfully about it and
operate mathematically with it. The main features of this fundamen-
tal concept must be respected in its operational definition and formal
model. This is a relation of target to model.
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De Finetti thought that the only meaningful way to understand
probability was as a degree of belief which could be held by a human
agent. A major reason for thinking this, I will argue below, is that
the concept thus becomes checkable: we can, conceivably at least,
check to what degree an agent believes something to be true. For
example, degrees of belief might be reflected in the betting prices we
choose in given situations, and this is, in principle, verifiable. What
is more, once we represent degrees of belief numerically as betting
prices, the celebrated Dutch Book theorem (see de Finetti (1974/1990,
p. 87) among many others) states that if (and only if) a set of betting
quotients respects the probability axioms, then there does not exist a
combination of buying or selling these bets that results in a certain
loss (or gain). In the Dutch Book argument for probabilism, degrees
of belief are interpreted as betting quotients, and the result is then
interpreted as saying that if (and only if) an agent has a set of degrees
of belief that respect the probability axioms, then she is not open to
accepting system of bets that can bring her a certain loss. This means
that degrees of belief should be probabilities, if the agent does not wish
to be open to certain losses. In Chapter 4 I criticise the purported link
between bets and degrees of belief; but probabilism, the argument that
degrees of belief should be probabilities, does not depend on betting
arguments succeeding1, and nor are bets the only way to operationalise
degrees of belief.
Formally, having degrees of belief as probabilities can be expressed
as follows. Let bel indicate a function which goes from a set which con-
tains the objects of our degree of belief (this can variously be defined
as sets, propositions, events, which for de Finetti are mathematical
objects which can take only the value 0 or 1) to the real numbers.
Then: (1) if we are certain that an event E1 will occur, our degree
1De Finetti proposes a representation theorem, or axioms for qualitative prob-
ability which result in quantitative probability when jointly applied (de Finetti
(1937/1964)), a Dutch Book argument (de Finetti (1974/1990)) and an accuracy-
based argument (de Finetti (1974/1990)); he seems to have stuck only to the latter
of these in later writing, and abandoned the betting definition of degrees of belief.
For more representation theorems, see Ramsey (1926/1990), Savage (1950/1972),
Maher (1993), and for more accuracy based arguments see Joyce (1998), Leitgeb
& Pettigrew (2010a) and Leitgeb & Pettigrew (2010b), Pettigrew (2016). For ar-
gument by derivation from qualitative axioms see Cox (1961), Paris (1994). There
are many more sources for each of these types of argument.
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of belief in this occurrence must be bel(E1) = 1; (2) for all events
E, it must be bel(E) ∈ [0, 1] ⊂ R; (3) if A and B are mutually
exclusive, it must be that the degree of belief in A or B occurring,
bel(A ∪B) = bel(A) + bel(B).
Some of de Finetti’s writings—his emphasis on measurement and
checkability, the suggestion that observing behaviour (betting or other)
is enough to gain an insight into an agent’s mental states—have led
to the idea that he was a strict operationalist, and that his position
inherits the problems of behaviourism. In a recent paper, Eriksson &
Hájek (2007) look at the available analyses of the concept of degree
of belief in the existing literature. What are degrees of belief?, they
ask, portraying de Finetti’s answer to that question as a strictly, or
‘actual’ in their terminology, operationalist one: degrees of belief are
defined by the operations by which we measure them with. They find
this problematic: once we deem a procedure’s output an acceptable
measurement of a given concept, we must, they say, accept any result
of such procedure as an exact definition of the concept at hand. The
concept just is the result of the measurement, and so no ill-calibration
of the measuring device is possible ((Eriksson & Hájek, 2007, p. 187)).
Determining whether this is a fair criticism of operationalism is
beyond the scope of this work. This characterisation of de Finetti,
however, whatever its merits, is quite common (Joyce (1998, pp. 583-
584) adopts it too, and see Berkovitz (2018) for further references).
The possibility of a leading philosophical interpretation of probability
being based, in the eyes of many, on a shaky and outdated (Eriksson
& Hájek, 2007, p. 187) principle should be worrying for contempo-
rary supporters of the view. My aim here, however, is to show that
this reading is incorrect. The right way to understand de Finetti’s
operationalism is, I will argue, through his pragmatist philosophy. I
approach this by looking at his philosophical inspiration and contrast-
ing his position with that of other authors, some in agreement and
others opposed to what they take to be a de Finettian position. What
emerges is a clearer picture of de Finetti’s distinctive brand of prag-
matism, and hence a proper understanding of his operationalism.
The chapter is structured as follows: I start in Section 2.2 by dis-
cussing Eriksson and Hájek’s characterisation of de Finetti; in Section
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2.3 I sketch the verification theory of meaning, as expressed by the
pragmatist authors closest to de Finetti, and in Section 2.4 I explore
what the consequences of this principle would have been for his the-
ory. In Section 2.5 I trace the differences between Peirce’s pragmatism,
which indirectly inspired de Finetti, and his own version of the posi-
tion, and in Section 2.6 I finally return to the position of Eriksson and
Hájek to compare it with de Finetti’s as constructed in the previous
sections. My conclusions are in Section 2.7.
2.2 De Finetti’s operationalist puzzle
Eriksson and Hájek, while portraying de Finetti as an actual opera-
tionalist, perceive a tension in his writing, in passages of his such as
the following:
In order to give an effective meaning to a notion—and not
merely an appearance of such in a metaphysical-verbalistic
sense—an operational definition is required. By this we
mean a definition based on a criterion which allows us
to measure it [. . . ]. The criterion, the operative part of
the definition which enables us to measure it, consists in
this case of testing, through the decisions of an individ-
ual (which are observable), his opinions (previsions, prob-
abilities), which are not directly observable. (de Finetti,
1974/1990, p. 76)
In this passage, a footnote refers the reader to to Bridgman’s book
(1927/1960), whose message can be conveyed in the following ‘slogan-
like’ quote: “In general, we mean by any concept nothing more than a
set of operations [by which it is measured]; the concept is synonymous
with the corresponding set of operations” (Bridgman, 1927/1960, p. 5).
Like Bridgman, de Finetti attributes his operationalism to the shock
of Einstein’s dismissal of the concepts of absolute time and space.
Absolute time, de Finetti (1937/1964, p. 168) writes, used to be seen
as an a priori concept but Einstein has taught us that a notion is “only
a word without meaning” if we don’t know “how to verify practically
any statement at all where this notion comes up”.
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This is a clear statement of intent; but Eriksson & Hájek (2007,
p. 190), while depicting de Finetti as an operationalist, doubt whether
de Finetti is a true, strict operationalist: the fact that he worries
about good operational definitions means that, for him, probability
must exist independently of its measurement. The perceived tension
is this: either one believes that there is nothing more to a concept than
the set of operations by which we measure it; or one believes that a
concept exists in its own right, and we can approach its true value with
good measurement. De Finetti, Eriksson and Hájek suggest, seems to
want both these things at the same time. My argument will be the
following: de Finetti, while believing that probability existed in its
own right, thought that we needed operations to measure it in order
to speak meaningfully about it.
In this, I agree with Galavotti, when she writes that, for de Finetti,
“while betting quotients are apt devices for measuring and defining
probability in an operational fashion, they are by no means an essential
component of the notion of probability, which is in itself a primitive no-
tion, expressing ‘an individual’s psychological perception’” (Galavotti,
2005, p. 211). I will now flesh out de Finetti’s position by studying his
pragmatist influences. Galavotti has written much on this, pointing
out many crucial aspects, but I think an important element should
be added to her picture: the faithful and consistent adoption by de
Finetti of the pragmatist verification theory of meaning, which can be
seen to motivate much of of his philosophical world-view.
Galavotti, in her earlier work (1989, pp. 241-242), seems to put
more emphasis on ‘pragmatic’ as meaning ‘practical’, or ‘useful’. She
argues that, according to de Finetti, probability should be under-
stood not as an abstract concept, but as an “indispensable instru-
ment for reasoning and behaving under uncertainty” (Galavotti, 1989,
p. 241). Other aspects of ‘pragmatic’ in de Finetti’s work, according to
Galavotti, are the continuity between inductive reasoning and induc-
tive behaviour, and between decisions in everyday life and in science
(Galavotti, 1989, p. 240-242). Recently, Galavotti (2011) has exam-
ined the broad philosophical perspective that de Finetti borrows from
philosophical pragmatism, but the verification theory of meaning is
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still missing from her list of pragmatist influences in de Finetti’s work
(Galavotti, 2011, p. 508)
De Finetti writes:
I had, by and large, adopted the mode of thinking advo-
cated by authors such as Vailati and Calderoni (or per-
haps it would be more accurate to say that I found their
approach to be close to my own). Papini used to say of
Calderoni that ‘what he wanted to do was to show what
precautions one ought to take, and what procedures one
ought to use, in order to arrive at statements which make
sense’ (de Finetti, 1974/1990, p. 41).
The influence of the Italian pragmatists Vailati and Calderoni on
de Finetti, or his agreement with them, has been noted elsewhere
(Jeffrey (1989), Parrini (2004), Suppes (2009)), but my aim in this
chapter is to improve on this understanding and, in so doing, cast
light on the proper role of operationalism. De Finetti’s verificationism
does not seem to be inspired by Ayers, Wittgenstein, Schlick, Carnap
or any of the Vienna Circle authors now mainly associated with the
position.2 Rather, it is Vailati and Calderoni who are mentioned time
and time again. Their work on pragmatism, published in 1909, is a
critical commentary on Peirce’s pragmatism and its misinterpretations
by other authors. I look to this next.
2.3 Pragmatist meaning
Vailati and Calderoni, according to Parrini (2004, pp. 35-36), adopt
a view very close to that of Peirce. Here I will focus mainly on their
approval and adaptation of the Pragmatist conception of meaning,
meaning, in which they point out that Peirce endorsed the following
methodological rule, attributing it to George Berkeley:
The only means to determine and clarify the meaning of
an assertion is to indicate which particular experiences,
2There was some correspondence between Carnap and de Finetti, as Parrini
(2004, pp. 51-53) points out; but this was on de Finetti’s philosophical interpreta-
tion of probability, aspects of which puzzled Carnap.
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according to such an assertion, are going to take place, or
would take place under specific given circumstances. (Vailati
& Calderoni, 1909/2010, p. 234)
Further on, they continue as follows:
Such methodological rule is nothing more than an invita-
tion to translate our assertions into a form that makes it
possible to apply [. . . ] those very criteria of true and false
which are more “objective”, less dependent on individual
impressions and preferences. This form would be able to
indicate more clearly what kind of experiments or obser-
vations can and need to be performed, by us or others, to
decide whether, and to what extent, our assertions are true
(Vailati & Calderoni, 1909/2010, p. 234).
This is inspired, Parrini points out, by Peirce’s classic 1878 paper
How to make our ideas clear. Parrini notes that neither Vailati nor
Calderoni accepted this verificationism uncritically. It is safe to say,
however, that they took the principle seriously. seriously. And so did
de Finetti, as borne out by his own words: “statements have objective
meaning if one can say, on the basis of a well-determined observa-
tion (which is at least conceptually possible), whether they are either
TRUE or FALSE” (de Finetti, 1974/1990, p. 6).
There are several other striking and relevant points of agreement:
for de Finetti opinions are not subject to criticism or to the criterion
for meaning: “it is meaningless to think that my [probabilistic] evalua-
tion is wrong, because it is meaningless apart from me, it has no other
function than to express my state of mind” (de Finetti, 1931/1989,
p. 193). This idea can be found in Vailati and Calderoni too (Vailati
& Calderoni, 1909/2010, p. 236). Vailati and Calderoni saw pragma-
tism as a logical analysis of our “assertions and beliefs”, which pro-
ceeds by extracting possible predictions implied in them. Criticising
this because it is “bad psychology” has the same worth (i.e. none)
as criticising “syllogistic logic, based on the argument that syllogism
is not an exact description of our actual ways of reasoning” (Vailati
& Calderoni, 1909/2010, pp. 246-247). This too, as I will argue espe-
cially in Chapter 3, is in line with with de Finetti’s thought. For the
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purposes of this chapter, however, the most important point of agree-
ment between de Finetti and Vailati and Calderoni is on the concept
of meaning : I shall now discuss this.
2.4 Meaning and probability
In the passages above by Vailati and Calderoni two things are es-
tablished: a definition of meaning and a meaningfulness criterion for
propositions. The meaning of a sentence is the set of predicted ex-
periences that it entails; and the criterion is simply this: does the
proposition entail any prediction, checkable by “experiment or obser-
vation”? If it does, the proposition has meaning; if it does not, it
is meaningless. There is a clear link between this criterion and de
Finetti’s subjectivism, a link which is perhaps not emphasised enough
in the current literature. For de Finetti, the subjectivist account must
have been the one that made probabilistic sentences meaningful in a
satisfactory way.
Let us take a basic probabilistic sentence, such as this: S = “the
probability of event E is a ”. We want to determine whether this
proposition has meaning. In the subjectivist interpretations the prob-
abilistic sentence S is meaningful because, in principle, we can verify
whether a human agent holds probability a as their degree of belief
over the occurrence of E, and will act in such a way as to display
precisely such belief. Such action could be, for example, accepting a
relevant bet, or choosing the number a in a proper scoring rule sce-
nario.3 Here in principle means that, while we realise that there will
be practical issues with the measuring process, if we are allowed to
make certain simplifying assumptions (de Finetti, 1974/1990, pp. 77-
80, 82), we can imagine this definition to be conceivably practical. In
the betting definition, the idea is that if we suppose an agent to have
utility linear in money, the event to be independent of the betting deci-
sions, and more (much more, perhaps—I deal with this in Chapter 4),
3This puts further constraints on the content of the sentence: the event E
must be a well-defined, objectively verifiable event—or else the sentence slips away
again into meaninglessness. See also Sections 5 and 6 in the Appendix to de Finetti
(1974/1990), in which the author takes the possibility of betting over it as a rule
of thumb for whether something is a well-defined event.
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then the agent should declare her sincere degree of belief as her cho-
sen betting price. Note that (it is supposed that) there are no logical
or theoretical obstacles for the definition to work in practice, but the
practical obstacles are also taken to be such that it is conceivable that
they can be overcome, so that this definition could actually work in
practice. It seems plausible that in many situations, with small sums
of money, a person’s utility will be roughly in line with money and the
betting decision independent of the state of the world (with regards to
the event in question). I return to this below in Section 2.5.
An objection to this readily comes to mind: surely not all proba-
bilities are degrees of belief held by someone, or even potentially held
by someone. In particular, when we use the mathematical theory of
probability, we might have probabilities that are, say, results of deep
theorems or of complex calculation, or simply intermediate results of
such calculations. It seems unnecessarily cumbersome to re-interpret
each and every mathematical probability as someone’s degree of belief.
This is how de Finetti (1974/1990) saw it. There are two, connected,
ways of studying a phenomenon such as probability (here, as else-
where, the parallel with physical theories is important). There is an
“axiomatic approach to the theory of probability” and an “axiomatic
approach to the calculus of probability”; the first emphasizes the “es-
sential meaning”, the second “the formal aspect”; this is similar to the
division of labour between physics and mathematics: the first works on
“the passage from the ‘facts’ to their mathematical translation”, while
the mathematician works by building on the latter, putting aside ques-
tions of meaning and adherence to the ‘facts’ (de Finetti, 1974/1990,
p. 256).
De Finetti places his work on probability firmly in the first camp,
and thinks that many other approaches make the mistake of not ap-
plying this strategy strictly enough—even if the meaning they give to
probability might be different to his. These other approaches, for ex-
ample, add rules such as countable additivity, which is not an essential
aspect of probability, merely for technical convenience (I discuss count-
able additivity in Chapter 5). What, then, are these ‘facts’ and what is
the ‘meaning’ that de Finetti’s axioms translate into mathematics? For
de Finetti the latter is “the analysis of the condition for coherence for
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bets (or something similar) on things we called ‘events’” (de Finetti,
1974/1990, p. 257). He vows to adopt “nothing more, and nothing
less” than what this analysis demands. But remember: de Finetti also
writes (as quoted above, (de Finetti, 1974/1990, p. 76)) that the oper-
ational definition allows us to measure the unobservable opinions of an
individual. So the ‘facts’ that the axioms translate into mathematics,
via the operational procedures, are actually these opinions of people,
and this is the primitive concept of probability that de Finetti, like a
physicist modelling a natural phenomenon, is seeking to model. This
is not put explicitly, but the two passages from de Finetti (1974/1990)
I discuss in this section make it clear that the conceptual structure
underlying de Finetti’s thought goes something like this: the starting
point is the opinions of people in situations of uncertainty; this is the
phenomenon at hand and the target of the model. de Finetti (1930)
compares this to the concept of weight. The next phase is the oper-
ational definitions, which quantify this concept, and which should be
designed in such a way as to reflect and measure accurately its impor-
tant features. And finally there are the rules governing the quantified
entities that result from the operational definitions; these rules are the
axioms of probability. These should be exactly what is required by
the analysis of the operational procedure. Once we have the axioms,
we can operate mathematically without worrying, in the mathematical
practice itself, whether each and every mathematical probability is an
actual or potential degree of belief.
An important aspect of the framework I have just described is the
acknowledgement that the fundamental concept of probability and
its abstract model, mathematical-probability, are conceptually differ-
ent. I return to this below, when I contrast de Finetti and Peirce,
and this is the idea that underlies the discussion in part 2.6 which
follows. So far, I have argued that subjective probability can be put
forward as an excellent candidate in the context of a de Finetti-style
criterion of meaning.4 This is especially interesting because the cri-
terion’s originator, Peirce, began from this same idea and ended up
with a completely different conception of probability. The fine points
4It is not the only one: finite frequentism, and perhaps some versions of Lewis’s
Best System analysis of chance might also be operationally accessible; I leave this
discussion for future work.
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of this different adoption of the criterion have not, to my knowledge,
been discussed in the existing literature, and by contrasting de Finetti
with Peirce, the former’s approach emerges in sharp relief. I shall deal
with this in the next section.
2.5 From Peirce to de Finetti: conceivability and
verifiability
Peirce inspired Vailati and Calderoni, who in turn inspired de Finetti.
What is striking, then, is that the latter is one of the founders of
subjective Bayesianism, while Peirce is considered a precursor of the
propensity-interpretation of probability, as it was named by Popper
(1957) in a seminal article. For Peirce, probability is the “would-
be” of an object, “a property, quite analogous to any habit that a man
might have” (Peirce, 1910/1978, p. 241). This could be, for example,
the ‘would-be’ of a coin to come up heads when flipped, or the ‘would-
be’ of a tennis player to win her next match, or of a die turning up 6.
Note, however, that “in order that the full effect of the die’s ‘would-
be’ may find expression, it is necessary that the die should undergo an
endless series of throws, [. . . ] the throws [being] independent each of
every other (Peirce, 1910/1978, p. 242).
How to square this concept with the sort of verificationism which,
originating from Peirce, inspired Vailati and Calderoni and, in turn,
de Finetti is not clear. We certainly cannot check an infinite sequence
of events, not even ‘in principle’. Note that Vailati and Calderoni
are not interpreting Peirce’s as a strict verificationism, nor are they
endorsing such a view. They write that we can meaningfully speak
of hypotheses which are difficult or even impossible to check directly
(Vailati & Calderoni, 1909/2010, pp. 242-243). For such hypotheses,
however, “‘indirect’ verification i.e. that which consists in the verifi-
cation of other affirmations that we can deduce from them” (Vailati
& Calderoni, 1909/2010, p. 243) must still be possible. This weak
version of verificationism was taken on board by de Finetti5: he is
happy to measure probability, i.e. the unobservable degrees of belief
5Berkovitz (2012), reading de Finetti, reaches a similar conclusion.
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of individuals, exclusively by the predicted actions we can deduce from
them.
This form of verificationism is permissive, but it still excludes some
propositions. If two or more incompatible propositions are unveri-
fiable directly, and the only way of verifying them is through a set
of deducible consequences which is identical for all propositions, then
any discussion of which proposition is true will be useless (Vailati &
Calderoni, 1909/2010, pp. 244-245). But this is exactly what appears
to go on in Peirce’s definition of probability: regardless of whether the
true ‘would-be’ of flipping heads for a coin is 110 or
9
10 , the deducible
consequences are the same. That is, any finite sequence of flips is pos-
sible regardless of whether the first or the second ‘would-be’ is true.
This is all the more puzzling, because close reading of Vailati and
Calderoni suggests that they have not strayed too far from Peirce on
meaning.
The key seems to be in how they interpret something to be ‘in
principle’ or ‘conceivably’ checkable. Suárez has recently interpreted
‘conceivability’ in Peirce thus:
The concept of the object is only exhausted by its full set of
conceivable effects. In other words, the pragmatist maxim
applies to all objects, whether actual, possible, or merely
imaginary. And it defines any such object in terms of all
its effects, whether actual, possible or merely imaginary
(Suárez, 2013, pp. 13-14).
Suárez, like Vailati and Calderoni, quotes Peirce’s How to make our
ideas clear. But Vailati and Calderoni, I would argue, have a better
handle on it: contra Suárez, I think the emphasis is on conceivably
practical, and not on conceivable in itself, understood as something
like “anything we can conceive of”. To support this, I will now quote
some of the relevant passages by Peirce at some length:
[W]e come down to what is tangible and conceivably prac-
tical, as the root of every real distinction of thought, no
matter how subtile it may be; and there is no distinction
of meaning so fine as to consist in anything but a possible
difference of practice. (Peirce, 1878, pp. 293) I only desire
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to point out how impossible it is that we should have an
idea in our minds which relates to anything but conceived
sensible effects of things. Our idea of anything is our idea
of its sensible effects; and if we fancy that we have any
other we deceive ourselves, and mistake a mere sensation
accompanying the thought for a part of the thought itself.
[. . . ] Consider what effect, which might conceivably have
practical bearings, we conceive the object of our concep-
tion to have. Then our conception of these effects is the
whole of our conception of the object [. . . ] (Peirce, 1878,
pp. 294, )
For example, when Peirce says that it is impossible to “have an
idea [. . . ] which relates to anything but conceived sensible effects of
things”, I take him to mean, given the context of the paper, that there
must be some sensible effects that we imagine, or picture, or predict
(or, indeed, conceive) when we entertain an idea. I think it is better,
then, to interpret the ‘conceivably’ in Peirce as doing the same job as
the expression ‘conceptually possible’ adopted by de Finetti. I think
it is justified to take the two authors as meaning roughly the same
thing when they talk about experiments that are at least conceptually
possible, and consequences that are conceivably practical.
If I am right, then, Peirce, Vailati and Calderoni and de Finetti
were roughly in agreement on what is conceivably checkable. So where
do they diverge? Peirce (1910/1978, p. 242) makes it clear that a
definition of probability based on an infinite run of trials is conceivably
practical, because its becoming actualised is a logical possibility.6 At
the same time, Peirce, in this paper, shows no sign of having given up
on the theory of meaning which inspired the Italian pragmatists: he
goes on to say, “I really know no other way of defining a habit other
than by describing the kind of behaviour in which the habit becomes
actualised” (Peirce, 1910/1978, p. 243). It just so happens that the
‘would-be’, or ‘habit’ of a coin is actualised in an infinite sequence of
events, which can nonetheless happen in a finite time.
6For example, imagine a sequence of coin tosses where the first coin toss occurs
at time 0, the second one 30 seconds later, the third 15 seconds after the second, and
so on, each interval lasting half of the one preceding it. Then the infinite number of
coin tosses would take 1 minute to be performed (see (Peirce, 1910/1978, p. 242)).
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This idea of conceivability as logical possibility is not operational.
We cannot measure probability with a procedure requiring an infinite
number of steps. The emphasis on measurement is a novel aspect
here, attributable to de Finetti, and it seems to originate from, or
be in agreement with, Vailati and Calderoni, Einstein and Bridgman.
The break between Peirce and de Finetti, it appears, might be pre-
cisely at this point. A possible problem with this reading, however, is
that de Finetti’s mathematical theory of probability makes use of real
numbers. If a degree of belief is represented by an irrational number,
it might take an infinite number of steps to measure it. But the an-
swer to this shows the crucial difference between de Finetti and Peirce,
and supports the points made above in part 2.4. Peirce tries to make
mathematical probability a conceivably checkable concept, but in order
to do so he has to weaken conceivability to mean ‘logical possibility’.
De Finetti does not attempt this. For him, the mathematical theory
is distinct from, and an abstraction of, the practical, pre-theoretical,
idea of probability, or rather, the uncertainty held by individuals. It
is this latter concept that must be conceivably checkable, and thus
meaningful, and we then model it in mathematics.
I think the key to understanding de Finetti’s weak version of oper-
ationalism lies in a proper exploration of his pragmatism. I now return
to the position defended by Eriksson & Hájek (2007), whose charac-
terisation of de Finetti’s operationalism inspired this discussion. My
conclusions will follow.
2.6 Probability as a primitive concept
Eriksson & Hájek (2007) study the available analyses of the concept
‘degree of belief’ and find them all lacking; they decide that ‘degree of
belief’ is a conceptual primitive, one of the unanalysed “basic building
blocks in our thinking” (Eriksson & Hájek, 2007, p. 205). They call
this position primitivism about degrees of belief. They offer some posi-
tive reasons for ‘degree of belief’ being primitive: it is “well understood
[,. . . ] natural [. . . ]”, and, given its role in Bayesian epistemology, forms
the basis of a successful and progressive research programme. In par-
ticular, bets may sometimes give an indication of underlying degrees of
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belief, but not always (Eriksson & Hájek, 2007, p. 205-211). Parts of
this sound so close to de Finetti’s position, as outlined in my discussion
above, that it is tempting to read it as a contemporary version of the
same idea—a de Finettian position based on readings more palatable
to the 21st-century philosopher. But I think de Finetti’s project is dif-
ferent. Eriksson & Hájek (2007, p. 205) write that there are conceptual
primitives, studied by philosophy, and there are ontological primitives,
studied by science. To argue their point, they use a running parallel
with the concept of charge: charge is an unanalysed primitive concept
in physics, but the science works perfectly well regardless; surely, they
argue, we can do the same with conceptual primitives in philosophy.
De Finetti, as is clear from his references to Einstein, also looked to
the successful sciences for inspiration on how to treat concepts and
meaning. But the sciences were more than just the source of a use-
ful, independent example to be used for proving a point. On this, he
writes:
All concepts, mathematical ones included, are more or less
directly and clearly suggested by intuition: however, their
definition is totally arbitrary, as long as the consequences
that we wish to draw from them are purely formal: as long
as, that is, they are propositions in which a concept acts
in the way implied by its definition. This is the case for
[mathematical] measure; we would have a different case, on
the other hand, for weight, because we cannot impose to
the scale to work according to our definition; in the same
way, it seems to me, probability too is a different case.
(de Finetti, 1930, pp. 4-5, my translation)
De Finetti here is arguing against the study of probability as part of
the branch of mathematics called measure theory.7 Just like weight, he
writes, probability has real-world (if not mind-independent) features,
which its formal definition must respect. De Finetti would most likely
have agreed with Eriksson and Hájek’s view (2007, p. 210) that we have
antecedent knowledge of the concept ‘degree of belief’, independently
7This turned out to be a losing battle: since the formalisation of probabil-
ity theory in Kolmogorov (1933/1956), mathematical probability has largely been
studied as a measure.
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of its possible measurements. But just as the ontological primitive
‘charge’ must be characterised in such a way that it makes sense of,
and creates a coherent framework in which to understand, real-world
experiments, so must the concept ‘probability’ (which, remember, for
de Finetti is just ‘degree of belief’) reflect the features of the pre-
existing, intuitive notion of probability. Eriksson and Hájek are happy
to use ‘degree of belief’ as a philosophical instrument to organise our
thinking; de Finetti worries that this would be arbitrary, a definition
of something, but not of probability as we already know it: he wants
to capture ‘the real thing’. De Finetti, of course, did not think in the
terms and within the conceptual framework adopted by Eriksson and
Hájek; he thought in terms of conventional definitions and effective
definitions. Formal, mathematical concepts can be defined in the first
way, but for a concept to be meaningful it needs to have conceivably
practical consequences: it needs an effective, or operational, definition.
But if we wanted to slot de Finetti’s probability into Eriksson and
Hájek schema, for an idea of where his thinking might be placed today,
I think we would say that he took ‘degree of belief’ as an ontological
primitive. This is also suggested by the passages I discussed in Section
2.4, where he finds that the method of the physicist of going from facts
and meaning to a translation into mathematics is the one he favours
in probability too.
While Eriksson & Hájek (2007, p. 207) were not aiming to give a
historically accurate depiction of de Finetti, a rebuttal of their por-
trayal is useful because it allows me to complete the picture of de
Finetti’s operationalism and pragmatism I have been building. Not
only is he not an ‘actual operationalist’, as they claim, but it is also
quite helpful to think of how de Finetti fits into their framework: he
could be said to be a primitivist about degrees of belief as well, only he
thinks they are not a mere convention, or conceptual primitive. Rather,
they already have a psychological reality, and we should model them
in a way which reflects this, via suitable operational definitions.
Before summing up my arguments, a short remark8 on the sort of
primitivism about degrees of belief I have in mind is appropriate, to
avoid potential confusion with a position of Jeffrey (1984, 1992 and
8This was suggested to me by Alberto Mura.
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elsewhere) which he calls radical probabilism. Jeffrey (1992, p. 203)
thinks that “probabilities needn’t be based on certainties (e.g. via
conditioning): it can be probabilities all the way down, to the roots”.
Probability is primitive here in the sense that it is not a prevision of an
all-or-nothing truth value and so does not depend on another concept
(truth) to gain validity. De Finetti may or may not have been a radical
probabilist in this sense. His earlier Probabilism (1931/1989) seems
closer to this position, while by the time he was writing de Finetti
(1974/1990) he seemed to have been more distant from it. In the
passages above, primitivism was used to indicate that degrees of belief
are a basic concept, existing, in the shape of the opinions of people,
independently of the context of their measurement. It seems to me
that this can be kept distinct from the sort of “primitivism” of Jeffrey
just sketched. That is, degrees of belief can be understood as a basic
psychological reality whether they are previsions of truth values or
whether it is, in fact, ‘probabilities all the way down’. Therefore, the
above is independent of the question, which I do not address here, of
whether de Finetti should be characterised, for a part or the entirety
of his career, as a radical probabilist.
2.7 Summary and conclusion
In this chapter I have argued that characterising de Finetti as a strict
operationalist, as is often done, is not correct. Even though he seems,
at times, to claim this label for himself, in the rest of his writing
he emerges at best as a weak operationalist, or or rather as some-
one who takes the pragmatist verification theory of meaning seriously.
Nonetheless, his brand of pragmatism is quite idiosyncratic. I have
argued that some of his main ideas, while inspired by Peirce, diverge
in subtle but important ways from the American pragmatist. This
might be in part thanks to the version of pragmatist philosophy by
Vailati and Calderoni. They, together with Bridgman and Einstein,
were some of the main influences on de Finetti’s own version of prag-
matism. By contrasting this to other positions, either similar (Peirce)
or critical (Eriksson and Hájek), a good picture emerges. De Finetti
considers probability a primitive concept, which has real-world, if not
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mind-independent, existence. This concept must be meaningful, that
is, it must have conceivably practical consequences (when employed,
say, in simple, well-formed sentences). Speaking about it in terms of
operational definitions ensures this to be the case. Degrees of belief,
potentially held by human agents, emerge for de Finetti as the only
meaningful interpretation of probability. This concept is meaningful;
mathematical probability is distinct and must be a model of this, so,






In the previous chapter, my approach to de Finetti’s pragmatism is
based on the feeling that his work, and his operationalism in partic-
ular, has been misrepresented in contemporary debates, and that a
proper analysis of these aspects could hopefully enhance and render
more productive the discussion of his theory. In this chapter, my focus
will be on another controversial aspect of de Finetti’s theory: its objec-
tivity, or the perceived lack of it. De Finetti says that degrees of belief
are subjective, that they should be coherent (i.e. respect the rules of
probability)—and that’s it. This matter has been much debated and
is the main motivation for the current chapter. The problem can be
summarised thus: why should coherence be the only requirement for
degrees of belief? Many prominent authors believe that if subjective
Bayesianism is a theory of rationality—and it does seem to be mo-
tivated by a rationality norm—there is something lacking in it. Jon
Williamson is one of the authors who shares this widespread, perhaps
dominant view in the current literature. To build his theory of ob-
jective Bayesianism, Williamson starts from de Finetti’s subjectivism,
finds it lacking, and goes on to add further constraints for rational
degrees of belief (see for example (Williamson, 2007, pp.2-5)). Here is




the various Bayesian interpretations chiefly disagree with
respect to Objectivity. According to the strictly subjective
interpretation [which is de Finetti’s, my note], probability
is largely a matter of personal choice [. . . ]. Thus, you are
perfectly rational if you strongly believe that the moon is
made of blue cheese, provided you strongly disbelieve that
it is not the case that the moon is made of blue cheese.
This laxity is often considered to be a stumbling point for
the strictly subjective interpretation (Williamson, 2010a,
p. 16).
In this chapter I flesh out de Finetti’s position and defend it against
readings such as the above. I argue that a number of influential and
widespread critical readings of de Finetti’s subjective Bayesianism are
mistaken. What this points to, then, is a new defence of some as-
pects of subjective Bayesianism. My main aim is to construct a better
picture of where a de Finetti-style subjective Bayesianism should be
located in contemporary debates, and my strategy, as in Chapter 2,
will partly consist in backing up this picture with historically informed
arguments. As in the previous chapter, the text by Vailati & Calderoni
(1909/2010) will be helpful in constructing or completing a background
philosophical picture for my interpretation of de Finetti.
De Finetti’s position is often considered the most radical in a spec-
trum of Bayesian positions that go from ‘radically subjective’ or ‘ortho-
dox’ Bayesianism to objective Bayesianism. I elaborate on this below
in Section 3.2, and I answer some points of criticism from the objec-
tive Bayesian camp. Clearly, intermediate positions do exist, and it
might seem disingenuous to pit the two positions at the opposite ends
of the spectrum against one another whilst ignoring the rest: after
all, a good solution to some of the problems raised in this discussion
could of course be to adopt a position somewhere in the middle of
the subjective-objective spectrum. However, the reason for embarking
on a defence of this sort is two-fold: firstly, I want to show that de
Finetti’s position does not really belong on the subjective-objective
spectrum at all, since his is not a project in formal epistemology like
the others it is often compared to. Secondly, by showing that a major
class of criticism of de Finetti’s position is misplaced, the argument
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here goes some way towards showing that a de Finetti-style subjective
Bayesianism is a tenable and reasonable position. This is indepen-
dent of other variants of subjective Bayesianism existing in the formal
epistemology literature. Readers sceptical of de Finetti’s position in
general might still not be convinced, but I hope they too might ap-
preciate a discussion in which all positions are properly motivated.
Indeed, their criticisms of the position may cut deeper when aimed at
a better-defined target.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: in Section 3.2 I
sketch, and suggest an answer to, a major line of criticism that has been
levelled at de Finetti. I give some support for my answer in Section
3.3, where I give an outline of de Finetti’s subjective Bayesianism, as
I think it should be understood. I back up this position in Sections
3.4, 3.5, 3.6. In Section 3.7 I try to give a proper picture of how
objectivity is used in subjective versus objective Bayesianism, not so
much to make the disagreement go away, but rather to try and draw a
clear conceptual map of the positions. My conclusions are in Section
3.8.
3.2 Degrees of belief and subjectivism
Weisberg, in a review article on the Varieties of Bayesianism writes
(2011, p. 3) that “a Bayesian theory is any theory of non-deductive rea-
soning that uses the mathematical theory of probability to formulate
its rules.” Weisberg is careful to distinguish what he calls the ‘degree
of belief interpretation’, which states only that probabilities are de-
grees of belief, from the ‘subjectivist’ interpretation, which says that
only the basic three probability axioms should appear in our Bayesian
theory. Remember that the basic axioms regulating a probability func-
tion P for events A,B,E are the following: (1) P (A) ∈ [0, 1] ⊂ R, (2)
P (E) = 1 if E is the certain event, (3) P (A ∪ B) = P (A) + P (B) if
A,B are mutually exclusive. These three rules alone allow for a wide
range of degrees of belief as admissible in a given situation: hence if
we accept no further rules we are ‘subjectivists’, and hence the ac-
cusation of advocating an ‘anything goes’ epistemology. Williamson’s
reading, quoted above, is far from being idiosyncratic: it is in fact a
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very common one, perhaps the one which dominates current debates.
Hájek (2012) thinks that de Finetti’s theory allows for “crazy” belief
states, as it only accepts the basic axioms of probability as formal rules.
On the subjectivist position, Weisberg (2008, 22) writes the following:
suppose an agent has a high degree of belief in a coin landing heads,
and the only reason he can give for this is that he has a low degree of
belief in it landing tails. Even if the agent’s doxastic state were coher-
ent (and thus would pass the subjectivist’s requirements) this kind of
motivation would not “raise our estimation of his rationality” (2008,
22). This, he finds, makes subjective Bayesianism problematic. He
thus suggests we ‘fill out’ our Bayesian theory with more formal rules.
Although Weisberg does not mention him in his section on subjec-
tivism, de Finetti fits his definition and, as Weisberg’s critique is the
most detailed one, I shall address myself to that. Firstly, it seems clear
to me that the following issues can be kept separate: on the one hand,
the issue of which rules are essential to a “theory of non-deductive rea-
soning that uses the mathematical theory of probability” and whether
a belief state is consistent with these rules; on the other, the issue of
which degrees of belief an agent should have, and whether an agent can
give good reasons for assigning the degrees of belief that she does. The
first set of questions are fundamental for any project in non-deductive
reasoning, while the second do not seem to be: they delve into the
content of an agent’s credences and their eventual justification. These
kinds of requirements suggest that what Weisberg has in mind is a
conception of Bayesian theory that goes well beyond merely a class of
formal reasoning theories which use probability as its basis, morphing
into something like a broad theory of rationality. While de Finetti’s
theory falls under the first label (a formal theory of reasoning), it
definitely does not fall under the second.
Secondly, subscribing to a de Finetti-style subjective Bayesianism
does not necessarily mean thinking that coherence is sufficient for ra-
tionality, but only that it is a necessary component. Therefore, while
it is true that we would doubt the rationality of someone who can give
no good reason for their believing something, to use this as a criticism
of subjective Bayesianism is misplaced. Weisberg, moreover, writes
that since a subjectivist is unable to give such good “epistemological
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reason for their conviction” (Weisberg 2008, 22), we should add formal
rules to our theory. But this suggests that we either have a formal rule,
or we have no epistemological reason to have a given degree of belief.
This seems to me a false dichotomy. Not only might we have perfectly
good knowledge which affects degrees of belief but is not in the form of
a general formal rule; but it also, in fact, might be extremely difficult
to translate into a formal rule all the information and knowledge that
goes into forming a degree of belief. I return to this below in Section
3.6.
All told, I think de Finetti is not attempting a theory of rationality,
does not say that a coherent doxastic state is automatically rational
and would also reject the notion that the road to more rationality
necessarily involves adding more rules. I defend this below in Section
3.3. What is de Finetti doing then? I think his overarching philo-
sophical project is as I depict it in Chapter 2: an attempt to place
the mathematical theory of probability on what he thought was sound
philosophical ground: that is, a theory which revolves around a mean-
ingful concept of probability. De Finetti wishes to study probability as
a content-less (non-deductive) logic; considerations of what an agent
should believe and why are simply outside his intended scope. I shall
now discuss this.
3.3 De Finetti’s subjective Bayesianism
I argue in Chapter 2 that de Finetti saw mathematical probability as a
formal model of the pre-theoretical concept of probability. This funda-
mental distinction has a few important consequences. Mathematical
probability itself is seen as a content-less logic, an analogue and an
expansion of classical deductive logic (de Finetti, 1974/1990, p. 8).
However, this is not an arbitrary formal language, but one that must
respect, in its fundamental axioms, the features of the target it is
modelling: the pre-theoretical idea of probability, as quantified by the
operational definitions. Unlike the other authors he is often compared
to today, he was not interested in constructing a theory of rational-
ity. In his own words, as quoted by Galavotti in her introduction to
de Finetti (2008, pp. xviii-xix): “The subjective theory [. . . ] does not
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contend that the opinions about probability are uniquely determined
and justifiable. Probability does not correspond to a self-proclaimed
‘rational’ belief but to the effective personal belief of anyone.” The
concept of probability must conceivably be the degree of belief an
agent has in order to make sense, but that is as far as it goes. As
mentioned above, de Finetti understands the probability calculus as
an analogue of classical deductive logic: a deductive argument can
be valid whilst having conclusions which clash with the actual state
of the world (imagine a valid argument whose conclusion is that the
moon is made of blue cheese), but this is no criticism of the endeav-
our of first-order logic. De Finetti wishes to avail himself of the same
defence and, prima facie, it seems to withstand the criticism of Weis-
berg, Hájek and Williamson. A few interconnected factors, however,
threaten this defence of de Finetti’s. I think his theory can survive, al-
though not entirely unscathed. The first issue, which I discuss here in
two parts, is that de Finetti attempts to give probability a philosoph-
ically acceptable definition starting from a principle which looks a lot
like a specific rationality norm. De Finetti’s critics could well ask why
this norm was chosen and why stop at this one alone, if it’s rationality
norms that we’re dealing with. The second is the normative status of
the theory. The third is the relativistic position that de Finetti has
expressed in some of his writings, which naturally lend themselves to
an ‘anything goes’ reading. I address these issues in this order.
3.4 Rational degrees of belief: why stop at
coherence?
A version of the rationality norm that is apparently the driving force
behind de Finetti’s subjective Bayesianism is that we should not have
credences that allow us to make a certain loss in a system of bets: this,
remember, is the requirement of coherence. But why choose coherence
in particular and base our whole theory around it? There are many
other, stronger rules that can be added to reduce the number of belief
states considered acceptable by the theory. Williamson adds Calibra-
tion, the principle that we should set our degree of belief according
to relevant frequencies if known, and Equivocation, the principle that
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out of these calibrated degrees of belief we should pick the one hav-
ing maximum Shannon entropy, here taken as a reverse measure of
informativeness (so that the degree of belief that maximises entropy
is the one that ‘adds the least information’ to what emerges from the
available data). These, in cases with a finite event space, combine to
ensure that there is only one distribution of degrees of belief that is
acceptable. Another possible addition is regularity, the principle that,
unless a proposition is a tautology or a contradiction, degrees of belief
about it should always be in (0, 1), and so not at the extremes.
De Finetti was opposed to rigid rules that are supposed to result
in only one rational belief attitude. (His criticism was mostly directed
at frequentist statistics, so not exactly the angle I discuss here.) For
example, he writes that while in many cases it makes sense to adopt a
uniform distribution over a set of incompatible and similar events, this
should not be elevated to a rigid rule; the evaluation that a given case
requires a uniform distribution is always a subjective one (de Finetti
(1974/1990, p. 199); see also Berkovitz (2018) on this). But being op-
posed to something is not enough in itself; what underpins de Finetti’s
opposition is his assertion that he thought that no further restrictions
were demanded by the Dutch Book theorem. He writes (de Finetti,
1974/1990, p. 258), as I quote above, that the axioms of probability
will be nothing more, and nothing less than what is required from the
analysis of the betting scenario. There is no Dutch Book for Calibra-
tion, Equivocation or regularity, and so they should not form part of
the basic rules. There are two important challenges to this argument,
which I address here.
Regularity and indirect bets
The first is made by Mura (1995), who finds that it is not entirely
correct to assert that regularity is not demanded by the Dutch Book
theorem. Suppose a bet1 on event E has stake 1, and we accept to
pay 1 to participate in this bet, reflecting our degree of belief 1 in the
occurrence of E. Then, we can either lose 1 if E does not occur or gain
1 if it does occur—but this, considering what we spent to participate
in the bet, is a gain of 0. Mura (1995, pp. 48-49) thinks that it is
1For a more exhaustive discussion of bets see Chapter 4.
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consistent with de Finetti’s thought to postulate that a belief state
that brings us into a situation in which we can only lose or gain 0 is
defective. He proposes to substitute the classical bets in de Finetti
and Ramsey by what he calls indirect bets2, thanks to which he is able
to define a sense of credal inconsistency which works both for all-or-
nothing beliefs and for degrees of belief; this, in turn, can give a sense
in which probability theory is an extension of classical propositional
logic, which, as I explain above, was a tenet of de Finetti’s view. Given
this framework, Mura (1995, pp.49-50) shows that no violation of rules
additional to the basic axioms of probability can bring about credal
inconsistency. This is an improved justification for stopping at the
basic rules of probability and adding no further rules: your credences
are inconsistent if you violate finite additivity, say, but not if you
violate regularity or any other rule which is not deducible from the
basic axioms.
Calibration, equivocation and accuracy
The second challenge appears in Williamson’s (2010b) review of de
Finetti’s (2008). Note that Mura argues that de Finetti cannot claim
that regularity is not demanded by Dutch Book arguments; William-
son’s calibration and equivocation, however, are definitely not demand-
ed by them. De Finetti’s position is thus immune, it appears, to crit-
icism from this angle. But Williamson (2010b) notes that de Finetti
abandoned Dutch Book arguments for probabilism, in favour of accuracy-
based ones. In doing this, according to Williamson (2010b, p. 132),
de Finetti “shoots himself in the foot”, because this sort of reason-
ing “leads more naturally to objective Bayesianism than to subjective
Bayesianism”. Bets will not bring about calibration and equivocation,
the argument goes, but accuracy will. He bases his reasoning on the
fact that since, in accuracy-based approaches we are “minimising ex-
pected loss with respect to a scoring rule [. . . ] minimising worst-case
expected loss is rather natural” (Williamson (2010b, pp. 132-133), my
2An indirect bet is a collection of bets on a composite event (say for example
A∪B), with the amount paid for the bets on the ‘sub-events’ (here A,B) adjusted
in such a way as to result in a constant gain or loss if the composite event occurs
or not (regardless of which specific combination of sub-events make this true, here
A occurring or B occurring).
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emphasis). To address this, we must make a brief detour into the kinds
of arguments used in accuracy-based formal epistemology, citing a few
examples.3
Let E be the event over which we want to elicit a degree of belief.
Let 1E be the indicator function of E, such that 1E = 1 if E happens,
1E = 0 (or equivalently 1Ē = 1, where Ē is the event complementary
to E) if E it does not happen. Although there are other options, in
these approaches the Brier score is often used to penalise an agent





((bel(E)− 1E)2 + (bel(Ē)− 1Ē)2)
so that, for example, if E happens and it was bel(E) = 1, the Brier
score will be its minimum, 0. If bel is incoherent, there exists a set
of credences which perform better whatever happens, regardless of
whether E or Ē turns out to be the case; they are closer to both
points. We say that bel is strictly dominated. The Brier scoring rule
is in a class of scoring rules called proper because their construction
makes it advantageous for an agent to declare her sincere degrees of
belief.
Now, as an example, let bel0 be such that bel0(E) = 0.1, bel0(Ē) =
0.6. This is incoherent, as bel0(E) + bel0(Ē) 6= 1. If E occurs, bel0 has
the Brier penalty
LE(bel0) = 0.585,
while if Ē occurs, the Brier penalty for bel0 is
LĒ(bel0) = 0.085.
What the sources in footnote 3.4 show, is that (1) there exist a
set of assignments of degrees of belief to E and Ē that have a lower
penalty both if E occurs and if Ē occurs; they are said to strictly
dominate bel0; and (2) that if an assignment is coherent, there exists no
other assignment (including other coherent assignments) that strictly
dominates it.
3See, among others, de Finetti (1974/1990), Joyce (1998), Pettigrew (2016) for
full treatments and proofs.
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As an example, let bel1 be such that bel1(E) = 0.25 and bel1(Ē) =
0.75. Then, the Brier penalties will be
LE(bel1) = 0.5625,
if E occurs and
LĒ(bel1) = 0.0625
if Ē occurs. This does better than bel0 in both cases.
The above is an example of why the Brier score makes it conve-
nient for an agent to declare coherent degrees of belief. This needed
to be established before treating expected loss, otherwise calculating
this latter quantity could involve multiplying Brier scores by numbers
which are not probabilities. Attempting to minimise these ‘incoher-
ent expectations’ would give, for example, the weird result that it is
best to choose belweird(E) = belweird(Ē) = 0, since this makes our
‘expected loss’ equal to 0.4 Williamson writes about (1) minimisation
of expected loss and (2) minimisation of worst case expected loss. The
former idea, (1), comes into play when, having shown that accuracy
forces us to declare probabilities, we want to check that it forces us
to declare ‘our’ probabilities, and not just any number. (This is a
big problem with betting definitions of degrees of belief, which I dis-
cuss next in Chapter 4.) This works as follows (I report the proof by
de Finetti (2008)): suppose our sincere degree of belief is given by the
coherent degree of belief function bels; but suppose we try and declare
a different number, say x ∈ [0, 1]. Now, it is simple to see that the
expected loss, if I declare bels, is
E(L(bels)) = bels(E)− bel2s(E).
If, on the other hand, I insincerely quote x and 1 − x as my degrees
belief in E and Ē respectively, the expected loss will be:
E(L(x)) = x2bels(E) + bels(E)− 2xbels(E) + x2 − x2bels(E).
Now observe that
E(L(bels))− E(L(x)) = (x− bels(E))2 ≥ 0. (3.1)
4I am grateful to Seamus Bradley for pointing this out.
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Any difference between bels(E) and x will only add to our expected
loss. This is the sense in which we explore the minimisation of ex-
pected loss: when we are wondering whether to respond sincerely to
the elicitation question or not.
What, then, is (2), the minimisation of worst-case expected loss
that Williamson refers to? One notices immediately that the termi-
nology is somewhat curious: if we calculate the expected loss, as above,
we include both the ‘best case’ (in which the events turn out closer to
our prevision) and the ‘worst case’ (the complementary event). But
to pick out the minimum worst-case expected loss, we need to have
two sets of probability functions to choose from, say M and N , and
calculate the expected loss for a belief function in N with respect
to a probability function in M . For example, let ch1, ch2 ∈ M and
bel3, bel4 ∈ N . The expected Brier loss of declaring bel3, calculated
according to ch1, is:
E(L(bel3, ch1)) = ch1(E)(bel3(E)− 1)2 + ch1(Ē)bel23(E). (3.2)
Looking at E(L(bel3, ch1)) and E(L(bel3, ch2)) on the one hand, and
E(L(bel4, ch1)) and E(L(bel4, ch2)) on the other, we are supposed to
choose, between bel3 and bel4, the degree of belief assignment whose
worse expected Brier score, with respect to ch1 and ch2, is lowest
(remember that a lower score is better). This is minimisation of
worst-case expected loss. A mathematical result (see Pettigrew (2016,
Chapter 13 and Appendix IV)), then, shows that the degree of be-
lief assignment, or credence function, that achieves this minimisa-
tion is the one, among the available ones in N , which is the most





= 1/2. This would follow the recommendation of
Williamson’s principle of equivocation.
Furthermore, which credence function is closest will, in general,
depend on what notion of distance we adopt; de Finetti adopts the
Brier score, but there are many others. If we choose the logarithmic
scoring rule Llog instead
5, we will have the following: the credence
function in N which is closest, by the lights of Llog to the most mid-
dling function, is also the one with maximal Shannon entropy, among




credence functions in N (Pettigrew (2016, pp. 176-177), Williamson
(2010b, pp. 133-134)).
Let us now go back to how this is supposed to be a problem for de
Finetti. There are two steps. Firstly, Williamson writes that since de
Finetti is minimising expected loss (1) with respect to the Brier scor-
ing rule (as in Equation 3.1), it is ‘natural’ that he would minimise
worst-case expected loss (2). Secondly, the logarithmic scoring rule is,
according to Williamson (2010b, p. 133) better supported and “more
typical as the default loss function”; the adoption of this, together
with the minimisation of expected loss, leads to choosing the credence
function which maximises Shannon entropy, which is the central tenet
of Williamson’s objective Bayesianism. Hence, de Finetti would in-
evitably be led into adopting objective Bayesianism because of his
adoption of an accuracy-based argument for probabilism.
I think both these moves can be resisted. I treat loss minimi-
sation first. Here we cannot rely on the simple distinction between
rules whose violation brings about strict domination and rules that
do not have this characteristic, because neither agent sincerity (which
results from minimising expected loss (1)) nor equivocation (which re-
sults from minimising worst-case expected loss (2)) are required by
coherence—but we would like to hold on to (1) but not be forced to
accept (2). (Rule (1) is not required by coherence because an agent
can be coherent and insincere: the insincere quotation of degrees of
belief is only worse off in expectation; it is not strictly dominated.)
Nonetheless, a distinction can still be made: (1) and (2) are qualita-
tively different and applied at different phases. (1) regards the elicita-
tion process; the effort is to show that we should declare our sincere
degree of belief, whatever it is, or else we add an unnecessary positive
number to our expected penalty. (2) is a principle that is meant to
help us choose which degree of belief to quote. It requires the introduc-
tion of a further class of probability functions.6 In Williamson (2010b,
p. 132), the set M (in my notation) contains “reasonable choice[s] of
belief function for the agent”. So we are supposed to choose a cre-
dence function which minimises worst-case expected loss with respect
6Pettigrew (2016, Chapter 13) calls these, which I called ch1, ch2 ∈M , chance
functions.
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to this class of credence functions. The passage to accepting rule (2)
can be resisted for two reasons: firstly, in de Finetti there is no talk
of the existence of a separate class of credence functions used in this
way; certainly neither its existence nor its use in this way are require-
ments of coherence. Secondly, de Finetti explicitly wants to avoid
rules which interfere with the content of our coherent credence func-
tion: requiring sincerity in the elicitation process does not do this;
requiring minimisation (2) does. So because adopting (2) requires an
additional theoretical framework which is not required by coherence
and it goes against the foundational ideas of his theory, de Finetti is
not forced to adopt it. Note that de Finetti (1974/1990, p. 188, foot-
note) briefly considers minimisation of worst-case expected loss and
dismisses it as absurd, as its application results in believing all events
in a given algebra, say E, Ē, F, F̄ , G, Ḡ, . . . , to degree 1/2, which is
globally incoherent. This is too quick—we should minimise worst-case
expected loss while imposing that the overall distribution is coherent.
But Williamson’s argument is too quick as well. We are allowed to
invoke (1) and not (2).
The second part of Williamson’s criticism was that the logarithmic
scoring rule is better supported than the Brier scoring rule. But while
the former might be well supported, however, there are good argu-
ments for the latter too. Williamson writes that the former is more
typical, but Pettigrew (2016) and Joyce (1998) are influential propo-
nents of accuracy-based probabilism and they offer extensive support
for the latter. It is clear that de Finetti is not forced to pass to loga-
rithmic scoring rules, and hence to objective Bayesianism. All in all,
then, de Finetti is not forced to adopt equivocation by his adoption of
the Brier scoring rule.
Note that Pettigrew (2016) has recently constructed an accuracy-
based theory of formal epistemology which vindicates not only prob-
abilism but also versions of calibration and equivocation. The first,
however, requires the introduction of objective chance functions (Pet-
tigrew, 2016, Chapters 8-10), which map each chancy event to its
objective chance. A follower of de Finetti would simply deny the ex-
istence of such functions and of objective chance. If we want to prove
that accuracy-based arguments for probabilism by necessity also justify
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calibration, we would first need to demonstrate that objective chances
of this kind exist, and that is an open problem. Resolving this vast
issue is far beyond the scope of this work; I shall limit myself to noting
that it is an arguably tenable position that (we can operate as if) these
objective chances do not exist, so a de Finettian position is not forced
to accommodate them. The justification of equivocation in Pettigrew
(2016, p. 162) is formally similar to Williamson’s; here it is once more
based on chances and on the desirability of the minimisation of worst-
case expected loss. This is fine as far as it goes (and is no criticism
of Pettigrew), but the adoption of these additional principles is not
mandatory.
Summing up the previous two sections, the question was: why does
de Finetti stop at the basic rules of probability and go no further?
The contention here is that the motivation he adopts for justifying
coherence might be powerful enough to justify a host of additional
rules as well, which would make the refusal to adopt these quite arbi-
trary. I think these are serious challenges. Interpreting the ‘why’ in
my question as a question of interpretation of de Finetti, I would say
that he wanted to build a theory which would be the equivalent of
propositional logic but for uncertain beliefs. The theory would need
to interfere as little as possible with the content of our beliefs, and only
represent formal rules to be adhered to. Regarding the more difficult
question of whether this is justified, Mura (1995) shows that from sim-
ple Dutch Book arguments it is possible, in fact, to justify regularity,
which is additional to, and not deducible from, the basic probability
axioms. If we want to avoid this, it seems that Mura’s indirect bets
would be a good way to do it. In any case, even if de Finetti bites the
bullet, keeps simple Dutch Book arguments and accepts regularity, he
is safe from the objections arising from the objective Bayesian camp. If
he goes for the accuracy-based argument for probabilism, on the other
hand, he has to contend with a different set of criticisms. Here too I
think de Finetti’s theory can survive. Quite simply, the arguments for
calibration and equivocation rely on additional formal structures and
principles which are not needed in a theory such as de Finetti’s. In
an attempted logic of the uncertain, de Finetti is entitled to favour
those rules whose violation brings about the possibility of strict domi-
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nation over others that don’t. The proof that the Brier score is proper
does not rely on coherence arguments; nonetheless, I argued that de
Finetti can make this argument without being forced to argue for the
minimisation of worst-case expected loss as well. Next, I consider the
normative character that coherence is supposed to have.
3.5 Normativity
Pettigrew (2016) carefully gives his reasons for adopting the principles
he does. His aim is to convince the reader of their normative character,
which is then inherited by his conclusions on rational reasoning. De
Finetti does no such thing in support of the Brier score, nor does he put
much effort into backing up coherence itself. One might well wonder
what basis the normative status of de Finetti’s theory actually rests
on—and the theory is definitely supposed to be a normative one, not
a descriptive one. He writes that the rule of coherence illustrates how
“one must” work with probabilities, but notes the following:
The ‘one must’ is to be understood as ‘one must if one
wishes to avoid these particular objective consequences’. It
is not to be taken as an obligation that someone means to
impose from the outside, nor as an assertion that our eval-
uations are automatically coherent. [. . . ] Given any sets of
events whatsoever, the conditions of coherence impose no
limits on the probabilities that an individual may assign,
except that they must not be in contradiction amongst
themselves (de Finetti, 1974/1990, p. 72-73)
The previously mentioned consequences of losing money in a sys-
tem of unfair bets, or of scoring provably less than one could have done
in a proper scoring rule scenario, are objective in the inter-subjective
sense: anyone is (or should be) able to see them, regardless of their
subjective credences. It is to be noted that de Finetti does not put
any effort into actually giving reasons why these consequences are bad ;
for his purposes, it is enough that they are recognisable by everyone,
and hence objective in this sense. We could even paraphrase the point
thus: losing money in an unfair system of bets may or may not be a
negative thing (although most people would recognise it to be such),
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but everyone can realise that this can happen if they have incoher-
ent credences. Hence, if you wish to avoid such consequences, your
credences should be coherent.
A problem with this ‘conditional offer’ could be that, while coher-
ence is widely thought to be a positive feature of sets of degrees of
belief, it looks as if this conditional approach could be generalised to
include whatever we want. So: if we value money losses, we should be
incoherent7; or more generally, whatever practical, objectively recog-
nisable goal we have, there can be an equivalent justification which
hinges on an argument identical to the one used by de Finetti. It
should be noted that while de Finetti thought that everyone should
be able to express in probability whatever beliefs they pleased, he did
think that people should be coherent. Now we are bringing this ‘free-
dom’ one conceptual level up and achieving a sort of methodological
anarchism that de Finetti did not favour. The question then becomes:
why should probability, and not some other method that achieves some
other practical goal, be the logic of science, as de Finetti (1930) claims?
This issue points to the discussions on pragmatic versus non-prag-
matic justifications of probabilism (see Joyce (1998)). A theory such
as Pettigrew’s (2016) or Joyce’s (1998) do not have the problem out-
lined above, because they explicitly state that accuracy, as measured
by a proper scoring rule, is closeness to truth—an idea de Finetti was
opposed to (de Finetti (1930), de Finetti (2008, p. 53)). So a scientist,
or someone who wants to get closer to the truth, should be coher-
ent because otherwise she is further from the truth than she could
be, whatever the truth turns out to be. The scoring rule here has
the role of a vehicle for the desired conclusion: given some reasonable
assumptions, the Brier score emerges as a good measure of distance
from truth, and minimising this expected distance is what, in turn,
brings about probabilism. But in de Finetti an agent should be co-
herent because she would otherwise suffer a higher penalty under the
Brier score than necessary, whatever the state of the world. Here I
am taking de Finetti’s use of scoring rules out of context, since their
role in his theory is definitional: the meaningful concept of probability
7Although, as Hájek (2005) points out, we should beware of Good Bookies,
who want to gift us money.
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is given, by definition, as the answer an agent would give if she were
subject to Brier score penalties. The worry, however, remains: it is
unclear why she should be coherent in general, given that she will not
suffer potential penalties on every decision she makes.
I think the intended answer to this question is that incoherence is
similar to logical inconsistency, so an incoherent evaluation, regard-
less of whether it will be punished by higher-than-needed penalties,
shows there is something wrong in how we organised our beliefs. This
is separate from seeking the truth, and in fact it gives a reason for
being coherent, whatever our goals happen to be—including doing sci-
entific research. The problem is that it is notoriously difficult to define
exactly in what sense probabilistic incoherence represents a form of in-
consistency. With bets, there is a sense of inconsistency if we value
exactly the same thing in two different ways. For example, assuming
linearity of utility in money (and all the rest, see Chapter 4), betting
on A ∪ B (with A,B incompatible) or simultaneously betting on A
and B separately has exactly the same effect, so accepting to bet at
different prices on these two cases shows an inconsistency in evalua-
tion. This idea was originally Ramsey’s (1926/1990). Howson (2008)
criticises its dependency on the linearity of utility in money, thanks
to which you get the principle for free (more on this in Chapter 4).
Joyce (1998, p. 586) writes that “it remains unclear why this should
be counted an epistemic defect given that the inconsistency in ques-
tion attaches to preferences or value judgements”, and answering this
problem actually motivates his whole non-pragmatic approach to jus-
tifying probabilism. Another approach is that of Mura (1995), who
defines cred-contradiction in terms of indirect bets.
But how do we characterise coherence as an analogue to consis-
tency in a bet-free, accuracy-based approach like the late-de Finettian
one? The problem is that neither Joyce nor Pettigrew, who takes up
a similar challenge and writes (2016, p. 9) that “Probabilism [. . . ] is
akin to the putative principle of rationality for full beliefs that re-
quires that an agents beliefs be logically consistent ”, provide a sense
in which coherence is similar to consistency. Being further from the
truth than necessary is an epistemic defect, but it does not imply in-
consistency (we can have a full all-or-nothing belief that the Moon is
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made of cheese and this can be part of a consistent set of similarly
outlandish ideas). At present, it is not as yet obvious to me what kind
of inconsistency inaccuracy represents, how to attach an idea of incon-
sistency to a subjective Bayesian accuracy-based approach, or how to
salvage its normativity in another way. I see a few possible solutions
which I list below, but am currently unsure as to their validity and
leave their exploration to future work (without ruling out, of course,
that there may be good existing solutions to this that have escaped
my attention.)
These possible solutions are as follows: (1) Perhaps this is not
such a big worry; probabilities will be by definition coherent thanks
to their operational definition, and they carry through this coherence
as an agent operates with them. Perhaps we eliminate the issue at
the initial step and do not to worry more about the problem of under-
standing the sense in which an incoherent reasoner is also inconsistent.
(2) While we define probability thanks to scoring rules to avoid the
problem of insincere bettors which I explore in Chapter 4, we could
keep the idea of consistency linked to bets, on a Ramsey-like or Mura-
like understanding. (3) We find a good link between inaccuracy and
incoherence; this would be my preferred solution. Perhaps an equiv-
alent of a Mura-like solution but with accuracy instead of bets. (4)
We attach our subjective Bayesian theory to a full-blown theory of
how to relate degrees of belief to all-or-nothing beliefs, such as that
of Leitgeb (2017), and borrow concepts of inconsistency from there.
We otherwise use a concept of probabilistic inconsistency which is not
necessarily dependent on accuracy. (5) We substitute “correctness” or
“empirical adequacy” for truth and we mimic the arguments by Petti-
grew and Joyce. This disregards the search for a consistency-concept,
but can give normativity to the approach.
I shall put these questions aside for now, and focus on another
popular line of criticism against de Finetti: that he allowed everything
and anything to pass as rational by the lights of his theory.
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3.6 Relativism and ‘anything goes’
In de Finetti’s 1931 declaration of philosophical intent (de Finetti,
1931/1989, pp. 179-180), he writes that we have no objective reasons
to call someone who believes that eclipses cause wars ‘superstitious’.
When we “distil from my opinions the objective part, i.e., the part that
is purely logical or purely empirical, I will have to recognize that I have
no reason to prefer my state of mind to that of a superstitious person
[. . . ] I can question nature so that it will give me data as elements of
my judgements, but the answer is not in the facts; it lies in my state
of mind”. The violently relativistic and exalted tone of the article (he
ends with an ode to Fascism) are hard to stomach; the article suffers
from having been translated into English for the first time in 1989,
thus entering contemporary Anglo-Saxon debate when already a relic.
That being said, I think that the central point holds good, and is
reinforced by his more mature writings. In a straightforward sense, I
read it as saying that raw data, or a given logical structure, cannot
tell us what is true and what is false. That is not the same as saying
anything goes.
Admittedly, ‘anything goes’ might well have been closer to de
Finetti’s position in 1931. I am not attempting to sanitise his work
from elements which might be harder to defend, nor claiming that he
was completely coherent throughout his career. It does indeed look
like de Finetti was more ‘radical’ in his younger years. Nonetheless, it
seems to me that the central idea (although it might emerge as such in
an ahistorical reading of the article) survived in his later writing, and
is clear and arguably a good point. It is the idea that we are not going
to find in brute facts, or in the logical rules themselves, a ready-made,
knock-down argument for why someone is wrong. Unfortunately, we
will have to persuade this person she is wrong by the usual argumen-
tative means; of course these can include an appeal to data, or can
be in the shape of a formal rule, but we should not deceive ourselves
into thinking that these instruments will, in and of themselves, objec-
tively determine the irrationality of a given belief state. Note that de
Finetti did not think that, since the formal requirement of coherence
has nothing to say on what an individual’s credences should be, that
nothing can be said on this at all (de Finetti, 1931/1989, pp. 191-192).
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In fact, in his (1974/1990), de Finetti dedicates a chapter (Chap-
ter 5) to the matter. He addresses (1974/1990, p. 179) the “extreme
dilemma that a mathematical treatment often poses: that of either
saying everything, or of saying nothing”. We could place objective
Bayesianism in the former class, a theory that ‘says everything’, or
gives formal rules that can select a single credal state as the only ra-
tional one to have; and de Finetti’s critics accuse his theory of ‘saying
nothing’, or of abstaining completely from recommending a particular
credal state. De Finetti claims that his theory explores a third way: he
proposes considerations that might help in coming up with a degree of
belief, but emphasises that it is ultimately an individual reasoner’s re-
sponsibility to decide which of these techniques to use and what degree
of belief to set on. He advises against “superficiality” in evaluation:
this includes thinking that since the judgement is subjective anything
goes, and, importantly, thinking that “no mental effort is required,
since it can be avoided by the mechanical application of some stan-
dardised procedure“ (de Finetti, 1974/1990, p. 179). The guidelines de
Finetti provides range from practical tips on how get used to putting
our uncertainty into numbers (1974/1990, p. 180), how to order one’s
thoughts and reason clearly (1974/1990, p. 183-185), the application
of uniform distributions (1974/1990, p. 199), and the prevision and
use of frequency data (1974/1990, p. 202).
All in all, this amounts to the position that considerations on ra-
tionality and the content of degrees of belief are, of course, hugely
important, but that they should be left outside the formal theory of
probability.8 This does not mean that formal rules cannot be used in
the process of evaluation of probabilities, but these are not considered
to be constitutive of the concept of probability itself, and the decision
of which rules to use (for example the determination that we really
have no evidence that speaks in favour of, say, heads or tails in a coin
toss) is ultimately free and subjective. There is likely much more to be
said about this, but it seems to me that de Finetti’s position is tenable:
the decision to keep some formal rules out of the main axiomatisation
of epistemic probability does not necessarily entail slipping into an
8For more on this, see (Howson & Urbach, 2006, pp. 265-266) and especially
Berkovitz (2018).
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anything-goes position. Or, to be more precise, according to the for-
mal theory itself, anything goes; this is because the theory is supposed
to be neutral with respect to the content of degrees of belief. But this
does not mean that if we adopt this type of theory anything goes from
the point of view of rationality; but we will have to use tools and ar-
guments external to the theory itself to determine which credal state
has better support than another. This is in line with the idea that
de Finetti’s version of subjective Bayesianism gives necessary, but not
sufficient, norms for for rationality.
Having thus outlined de Finetti’s position in a way that contrasts
contemporary readings of him, I think one last major point remains.
The main thing the critics of de Finetti share is a worry that his theory
is not objective enough: some beliefs are objectively crazy, but his
theory is not able to reject them. De Finetti himself actually thought
he was rescuing objectivity, so there must be some crossed wires in the
debate. I shall discuss this in the final part of this chapter.
3.7 Senses of objectivity
It is a curious fact that de Finetti, accused of being insufficiently ob-
jective, actually felt that his theory finally vindicated objectivity. The
concept occupies a particularly central role in Williamson’s objective
Bayesianism, and Williamson too is concerned about insufficient ob-
jectivity in de Finetti, so I will look at his work more closely in this
section. My aim in this final section is to try and clarify this debate:
the first diagnosis that comes to mind is that the different schools of
thought must be talking at cross purposes. I will use Douglas (2004)’s
work on the concept of objectivity, and locate the respective uses of
the concept by de Finetti, Vailati & Calderoni and Williamson in her
classification of the different senses of ‘objectivity’. Douglas argues
that each different sense of objectivity is not logically reducible to one
another; if we could show that Williamson and de Finetti are simply
referring to different senses of objectivity, we could hitch ourselves on
to Douglas’s argument to make a good case for the claim that the two
approaches are indeed talking at cross purposes. Unfortunately, and
rather surprisingly, I will argue that this is not the case: Williamson,
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de Finetti and the pragmatists all refer to one and the same sense of
objectivity in Douglas’s classification, and so this simple line of argu-
ment fails. However, the different approaches do make a different use
of this sense of objectivity, and so I still think they are talking at cross
purposes, albeit in a more subtle way. I hope that showing this can
bring the debate out of the confusion in which it is now mired and on
to a more productive level.
It is important to note that this does not mean that the two po-
sitions are more in agreement than what is commonly thought. The
opposite is true: the difference in their respective approaches to ob-
jectivity is crucial, and brings further support to my broader point,
sketched in Section 3.1. De Finetti’s theory does not belong to the
objective-subjective spectrum of theories of rationality in formal epis-
temology. This is a classification made often by contemporary writers,
and his theory is then criticised accordingly. But de Finetti was not
interested in a formal theory of rationality, so he does not belong there.
As I argue in Chapter 2, he wanted to give a mathematical theory of
probability in which the central concept is, according to his standards,
philosophically well understood, or, in a word, meaningful.
Douglas (2004) finds that the concept of ‘objectivity’ in philoso-
phy of science is invoked in ways which are so varied that there must
be a multiplicity of concepts that go under the same name. She sets
out to define these different uses in a way which is “operationally ac-
cessible” (Douglas, 2004, p. 453): given the term’s common use as
a persuasive argumentative tool, we should be able to settle what is
objective and what is not, and which sorts of calls to objectivity are
appropriate for which contexts. Douglas distinguishes three separate
kinds of objectivity: objectivity1 has to do with interactions with the
world; this is the way in which we hope that experimental data is
objective. Objectivity2 has to do with how we use values in our rea-
soning, independently of real-world data: it pertains to cases in which
we try to assess whether our reasoning, say an argumentation or an
assessment, is biased or objective. Objectivity3, finally, has to do with
“social processes involved in knowledge production” (Douglas, 2004,
p. 461). Each mode is divided and classified further, but objectivity3,
and a particular kind of objectivity that, according to Douglas, falls
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under it, will be the focus of my attention. I treat the concept of ob-
jectivity used by the pragmatists, de Finetti and Williamson in turn,
and argue that they both constitute cases of procedural objectivity3.
This is how Douglas defines it: “Social processes can be considered
“objective” if the same outcome is always produced, regardless of
who is performing the process.” (Douglas, 2004, p. 461). Procedu-
ral objectivity3, Douglas notes, is similar to what Daston & Galison
(1992) call mechanical objectivity, a term that characterises the desire
for mechanically produced scientific images which arose in the second
half of the 19th century. The idea is that an image is objective if
we can produce it mechanically, without the intervention of human
bias and interpretation; whoever repeats the procedure should obtain
the same result. Douglas highlights the importance of procedural ob-
jectivity in the administration of public life and in collective, societal
processes; in Daston & Galison (1992), mechanical objectivity is some-
thing which applies more narrowly to science. In de Finetti and the
pragmatist philosophers Vailati and Calderoni procedural objectivity
is applied to the concept of meaning in a general philosophical setting.9
Williamson, finally, uses the concept in a more specialised problem in
formal epistemology. The idea, however, is always the same: the de-
sire for a repeatable mechanical process which gives the same results
regardless of who runs it, so that the results of the process will be free
of personal whim.
Vailati and Calderoni, the pragmatist inspiration for de Finetti,
adopt procedural objectivity in the following sense: they write that
for a sentence to have meaning, it should be clear what procedures are
possible in order to verify whether the sentence is true or false. They
9Both sets of authors also mention, or go close to, other forms of objectivity. In
3.6 I argued that de Finetti considers unfair systems of bets (Dutch Books) an ob-
jective consequence in the sense that anyone can see it, regardless of their particular
opinion. This is Douglas’s concordant objectivity3 (Douglas, 2004, pp. 462-463).
Nonetheless, I think it is the above sense of procedural objectivity that drives de
Finetti’s general approach. Vailati & Calderoni, on their part, talk about the
predicted experiences that a sentence entails, which evokes Douglas’s objectivity1,
which has to do with the interactions with the world (Douglas, 2004, pp. 456-458).
Again, however, I note that the overall aim of the Italian pragmatists is to give
a procedure that will always give the same results if applied correctly: it is from
this freedom from personal whim that objectivity arises. The objective character
of the interactions with the world is given for granted; it is assumed that, upon




say this will ensure the sentence is objectively checkable, the judgement
of truth or falsity being thus “less dependent on individual impressions
and preferences” (Vailati & Calderoni, 1909/2010, p. 234). Along sim-
ilar lines, De Finetti writes: “statements have objective meaning if
one can say, on the basis of a well-determined observation (which
is at least conceptually possible), whether they are either TRUE or
FALSE” (de Finetti, 1974/1990, p. 6). Objectivity here is given by the
existence of a predictable, repeatable procedure that checks whether
the statement is true or false. Ideally, it is implied, we would assert
every meaningful statement together with the instructions on how to
check it. I think this is the best way to understand de Finetti’s oper-
ationalism, and the two operational definitions of probability that de
Finetti offers in his de Finetti (1974/1990) book are in this vein: prob-
ability is defined together with the somewhat idealised instructions on
how to measure it. For example: we might say Rupert has degree
of belief 0.9 that tomorrow it will rain. Then, granting the idealised
conditions in which this experiment would take place, anyone could
check that Rupert would behave, in a specific betting or scoring-rule
scenario, in a way which reflects the fact that his degree belief in rain
is 0.9. The objectivity invoked here is not in the sense of objectivity1.
The sentence is not, for de Finetti, objectively meaningful because we
could base other applications on it—unless we take the special case
of the ‘application’ in which we put Rupert in the specific betting or
scoring-rule scenario. Nor is it objective because different experimen-
tal methods converge to it as a result (the elicitation methods of bets
and scoring rules are equivalent, but in a purely mathematical sense
de Finetti (1974/1990). The sentence is objective because, “on the
basis of a well-determined observation”, anyone can check its truthful-
ness.
Now, procedural, or mechanical, objectivity3 is clearly what guides
Williamson’s account too. In objective Bayesianism, “[t]he agent’s de-
grees of belief are objectively determined by her background knowledge
and there is no room for subjective choice” (Williamson, 2007, p. 2). In
cases modelled by a finite sample space, the application of Williamson’s
formal rules of Probability, Calibration and Equivocation, does indeed
give a unique numerical degree of belief. (The first principle is what
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I have called coherence; details of the other two are unimportant for
the current work.)
I would argue that de Finetti and Williamson make use of the very
same concept of objectivity. This could be seen as a curious assertion
for philosophical positions which are declared opponents on precisely
this point—and I think it is correct to consider the positions are di-
verging on this. The upshot is that it is not possible to run a sim-
ple, Douglas-backed argument to show that subjective and objective
Bayesianism are talking at cross purposes with regards to objectiv-
ity. But the to approaches are, nonetheless, at cross purposes, just in
a different sense. The crucial difference lies in how the two currents
make use of procedural objectivity. For de Finetti it is the concept of
probability itself which must come with a procedure to check its prac-
tical consequences. This is intertwined with the criterion for meaning
studied in Chapter 2 and his requirement that probability be treated
in a similar way to scientific concepts, and he applies procedural ob-
jectivity, as he does the criterion, at the level of the sentence S = “the
probability of event E is a ”. De Finetti requires there to be a proce-
dure by which anyone can check whether this sentence is true or false,
or else it will be meaningless. And this procedure must be intelligible
and in principle doable by anybody, with the same results: hence the
objectivity. Williamson, on the other hand, thinks that the number a
should be objective; it should be determined in such a way that any
rational agent, given the same background information as the agent
who came up with it, would have the same degree of belief.
Using the same idea of objectivity in either of these different ways
does not exclude the other; but, clearly, neither do they need to be
used concomitantly. In a given situation there might be an ideal de-
gree of belief that could be worked out thanks to a given repeatable
procedure—but it may or may not be checkable whether an agent holds
such degree of belief. Maybe no agent has ever been in that specific
situation, or one has but absolutely refuses to take part in any bet-
ting or scoring rule game. Vice versa, and more simply, it might be
checkable, with one of de Finetti’s procedures, whether an agent holds
a given degree of belief. But this degree of belief may or may not have
been worked out by applying probability, calibration and equivocation.
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In conclusion, it is useless for a supporter of one position to use
objectivity as a stick to beat the other. Each position is objective
enough, in its own way of applying the term. The discussion, in the
terms in which it has happened, is at a dead end. Having cleared
that up, we can glimpse a more productive direction in which to go:
when is it good to have a procedure by which whoever views a given
set of information will come up with the same specific probabilities?
And, on the other hand, when would it be useful to have a procedure
to determine whether a probabilistic assertion has a practical conse-
quence? It might be possible to devise a full classification of different
“operationally accessible” objective probability concepts, in the style
of Douglas. I leave this exploration for future work.
3.8 Summary and conclusion
At the beginning of the chapter I promised a new defence of de Finetti’s
subjective Bayesianism. I have argued that de Finetti is not construct-
ing a theory of rationality at all, so a major line of criticism towards his
approach is misguided. He is trying, rather, to situate probability as
a type of content-less logic. This is part of his broader attempt, which
I treat in Chapter 2, to study probability in a way similar to how he
thought the basic phenomena of science should be studied. This results
in the focus on a checkable, meaningful concept, and is not concerned
with setting out general formal rules for rationality. The aims of sub-
jective and objective Bayesianism are so distinct that I do not think
they should be considered as slight variants within the same endeav-
our, despite the widespread acceptance of this viewpoint. Objectivity
is often given as the direction along which these positions differ, and
this often goes hand in hand with the idea that more formal rules
mean more objectivity. De Finetti disputes this, and I argue that the
heart of the disagreement lies in the different uses of objectivity that
these two positions make. Douglas’s procedural objectivity, I find, is
a good description of what kind of objectivity both positions invoke.
De Finetti, however, thinks there should be a procedure which tells
us if a probabilistic utterance is objectively checkable, while objective
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Bayesians think there should be a procedure to tell us which degree of
belief is objectively best.
Before this, I treated three other points in which there is a natural
clash between objective Bayesians and de Finetti. I argued that de
Finetti can safely adopt only the formal rules that he does (perhaps
with the addition of the rule of regularity), although arguing for this
is not trivial; I also argued that the accusation of his approach being
an anything-goes position are unfair, as there should be space for de-
ciding which rules are a constitutive part of the theory of probability
and which are not, without being accused of such laxness. On the
normative status of de Finetti’s, or any other, probabilistic rules for
reasoning I left more of an open question. If we justify probabilism
through accuracy arguments, it is currently not obvious for me how
to align this to logical inconsistency, or to another idea from which
normativity might be inherited. I leave this as a starting point for
future research.
My overall aim is to provide a better picture of subjective Bayesian-
ism in order to suggest new, productive directions for this branch of
the debate in Bayesian epistemology and philosophy of science. Some
of de Finetti’s positions and priorities are locked in debates from which
mainstream philosophy has largely moved on. These may be of inter-
est to historians, or may emerge as relevant in the future. But many
of his points, when properly understood, can fit quite seamlessly and
constructively into contemporary debate. De Finetti’s idea of proba-
bility as a logic is an area of active research (Howson (2008), Howson
(2009), Mura (2009), Sprenger (2018)), as is his tentative suggestion
on how to apply this to quantum mechanics (Berkovitz (2012)). His
idea that probability is a primitive concept can, as happens in Chap-
ter 2, enter in a productive debate with the position Eriksson & Hájek
(2007) call primitivism about degrees of belief.
His clear separation between the phenomenon of degrees of belief
and its mathematical model of probability can free both the mathe-
matical and the philosophical practices from some foundational wor-
ries. While the axioms should be as good a description as possible
of degrees of belief, we cannot expect a complex mathematical result
to be automatically true of degrees of belief, so mathematicians need
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not worry about their practice having veered off course and no longer
describing the ‘real thing’10. More saliently, we do not need to worry,
in philosophy, about Bayesianism being bad psychology. For example:
of course we do not really have real-valued degrees of belief; this is an
artefact of the model, not of the target (on this, see also the discussion
by Jeffrey (1984, pp. 82-84)).
10Admittedly, there might be little danger of this: Bingham (2010, p. 11) re-
ports this emblematic quote by Doob, a mathematician who did much seminal
work in probability: “I cannot give a mathematically satisfactory definition of
non-mathematical probability. For that matter, I cannot give a mathematically
satisfactory definition of a non-mathematical chair”
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Chapter 4
Betting odds and sincere
degrees of belief
4.1 Setting
Probability has a long history of close association with betting and
games of chance (see, for example, Hacking (1975/2006)), and in some
philosophical schools of thought betting is taken as a definition of
the concept. This chapter is about one such influential definition and
a problem it faces—a problem which I think is fatal. In Bruno de
Finetti’s 1974 Theory of Probability, degrees of belief are meant to be
measured by offering a special kind of bet to a person and observing
which odds she accepts. In this chapter I address a fundamental prob-
lem regarding this deep link between bets of this kind and degrees of
belief, namely, that the agent does not know whether she is betting for
or against the occurrence of the event in question. This is a powerful
distorting factor: supposing the agent has a degree of belief in mind,
I will argue that she has good reason not to use this as her declared
odds in the betting game. I will examine some possible responses to
this, but argue that these responses fail to rescue the betting definition
of degrees of belief. The problem I focus on in this work is theoreti-
cal and intrinsic to the definition itself, and so, it seems to me, more
fundamental than those emerging in the lively debate on the topic.
If my argument goes through, bets could still help the agent put her
thoughts into numbers, but they would lose their role as a definition or
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as a measurement device and become mere aides for an agent’s intu-
ition. The chapter is structured as follows: in Section 4.2 I introduce
the betting definition of degrees of belief; in Section 4.4 I show that,
within the usual Bayesian framework, the betting definition often picks
up a number which is different from the agent’s degree of belief; some
additional technical details related to this are to be found in the Ap-
pendix, Section 4.7; in Section 4.5 I argue that the assumptions made
to save the betting definition are either unconvincing or so powerful
that they render the definition itself redundant; I sum up and discuss
my arguments in Section 4.6.
4.2 The betting definition
Preliminaries
Let us set the stage with the following, preliminary definition of prob-
ability by de Finetti: “The probability a that You attribute to an
event E is [. . . ] the certain gain p which You judge equivalent to a
unit gain conditional on the occurrence of E” (de Finetti, 1974/1990,
p. 75, my notation)
This is a pointer as to what the debate will be about: the idea is
to look at how much an agent is willing to bid in a bet on the occur-
rence of an event, and to infer from that her degree of belief about
that event. This helps us to understand the following preliminary ob-
servations, after which I will discuss bets in more detail. Throughout
this chapter, I will take utility to be identical to money (as de Finetti
does). That is, the utility function U for the agent in question is such
that, for example, U(AC0.05) = 0.05 and U(AC100) = 100. This makes
the exposition simpler: I will always talk directly about money with
this understanding. It is unrealistic in general but it is a concession to
the betting definition, and an abstraction which is generally granted.
In fact, any utility function which is linear in money (and not 0 every-
where) gives the same results for the betting definition. The rebuttal
of the definition that I propose also depends on utility being linear in
money; if the utility function of the agent in question is not linear, in
general it will not be true that her betting prices will be identical to
her degrees of belief, so the whole betting approach and its rebuttal
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don’t get off the ground. A utility function which is identical to money
is also increasing in money; this is not needed for the two-sided bet-
ting definition, nor for its rebuttal, but in the latter case some small
adjustments need to be made. I say more about this in the Appendix.
Here are the notation and conventions I will use. The details and
the way they are used will become clear below. Event E is assumed to
be well-defined and verifiable; I will indicate the eventuality of E not
occurring by Ē. The stake S is a positive number which can be won
or lost by the player. I indicate the sums that an agent pays out by
a minus sign: for example, ‘winning’ −S means paying out that sum.
Here S = |s|, where s is the stake in de Finetti’s definition below. The
betting definition is a game with two players, which I call agent A and
bookie B. Other symbols will be defined as they are used.
One-sided bets
We now go back to bets. Here is an example of the definition above:
suppose you consider these two outcomes equivalent: receiving AC0.05
for sure, or receiving AC1 if it rains tomorrow. This would indicate a
low confidence in rain tomorrow, because you are ready to accept a
low sum of money and forego the chance to win a considerably larger
one. According to this initial definition by de Finetti, the probability
you attribute to rain tomorrow is P (rain) = 0.05.
One quickly realises that this, in practice, would not work very well.
Suppose we were asked what sum we consider equivalent to the gain of
AC1 conditional on an event E occurring; if this were an actual game,
in the knowledge that we would stand to receive this sum for sure,
we should definitely declare a number as high as possible. Even if we
thought that P (rain) = 0.05, we might want to say P (rain) = 0.9, or
more: nothing said so far would stop us from declaring that we consider
receiving, say, AC1000 for sure, equivalent to receiving AC1 conditional on
event E occurring. We would emerge AC1000 richer, and the subjective-
Bayesian experimenter none the wiser as to how strongly we believe
that E will occur. Note that this is not a bet, as usually understood.
We could modify the game a little and ask the following: what is the
maximum you would be willing to pay, in order to receive AC1 if event
E occurs? This is now similar to a normal bet. But now we have
65
4. Betting odds and sincere degrees of belief
the opposite problem: even if we thought that P (rain) = 0.05, we
might declare that AC0.01 (or even AC0) is the maximum we would pay,
because if we know we would win AC1 anyway if E occurs, we might as
well try and pay as little as possible for the bet.
Two-sided bets
The full betting definition of degrees of belief seeks to avoid distorting
factors of this kind by introducing the following device: we measure
degrees of belief in a special kind of bet in which the agent doesn’t
know if they are betting on event E happening, or against it. Note
that a bet against E is equivalent to a bet on Ē. Here is de Finetti’s
definition, again adapted to my notation and treatment: given a well-
defined, verifiable event E,
You are obliged to choose a value x, on the understanding
that, after making this choice, You are committed to ac-
cepting any bet whatsoever with gain s(1E − x), where s
is arbitrary (positive or negative) and at the choice of an
opponent. P (E), the prevision of E according to your opin-
ion, is by definition the value x which You would choose
for this purpose. (de Finetti, 1974/1990, p. 87)1
Here is some more assumptions made in the betting scenario: bookie
B offers to agent A a bet regarding event E and asks A to declare a bet-
ting price x that she finds acceptable. Once A has declared a betting
price x, bookie B decides the magnitude of the stake S and whether
the bet is going to be on E or on Ē. It is then checked whether E has
occurred, and A receives or pays out an amount determined by this
occurrence and by the direction of the bet. A models the occurrence
of the event and the direction of the bet as probabilistically indepen-
dent (it would hardly make sense to enter a game where an opponent
can decide, or have such an influence, that we lose money however we
play). Finally, A and B should have similar levels of information; if B
has privileged information on E, a loss of money for A whatever hap-
11E is the indicator of event E: 1E = 1 if E occurs and 1E = 0 if E does not
occur. The notation in this style is mine.
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pens cannot be interpreted as a fault in reasoning on her part. Below
in Table 4.1 we have the possible gains and losses for the agent A.
E Ē
Bet on E S − xS −xS
Bet on Ē xS − S xS
Table 4.1: Possible gains and losses for agent A
Most basically, this special two-sided bet ensures that A will de-
clare a number x ∈ [0, 1]. For suppose A tries x = 1000; then, the
bookie B could make it so that the bet is on E. That is because for
any x > 1, xS > S and so S − xS < 0; this means the bookie could
engineer a certain loss of money for A, and this in turn means that
to avoid this A must choose x ≤ 1. Analogous reasoning shows that
it must be x ≥ 0. This style of argument constitutes one direction of
the celebrated Dutch Book Theorem, according to which betting odds
must be probabilities. Further reasoning along the same lines shows
that betting prices must be additive. This needs the assumption that
A values the possible prize resulting from a composite bet on incom-
patible events E,F exactly the same as the sum of the prizes arising
from the bets on E and F taken individually. This assumption is called
rigidity by de Finetti, and it is so powerful that the argument becomes
(admittedly) circular: betting prices are additive because they are as-
sumed to be so (this becomes important in the discussion Section 5.6).
The betting definition, however, aims at doing much more than
producing betting odds which are probabilities. What it aspires to is
measuring the sincere degree of belief of the agent who plays the game:
“the operative part of the definition which enables us to measure it,
consists in this case of testing, through the decisions of an individual
(which are observable), his opinions (previsions, probabilities), which
are not directly observable.”(de Finetti, 1974/1990, p. 76) Not any
number will do: we are trying to get a handle on what this agent
actually believes.
67
4. Betting odds and sincere degrees of belief
4.3 Further assumptions, surroundings and the
argument
Further assumptions
All this means that many more assumptions are needed in order to
reasonably claim that the betting definition measures degrees of belief.
These assumptions are and have been the subject of lively debate,
which I will allude to here. The agent who plays this game must
have utility which is linear with money (see the Appendix 4.7), and
so they must not be risk-averse (de Finetti, 1974/1990, p. 78). The
independence of the states (in our case above, just E, Ē) from the
betting actions is also necessary: for example, placing a large bet on
whether I will sleep 8 hours tonight might well keep me awake, which
will in turn change my confidence in having an 8-hour sleep.2
Surroundings
Before going on to discuss this, I think it is worth raising a possible
worry concerning the whole venture. De Finetti had already aban-
doned the betting definition of degrees of belief at least by 1979 (see
the collected lectures in de Finetti (2008)). It might seem, therefore,
that I am resurrecting a failed project just to try and shoot it down
again. Fortunately, although the influence of de Finetti’s definition
might warrant this anyway, I don’t think this is the case: the dis-
cussion and adoption of de Finetti’s betting definition, or one in this
style, outlasted de Finetti’s own adoption. The literature on this topic
is vast, and I shall now give an indication (necessarily incomplete) of
the nature of some of these debates.
Williamson (2010a) and Jeffrey (2004), broadly speaking, take on
board de Finetti’s understanding of degrees of belief as betting prices,
although for Williamson the latter are only an interpretation of the
former (more on this in Chapter 5).
2And it might not be enough: Seidenfeld & Schervish (1990) show that cases
which, taken individually, respect state-independence, can be coordinated in such
a way as to make it impossible to know which of them measures the degrees of
belief of the individual who plays the games.
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Maher (1993, pp. 99-102), on the other hand, argues against the de
Finetti betting definition. He points out that if our degrees of belief
are incoherent, then we cannot choose betting prices identical to them,
since this can bring about sure loss. Therefore, betting prices chosen
in the two-sided bet are not necessarily identical to our degrees of
belief. Hedden (2013) arrives at a similar conclusion via a different
route which includes the following interesting observation. Let a and
a′ be the sincere degrees of belief in the occurrence of events E and
Ē respectively. Then, Hedden (2013, p. 486) notes, the betting price
x that makes the bets both on E and on Ē (in my notation) have
expectation 0 is xa+a′ . If, on the other hand, Ē is the event which
is the focus of the elicitation procedure, then we see that the betting
price x′ that makes the bets both on Ē and on E have expectation
0 is x
′
a+a′ , and so x + x
′ = 1. This means that x and x′ are the
normalised3 versions of our degrees of belief a, a′. Therefore, x and
x′ are not necessarily identical to our degrees of belief a, a′; they are
identical only if it is already the case that a+a′ = 1, that is, if they are
coherent. Hedden sees this as a failure of the elicitation device, as does
Maher in his own argument. In the current chapter, I get round the
problem by supposing that the agent is coherent, with degree of belief
a in event E occurring, and degree of belief 1− a in Ē. This concedes
more to the betting definition, and so strengthens my argument against
it.4
Another place where a de Finetti-style betting definition has re-
cently been an important player is in the debate over diachronic Dutch
Book arguments (see Briggs (2009), Mahtani (2014)), and, in a partic-
ular application of these arguments, in the the literature on the Sleep-
3Meaning they are modified in such a way that they, collectively, add up to 1.
4In actual fact, I think it is a virtue that a method forces us to change our
incoherent degrees of belief and make them coherent (even though here the step
is done from (possibly) incoherent degrees of belief only so far as coherent betting
prices). In my view, assuming that the incoherent degrees of belief represent our
credence state, the new coherent betting prices could still faithfully represent it,
but in a manner which is formally improved. That being coherent is better than
being incoherent can be supported by one’s favourite argument for probabilism: see
footnote 2.1. That being said, a strength of Maher and Hedden’s arguments is that
they show that this particular normalisation is done in a somewhat underhanded
way. Perhaps an agent would want to pick their own normalised degrees of belief,
or different normalisation techniques might be suited to different incoherent sets
of credences: I think this is a very interesting and under-researched area.
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ing Beauty problem (see Elga (2000), Hitchcock (2004)). Here, the
main focus of attention is not whether or not bets correctly measure
or define degrees of belief, although there is an underlying assumption
of a somewhat reliable relation between the two. It is not my inten-
tion to claim that the arguments put forward in this debate would
collapse if this relation were to be proven completely unreliable, but
since the papers were written, broadly speaking, within the tradition
of the betting definition of degrees of belief, the debates would be, I
think, affected. Interestingly for the current work, the contribution of
Bradley & Leitgeb (2006) has been to argue that the Sleeping Beauty
problem is in fact a case in which degrees of belief can come apart from
betting odds. I agree with this conclusion, and my arguments below
can lend it some support.
Finally, Eriksson & Rabinowicz (2013) argue that by offering bets
we end up measuring not the degree of belief in event E (say), but a
series of conditional beliefs related to the bet itself. Part of this is in
a similar spirit to what I will do below.
The argument
De Finetti’s reasons for abandoning the betting definition (in favour
of proper scoring rules) are along the same lines as the one I will ex-
plore here. To my knowledge, the argument has not previously been
developed fully in the way I do here, neither by de Finetti himself nor
others. The problem I discuss in this chapter regards a basic feature
of the betting definition: the uncertainty as to the direction of the bet.
This is not something we can “abstract away from”, as it is a central
part of the definition. I do not claim that it is possible to “abstract
away from” the other problems listed so far; but, whether or not the
criticisms sketched above settle the debate on betting definitions, I
think the problem I will discuss has the potential to do so. What has
been written on this specific problem so far, by Mura (1995), Walley
(1991), de Finetti (1974/1990) and de Finetti (2008) appears, in my
argument, as one of the two horns of a dilemma. Walley sees the issue
as a reason to move on from the two-sided bet as an elicitation pro-
cedure. Mura (1995, p. 23) writes that “there is no serious solution
to this difficulty” and proposes a new interpretation of betting argu-
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ments. Here I propose to add an important element to the picture and
get to the root of what is wrong with the betting definition of degrees
of belief. I argue that either the betting definition very often does not
work, or the kind of assumptions we need to make to rescue it are
either unconvincing or render the betting definition itself redundant.
My arguments here are a possible vindication of Mura’s statement.
The position I will defend is that there is no reason to think that a
Bayesian agent, especially the idealised one around which the theory
is constructed, would or should approach the two-sided bet in such a
way as to give her sincere degree of belief a as her betting price x. The
betting definition seems to be dealt with in two inconsistent ways. On
the one hand, it is seemingly designed to force a potentially dishonest
agent, who will declare any betting odds that maximise her gain, to
actually declare betting odds that are identical to her sincerely held
degree of belief. On the other hand, the agent in this game does not
seem to be playing to win the largest possible amount, but simply to
have an expected gain of 0. De Finetti, more or less explicitly, endorses
the latter interpretation. I will argue that both interpretations of the
two-sided bet are problematic. In the first one, if the agent is trying
to maximise her gains it is reasonable to conclude that the betting
odds she will accept will, in most cases, be different from her sincerely
held degree of belief. I will discuss this below in Section 4.4, with
more details in the Appendix to this chapter, Section 4.7. The second
interpretation, on the other hand, rescues the definition but has serious
shortcomings: it relies on assumptions which are either unconvincing,
or make the betting definition redundant. I discuss this in Section 4.5.
4.4 Anticipating the direction of the bet: why the
betting definition is often wrong
As has been pointed out by de Finetti (1974/1990, p. 93), de Finetti
(2008, p. 29), Walley (1991, pp. 624-625) and Mura (1995, pp. 22-23),
if we were playing this two-sided bet against an opponent, we might try
to guess their beliefs and adjust our declared betting odds accordingly,
in order to engineer a positive expected gain for us. Walley and Mura
describe the problem and accordingly abandon this elicitation method,
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while de Finetti (1974/1990) offers an unconvincing response to it,
which I return to in Section 4.5.
I shall now go through some of the ways in which a Bayesian agent
might reason when in the two-sided betting game. My intent is to
make the simplest assumptions possible, with generality of the results
in mind. The main assumptions I will make are that the agent reasons
probabilistically about the direction of the bet, and that she plays to
maximise her expected gain. If one accepts these assumptions, the
betting definition very often gets it wrong; but, as I will argue in
Section 4.5, not accepting them is just as problematic.
In most cases, I will assume the agent has a certain degree of ig-
norance of the bookie’s intentions. There is little agreement in the
literature on how to model ignorance, and the more involved a model
of the agent needs to be in order to vindicate the betting definition,
the less convincing this vindication will be. After all, this definition is
supposed to be a starting point for a general treatment of probability;
there should be no need, therefore, for advanced modelling assump-
tions for it to rendered valid. In any case, neither simple-minded nor
slightly more involved modelling assumptions are able to vindicate the
betting definition.5 It is important to note that none of these observa-
tions are knock-down: it is not normative that an agent should reason
in any of the ways which follow. Nonetheless, as I will defend in more
detail in Section 4.5, the agent will reason probabilistically in some
way or another about the problem, and the accumulation of negative
examples shows, at the very least, that the two-sided betting definition
often, or even in most cases, gets is wrong.
I will now progress from the very simplest to the slightly more
involved assumptions an agent could make. All the proofs are in the
Appendix. Here is how we can model the situation. Looking at Table
4.1, let x be the betting price A declares in the game, and suppose A
has a probabilistic degree of belief a about the occurrence of event E
5 A significant assumption I make throughout is that the bookie does not alter
his degree of belief after seeing what betting price the agent has chosen, perhaps
the agent changing her declared betting price with this in mind, and so on. It
is beyond the scope of this work to explore the full game-theoretic consequences
of dropping that assumption; I would conjecture, however, that the deeper into
the game we push our model-agents, the further we get from the original intent of
measuring degrees of belief about the event in question.
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(so A also believes Ē to degree 1−a). Now, clearly if the two-sided bet
forces agent A to declare x = a, then it works: it is designed exactly
to pick up this degree of belief; if it does not, it does not work well.
I will assume throughout this section and the Appendix that agent
A seeks to maximise her expected gain from the bet. The expectations
of gain from each direction of the bet for agent A are
EEA = S(a− x)
EĒA = S(x− a),
where, for example, EĒA indicates the expectation for agent A from
the bet on Ē. If A declares x = a, she can be assured that the
expectation, according to her degree of belief a, will be 0 in both
cases, whether the bookie decides that the bet is on E or on Ē. If
A chooses to declare an x such that x 6= a, the expectation will be
positive for one direction of the bet, and negative for the other. The
task, for the agent, is estimating in which direction the bet will be.
A degree of belief over the direction of the bet
As a starting point, we can suppose that agent A has a degree of belief
q in the bet being on E and degree of belief 1 − q on the bet being
on Ē. That the agent would be able to assign a numerical degree
of belief to this source of uncertainty is the assumption most in line
with de Finetti’s general stance (see Section 4.5). For now, we do not
introduce the figure of a bookie. We have the following:
Proposition 1. The expectation for A in the bet as a whole is: EA =
S(2q−1)(a−x). Hence, if q > 12 , the betting price that maximises A’s
expected gain is x = 0; if q < 12 , the betting price that maximises A’s
expected gain is x = 1; if q = 12 , A’s expected gain is EA = 0 whatever
betting price x she chooses.
Guessing the degree of belief of the bookie
Now suppose agent A does not have a degree of belief directly on the
direction of the bet, but that she tries to reason about the beliefs of
the bookie B, who she is playing against and who she assumes is also
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out to maximise his expected gain. The most obvious assumption is
that the bookie gains what the agent loses, and vice versa. Here, then,
is the table of possible gains and losses of the bookie (Table 4.2), given
these assumptions:
E Ē
Bet on E xS − S xS
Bet on Ē S − xS −xS
Table 4.2: Possible gains and losses for bookie B
Assuming bookie B has degree of belief b on the occurrence of event
E, we can compute his expected gain:
EEB = S(x− b).
EĒB = S(b− x).
Given the above, B will choose to bet on E if x > b, because in this
case the expected gain EEB for him will be positive, whereas EĒB will
be negative. Conversely, if x < b, the bookie will choose to bet on Ē.
If A (thinks she) knows the bookie’s degree of belief b, she can
maximise her expected gain as follows (de Finetti (1974/1990, p. 93),
Walley (1991, p. 625) and Mura (1995, pp. 22-23) make the same
observation):
Proposition 2. Any x such that a < x < b, or b < x < a, will give
A positive expected gain. If a = b, A should offer betting price x = a.
It is important to note that if A thinks that her and the bookie have
identical beliefs with regards to event E, then the betting definition
works (de Finetti, 2008, p. 29). If one is satisfied that this is always
the case, then, the problem is solved. It could work as follows: suppose
that (1) we think bookie and agent must have identical evidence on
E or the betting game wouldn’t make sense; (2) we think that ratio-
nal agents with identical evidence will have identical degrees of belief
(perhaps because we are a certain brand of objective Bayesians); (3)
we suppose that agent A knows that bookie B has identical evidence
to her; and (4) A knows that a = b (because of (3) or otherwise); then,
agent and bookie will have the same degree of belief, a = b, and A
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should quote her sincere degree of belief as her betting price. (1) and
(2) mean that A and B will have identical degrees of belief; and (3)
and (4), or just (4), means that A knows this.
It seems to me that doubts on each of (1) - (4) are legitimate, and
this warrants further critical exploration of the betting definition. (4)
in particular, namely that the agent would always know the degree
of belief of the bookie but not the other way round (or the whole
bet would be unnecessary) is puzzling. I think it is reasonable to
suppose that a bookie with similar information to us would end up
believing something similar, and I model this below. However, even
in this idealised scenario, the supposition that we know, as soon as
a bookie offers us a bet, that whatever degree of belief we have will
match exactly the one of the bookie, seems to me an exceedingly strong
one. De Finetti certainly disagrees with (2) (de Finetti, 2008, p. 23).
Nonetheless, I will not argue against each one here. For those who
do think (1)-(4) or (1), (2), (4) are always met, the betting definition
works—but perhaps the burden would be on them to show why these
premises are true.
I should note6 here that the betting scenario is intended as an
idealised case of elicitation, built in order to fix the definition of the
concept of probability and then move on. But some uses of idealised
starting points are more successful than others. An example of a po-
tentially good one is de Finetti’s choice to treat probability separately
from utility for the sake of a simpler treatment (1974/1990, p. 80-
81). By doing this we are able to take the monetary value of bets as
their actual worth, and start a numerical treatment—without worry-
ing about the complex fluctuations of utility, possibly influenced by
things outside of our scope of interest. However, we can imagine that
if we had complete information about all the factors that influence an
agent’s utility deriving from a bet (among others, her attitude towards
risk and money) we could use the value of the bet as a starting point,
and move away from it by adding more detailed and realistic infor-
mation. This would be a successful use of an idealisation: we start
with a simple case and are able to progressively move away from it
to make it more and more realistic. The idealisation we are required
6This observation was suggested by Alberto Mura.
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to make within the betting scenario, however, does not appear to be
successful. Firstly, points (1)-(4) are hard to accept, especially, in de
Finetti’s words, “when formulating that very definition which should
provide the connection with reality” (1974/1990, p. 80). And secondly,
we cannot use the case of the agent knowing that she and the bookie
have the exact same degree of belief as a simple starting point from
which we can move away, because as soon as we try to move away
from it to make the scenario a bit more realistic, the definition (very
often) breaks down.
Note also that if the game is played with discrete currency, for the
smallest denomination ε that the specific currency allows (for example,
AC0.01), if a < b, A should offer betting price x = b − ε; if a > b, A
should offer betting price x = b+ε; here the betting price comes apart
nearly completely from the sincere degree of belief.
Bookie’s belief as a random variable: continuous
uniform distribution
Next, we can drop the idea that A knows B’s degree of belief precisely,
and suppose that she estimates B’s degree of belief b by a continuous
random variable b̂ that takes values between 0 and 1. Then, we would
need to place a reasonable probability distribution over b̂, something
that would reflect A’s total or partial ignorance about the bookie’s
beliefs. Here are some observations that this starting point allows.
Suppose A knows nothing about B’s beliefs. A classic and intuitive
probability distribution representing ignorance is the uniform distri-
bution: all values of b are equally likely to A’s eyes.
Proposition 3. If b̂ has a uniform distribution, A’s expected gain in
the bet is EA = S(x− a)(1− 2x), so to maximise her expected gain A
should offer betting price x = a2 +
1
4 .
The situation is depicted in Figure 4.1. The dotted line results
from mapping each sincere degree of belief a to its corresponding
expectation-maximising betting price x, given the assumptions above.
By way of contrast, the solid represents x = a, the case in which the
agent declares a betting price x identical to her degree of belief a. The
only case in which an agent who is making the assumptions above
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would declare her sincere degree of belief a as her chosen betting price
x, is when a = 12 .























x = a/2 + 1/4
Figure 4.1: Sincere beliefs and maximising betting prices: continuous
uniform distribution for b̂
Bookie’s belief as a random variable: other
distributions
It is possible to make a few further general observations on continuous,
not necessarily uniform, prior distributions that the agent A might use.
For all continuous distributions the expression for the expected gain,
which we are assuming A wants to maximise, is the following (see the
proof for Proposition 3 in the Appendix),
EA = (x− a)(1− 2Fb̂(x)),
where Fb̂ is the cumulative distribution function for b̂. Let us call mb̂
the median of the distribution of b̂. The agent has positive expected
utility if she chooses an x such that a < x < mb̂ or a > x > mb̂. So
whenever agent A chooses to represent her ignorance of B’s beliefs by
a symmetric probability distribution for b̂, while having a degree of
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belief a 6= 12 , there exists an x 6= a such that EA(x) > 0. On the other
hand, if it is the case that mb̂ = a, then A should set x = a.
I say a little more about this in the Appendix, where I also look at
what the adoption of a Beta distribution would do for agent A. In gen-
eral, however, the exploration of continuous distributions to model the
bookie’s degree of belief offers little support for the betting definition.
There certainly are cases in which agent A would set her betting price
x = a: an important one is if she models the bookie’s belief by a distri-
bution with median equal to a. But, even though it is not possible to
quantify this without even further assumptions, the counter-examples
pile up: it certainly is not necessary to reason in one of the specific
ways just listed which result in x = a.
Bookie’s belief as a random variable: discrete
distribution and maximum entropy
As a final example, I look at how agent A might play the two-sided
betting game if she is an objective Bayesian, in the style of Jaynes
(2003) and Williamson (2010a). To illustrate the special features of
this approach, I will model the belief of the bookie by using a discrete
distribution.7 Here I let the stake be AC1, and the agent must declare
a betting price in Eurocents, that is, it must be x ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 100}.
Objective Bayesians propose that we use Shannon’s measure of
entropy H to quantify the amount of uncertainty expressed in a prob-
ability distribution. H is a function from a distribution to a real
number; the larger this number, the less information this distribution
is supposed to contain. Given a certain sample space, we can ask
which distribution of probabilities has the maximum entropy. Solving
this with no further constraints gives back the discrete uniform dis-
tribution. Results analogous to those in Proposition 3, and equally
discouraging for the betting definition, apply.
To obtain something more interesting we can put in additional
constraints. For example, as in the case above, our agent A might find
it reasonable that the mean of the distribution modelling the belief of
7A discussion of continuous ignorance priors in Jaynes (2003, pp. 376-394)
would not add much to the treatment above: Jaynes arrives at a prior distribution
which is symmetric about 1/2
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her opponent is equal to her degree of belief a. This is an application
that Jaynes proposes in his book, and serves as a nice illustration. The
results of this are in Figure 4.2. Again, two data sets plotted. The
solid diagonal line represents the mapping from A’s sincere degrees
of belief a to the betting prices x that she would declare if she was
perfectly honest, with x = a. The small circles represent the following:
for each sincere degree of belief a the agent computes the probability
distribution for b̂ which maximises entropy, with the constraint that
the mean of the distribution is µb̂ = a. Each a is mapped to the betting
price x which maximises her expected gain given this distribution.























x = value maximising expected gain
Figure 4.2: Sincere beliefs and betting prices according to maximum
entropy distribution.
Note here that, although the two mappings coincide exactly only
around 1%, 50% and 99%, the optimal odds given under this model
are not very far from what they would be if they mirrored exactly
the sincerely held degrees of belief. This can be both encouraging
and not: if we offer the two-sided bet to an objective Bayesian agent
who reasons as above, the number we will get back will not be very
different from her true degree of belief, so it will be a decent indication
of its whereabouts. It falls short, however, of a definition: in the vast
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majority of cases, it will be x 6= a. Of the authors who might endorse
such an approach, Williamson (2010a, p. 31) does not define degrees
of belief as betting prices, but interprets, or explicates them as such.
It is not clear to me whether this requires the two concepts to be
numerically identical. If they only need to be ‘close enough’ for the
interpretation to go through, then this is potentially a good result
for that school of thought: given a few assumptions which are quite
natural within that framework, a Bayesian agent will give responses
in the two-sided bet which are quite close to her degree of belief.
Preliminary conclusions
In this section I have shown numerous examples in which a Bayesian
agent making reasonable assumptions will declare a betting price x
which is different to her degree of belief a in the two-sided bet. In some
cases x will be quite close to a, while in others it is almost exclusively
tied to what A thinks her opponent believes. In a few special cases is
the betting price x identical to a; but remember that this is supposed
to be a general definition of degree of belief, not one that works only
in special cases.
An objection to this could be that, especially in the latter sec-
tions, I have made quite specific, and by no means necessary, modelling
choices, and so the results are no counter-example to the betting defi-
nition. Of course the betting definition won’t work if we make these
assumptions; but we don’t need to make them, so this criticism is
invalid, according to the objection. I think this is objection is quite
weak, in so far as a definition of degree of belief, a basic concept in
subjective Bayesianism, should be able to stand up to the very feeble
challenge presented here, when the definition is being applied to an
agent who uses some of the most elementary Bayesian tools. One can
object to some of the specific modelling choices, but the most powerful
assumptions I have made are that the agent A thinks probabilistically
about the direction of the bet, and that she maximises her expected
gain from the betting game. It is here that the source of the problem
lies; and although some of the modelling tools I use here would not
be endorsed by de Finetti (but would be by other Bayesians), these
two assumptions should be accepted, within his theory, when using
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the betting definition. Indeed, while we can relax either condition, the
resulting rescue of the betting definition is problematic. I discuss this
next.
4.5 Playing for a draw: why the betting definition
is unnecessary
So far, I have argued that if we apply the betting definition to an
agent who thinks probabilistically, in most cases it will fail. I now
look at the different ways a supporter of the betting definition get
round this. All these responses rely on assumptions additional to,
or different from, the ones I made above, and they save the betting
definition, but at a cost. They can be summarised as follows: (a) The
agent is not supposed to have a degree of belief about the direction of
the bet, but only about the event E in question; (b) the agent risks
having a negative expected gain from the two-sided bet if she tries to
engineer a positive expected gain, so she should settle for expected gain
0 instead; (c) the betting definition might have practical problems but
its strength lies in capturing the price at which an agent is indifferent
between bets for and against an event, which is identical to her degree
of belief; (d) the agent might be indifferent to gain so she will not
try to game the bet for personal gain, or (e) the agent might value
honesty more than monetary gain, so she will offer her true neutral
betting price; (f) the potential for real gains and losses forces an agent
to think carefully about her probabilistic evaluation.
I think these responses fail to secure the two-sided bet as a valid
definition of degrees of belief. I discuss them next in order (a) - (f). My
own position, which emerges in response to point (c), is that we should
abandon bets as a definition of degrees of belief, and also abandon the
idea that there is a necessary structural connection between the two
(although of course there is some connection), and adopt a primitivism
about degrees of belief in the style of Eriksson & Hájek (2007), which
I discuss in Chapter 2.
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No degree of belief over the direction of the bet
In Section 4.4, an important assumption is that agent A thinks prob-
abilistically about the direction of the bet. But perhaps she is not
supposed to think like this: she should focus only on event E. I see
this as a weak criticism. There are two sources of uncertainty in the
two-sided bet, as is clear from Table 4.1. The event E might hap-
pen, or it might not; and the bet might be on E or on Ē. Both have
influence over our potential gains and losses. It is hard to even see
how an agent would know to treat these differently if offered a bet of
this sort. One does not need to be a supporter of de Finetti to see
this. De Finetti, however, expressly writes that we should treat all
sources of uncertainty in the same way, whatever the source: that is,
we should reason probabilistically about them (de Finetti, 1974/1990,
pp. x-xi). What is more, he writes that it does not make sense, in
any case, to say we don’t know what the probability is, or that it
does not exist: “probability [. . . ] exists in that it serves to express, in
a precise fashion, for each individual, his choice in his given state of
ignorance” (de Finetti, 1974/1990, p. 84). Therefore, a good Bayesian
agent should treat both sources of uncertainty probabilistically. She
might do her modelling differently from the way I do in Section 4.4,
but the arguments there make it seem doubtful that her chosen model
will end up always suggesting that she set x = a.
Striving for expectation 0
Another important assumption I make is that the agent tries to max-
imise her expected gain in the bet. Against this view, de Finetti
(1974/1990, p. 93) suggests that in the two-sided bet the agent should
eventually choose that unique betting price that makes the expected
gains from the bet on E and the bet on Ē equal: that is, x = a.
This results in both expectations being 0. He reasons as follows: he
acknowledges that by trying to estimate the bookie’s beliefs, we might
arrive at a positive expected gain from the two-sided bet, but he warns
us that if we make a wrong estimation we might end up with negative
expected gain. The matter is left at that, implying we should be sat-
isfied that agents would normally pick x = a. In short, the implied
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recommendation is that, since the agent does not know which way the
bet will go, she should avoid trying to maximise her expected gain.
I think this is a problematic response, as highlighted in the follow-
ing example, which I think is relevantly similar to the two-sided bet.
Let us imagine that we can decide to take part in a game of chance or
abstain from it. Not playing has expected utility 0 for us, while we cal-
culate that playing has positive expected utility. Let us suppose that
it emerges later that our information about the chances involved in
the game were erroneous, and so our expected utility in the game was,
in fact, negative. In this case, it seems right to say that we should not
have played. But the advice from de Finetti is never to play, even if we
think we would have a positive expected gain from the game, because
this judgement could be wrong. Note that the two-sided bet is not a
rigged casino game: we might legitimately have a positive expected
gain, and de Finetti admits as much. This advice, then, is simply too
paralysing for it to be a general principle. To repeat: we cannot avoid
taking all actions that we think have positive (even maximal) expected
utility, just because we might be wrong in our assessment. We will use
our best information to make good decisions, and if it turns out that
some of the information was incorrect, then we will update it. If we
never get to know it in time, then that’s just tough luck.
It might be said that this advice by de Finetti is only to be followed
in the specific scenario of the elicitation scenario. But my point is
precisely that a Bayesian agent, following standard and reasonable
rules, would not give her sincere degree of belief in the two-sided bet.
Since the advice to be extremely cautious when our expected utility
could be negative cannot possibly be a general rule, then the point
stands. I struggle to see any good reason to simply assume that if
the agent knew this was an elicitation bet (albeit with real money
involved) she would abandon her ambition to choose the option that
gave the highest expected gain and think that her best option would
be to strive for expectation 0. I return to this in the following sections.
Capturing the indifference price
A change of emphasis has the potential to improve the response above,
but at a certain cost. The strength of the two-sided bet is that it tests
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the price at which agent A would be neutral between betting on E
occurring or against it; I will call this her ‘indifference price’. It is, by
construction, identical to her sincere degree of belief. The problem,
however, is that the betting definition should be at least conceivably
practical and general. It should work when applied to a third party; we
should be able to say, about an agent A, that she has degree of belief
such-and-such because that is what emerges from the bet. But the
discussion so far shows that there are theoretical issues which prevent
this from being true. The presence of an adversary prevents a Bayesian
agent, in most cases, from answering honestly in the betting elicitation
scenario.
So the two-sided bet is a private device which theoretically unearths
our indifference price. In fact, we could even take the two-sided bet
as the procedural definition of the psychological phenomenon of the
indifference price. This, in turn, could be the abstract definition of
degree of belief. It might be argued, then, that practical measurement
problems are separate. But the indifference price is not needed as
a definition of degree of belief, even in an abstract, non-operational
role. A one-sided bet would work just as well: we know, privately,
what the highest price is that we would pay for a gamble. Anyway,
in many cases it is absurd to try and think of a bet on the truth of
something, and this is a criticism that has often been levelled at the
approach. The bets are often just additional, unneeded, baggage. The
indifference price is equal to the sincere degree of belief, when betting
considerations are appropriate and helpful, but degrees of belief are
not necessarily indifference prices.
The two-sided betting definition, then, cannot even be conceived of
as public, so it cannot be an operational definition, and is redundant
as an abstract definition of degrees of belief. It could be a guide in
our introspection, but, again, other guides exist. I think an explicit
adoption of primitivism about degrees of belief is a good resolution. I
deal with this in Chapter 2. Below, I describe some ways to try and
escape this conclusion, but I think they do not work. The requirements
are that it needs to be shown that there exists an interpretation of the
two-sided betting definition which does not need ad hoc assumptions
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that are unworkable as general rules, and which makes the definition
conceivably practical and public.
Indifference to gain and agent honesty
Given what has already been ruled out above, it seems to me that
there two, non-mutually exclusive, reasons for an agent telling an ex-
perimenter honestly her indifference price: the agent might not care
about gain, or her sense of honesty might override other considerations
in her reasoning. I discuss these two reasons in this order.
If an agent does not care about gains, she does not need to be
‘tricked’ into declaring her true degree of belief by the offering of a
bet. Worse, I think that whether or not A already has a numerical
degree of belief, her lack of interest in gains or losses would make the
two-sided bet a very bad device for her. She is being asked which price
would make her indifferent between two bets: but as she is indifferent
to gains and losses all prices would be her indifference price; and, on
the other hand, if she does care about gains then we are stuck again
with trying to explain why she will sacrifice her gains in this specific
game.
We are left with the second assumption: that an agent will answer
honestly about her indifference price. An honest answer on the agent’s
part might mean her sacrificing an expected monetary gain and what-
ever other advantages she thought keeping her beliefs for herself might
bring. She surely realises this, as she sees that her indifference price is
x = a. Arguably, then, from the point of view of agent A, being honest
in declaring her indifference price is the same as being honest if simply
asked what her degree of belief is. In the latter case, her expected
disadvantage from sharing her beliefs remains the same as when she
shares her indifference price (i.e. the possible loss tied to sharing one’s
information); and the expected gain from the two-sided bet was going
to be 0 anyway. This suggests that, if we assume self-defeating agent
honesty, the bet is an unnecessary complication.
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Preliminary conclusions: thinking carefully about
one’s evaluation
I have argued that the two-sided bet only really works as a private
intuition-boosting device to put a number to our feelings of uncer-
tainty. I have also argued that this diminished role falls short of what
a definition of probability is, even in a non-operational facility. There
is a link between indifference price and degrees of belief, but there
is no need to burden all degrees of belief with the necessity of being
the result of reasoning in terms of bets. This is especially true given
that the two-sided betting definition has no operational aspect, so we
would be tying the definition of degrees of belief to an abstract bet-
ting process that brings no particular conceptual advantages. Even if
we think that probability is just degrees of belief, primitivism about
the fundamental concept of degrees of belief is a viable route. Mathe-
matical probability emerges as the model of this primitive, unanalysed
concept.
As a final counter to this, I consider the following. Perhaps the
two-sided bet is privileged with respect to other devices that help us
discover our degree of belief, and has a public aspect after all, because
the money involved forces us to think carefully about our evaluation.
What I have in mind here are cases such as the following: a person who
agent A does not know, who is in no obvious distress, simply asks her
how uncertain she is about the eventuality of rain tomorrow. She might
reply she has no idea how uncertain she is, or offer a number without
giving it much thought. This would mean the person’s elicitation
question has failed. But, the argument might go, if agent A now has
to place a two-sided bet on (or against!) rain tomorrow, she should
think carefully about what betting price she chooses, or she might
stand to lose some money. The two-sided bet puts an agent on the
spot, and forces her to explore her information and come up with her
best estimate. This is more than a private reasoning device.
This is fine as far it goes, but as soon as the agent has made up her
mind on what a should be, all the above arguments apply. Even if the
bet could be useful for her to put a number to her uncertainty, there
is little reason to think that it would also be of any use in getting
her to tell us that number—which, remember, was the point of the
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exercise. And so it gets back to the status of being a private reasoning
device. Note, furthermore, that even if the betting definition did work
for agents who did not yet have degrees of belief, the fact that it would
very often fail for agents that already have a degree of belief a would
still be a major problem. This would be a theory saying that rational
agents should have numerical degrees of belief, while giving a definition
of them that often fails when they actually have them.
This concludes the discussion of how to save the betting definition
of degree from the problems discussed in Section 4.4. I shall now
summarise and discuss my findings.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued for the following position: if a Bayesian
agent has a degree of belief over some event or proposition, the classic
two-sided bet will not, in the majority of cases, pick up on this degree
of belief correctly. This is mainly do the fact that the bet is two-
sided. While the fact that there might be a problem with the two-sided
betting definition has been noted previously, its full consequences have
not yet, to my knowledge, been brought to light. This might explain
why the debate surrounding this definition is still ongoing. Bringing
to light the full consequences of the problem also calls for the novel
task of looking into possible defences of the betting definition. I have
argued that these fail to secure the two-sided bet as a valid definition
of degrees of belief. I conclude that it should be abandoned: perhaps
in favour of Walley’s 1991 betting elicitation techniques, or ones based
on proper scoring rules (see de Finetti (2008)); but we can also leave
degrees of belief as an unanalysed primitive, in the style of Eriksson
& Hájek (2007).
4.7 Appendix
This Appendix contains the proofs and observations which, although
straightforward, would slow down the reader if included in the main
text.
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Utility functions. As I mentioned above in Section 4.2, a utility
function which is linear in money will give the same results as a utility
function which is identical to money, but for a utility function without
these attributes, in general the betting definition will not work. Let U
be the utility function in question. The expectation for the agent for
the bet on E (the case of Ē is entirely similar) is
EEA = aU(1− x) + (1− a)U(−x).
The two-sided betting definition works because the betting price x = a
is the only value that sets the expectation of both sides of the bet to
0. For a general, not necessarily linear, utility function, this fails. For
x = a the expression becomes
EEA = aU(1− a) + (1− a)U(−a),
which need not be identically 0. If we suppose that U is a linear
function however, we have, when x = a,
EEA = aU(1− a) + (1− a)U(−a),
= aU(1)− aU(a)− U(a) + aU(a) = 0.
Because of the symmetric character of the two-sided betting defi-
nition, the utility function can be increasing or decreasing. It cannot,
however, be identically 0: in that case, EEA = 0 for whatever value of
x that is chosen, so the definition loses its power. If U is linear and
decreasing, things work as follows: suppose, as above in Section 4.2,
agent A tries x = 1000; then, the bookie B could make it so that the
bet is on Ē. Then, since for any x > 1, xS > S, the bookie can engi-
neer a certain gain of money for A, which would represent a decrease
in utility; to avoid this A must choose x ≤ 1.
In my rebuttal to the betting definition some small adjustments are
needed if the utility function is linear and decreasing. I give an example
of this below, but I will treat it only once as it works analogously in
each case.
Proposition 1. The expectation for A in the bet as a whole is: EA =
S(2q−1)(a−x). Hence, if q > 12 , the betting price that maximises A’s
expected gain is x = 0; if q < 12 , the betting price that maximises A’s
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expected gain is x = 1; if q = 12 , A’s expected gain is EA = 0 whatever
betting price x she chooses.
Proof. For calculating the expectation, remember that the direction of
the bet and the occurrence of the event are by assumption probabilis-
tically independent. This means that we have EA = S((1−x)aq+(x−
1)a(1−q)−x(1−a)q+x(1−a)(1−q)), hence the result. The properties
of this expression are seen by inspection: if q > 12 , then S(2q − 1) > 0
and x should be minimised while x ∈ [0, 1]. A symmetrical argument
is valid for the case q < 12 . If q =
1
2 , then S(2q − 1) = 0.
For a general linear increasing utility function U , the result is
worked out analogously, as we have:
EA = S (U(1− x)aq + U(x− 1)a(1− q)− U(x)(1− a)q + x(1− a)(1− q))
= S(2q − 1)(U(a)− U(x)),
so x should be minimised while x ∈ [0, 1]. If the utility function is
linear but decreasing, if q > 12 , then x should be maximised while
x ∈ [0, 1]. A symmetrical argument is valid for the case q < 12 .
Proposition 2. Any x such that a < x < b or b < x < a will give A
positive expected gain. If a = b, A should offer betting price x = a.
Proof. Suppose a < b. If x < a < b, this will trigger the bet on Ē and
A’s expectation will be EĒA = S(x − a) < 0. If a < x < b, this will
trigger the bet on Ē and A’s expectation will be EĒA = S(x− a) > 0.
If a < b < x, this will trigger the bet on E and A’s expectation will be
EEB = S(a − x) < 0. The reasoning for b < a is entirely similar, with
only b < x < a resulting in a positive expecation for A.
Now suppose a = b. If x < a = b, this will trigger the bet on Ē
and A’s expectation will be EĒA = S(x− a) < 0. If b = a < x, this will
trigger the bet on E and A’s expectation will be EEB = S(a− x) < 0.
So it must be x = a.
For the observation under Proposition 2, note that if x < a < b,
then EEA = S(b− a− ε), and if b < x < a, then EĒA = S(a− b− ε).
Proposition 3. If b̂ has a uniform distribution, A’s expected gain in
the bet is EA = S(x− a)(1− 2x), so to maximise her expected gain A
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Proof. Let PA indicate agent A’s credence function. From Proposi-
tion 2 we have that PA(Bet on Ē) = PA(b̂ > x) and PA(Bet on E) =
PA(b̂ < x). So the global expectation EA for the bet is now the
following (recall that direction of bet and occurrence of event are in-
dependent):
EA = S(x− a)(PA(b̂ > x)− PA(b̂ < x))
= S(x− a)(PA(b̂ > x)− PA(b̂ ≤ x)) since b̂ has continuous distribution
= S(x− a)(1− 2Fb̂(x)), where Fb̂ is the cumulative distribution
function for b̂
= S(x− a)(1− 2x) since b̂ is uniformly distributed.
Given this, it is immediate to calculate the x that maximises this
expression.
Comments on Section 4.4. We can make slightly more specific
comments than were made in Section 4.4 if we suppose that A adopts
a Beta distribution to model her knowledge of b̂. It is common to use a
distribution from the Beta family to model an unknown between 0 and
1. The discussion above regarding the median mb̂ still applies, and we
can add the following observation. It might be reasonable to set one of
mode (Mb̂), median (mb̂) or mean (µb̂) of the distribution over values
of b̂ equal to a. These constitute different ways of acknowledging that
the bookie’s beliefs will probably be somehow related to the agent’s
own. (For example, they might find themselves in similar information
environments.) Now, for Beta distributions, eitherMb̂ = mb̂ = µb̂ =
1
2 ;
or Mb̂ < mb̂ < µb̂ if Mb̂ <
1
2 , or Mb̂ > mb̂ > µb̂ if Mb̂ >
1
2 (Groeneveld
& Meeden (1977)). So, if a = 12 and agent A wishes to set mode, mean
or median equal to it, it will end up being mb̂ = a, then A should
set x = a. Note, however, that if a 6= 12 and A sets either Mb̂ = a
or µb̂ = a (but not both equal to a), then there exists an x such that
a < x < mb̂ or a > x > mb̂, giving A positive expected gain.
Comments on Section 4.4. Here are some additional details on
the maximisation problem that led to Figure 4.2. In what follows I
will call events the numbers from 0 to 100, with the understanding that
b̂ could turn out to be any one of these. It is a completely different
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matter from the event E over which the agent and the bookie are
betting. In this maximisation problem, the events are 0,1,. . . ,100. We
call the probability of each event respectively p0, p1, . . . , p100. We want
to maximise:




subject to these conditions:
g(p0, . . . , p100) = p0 + · · ·+ p100 = 1
h(p0, . . . , p100) = 0p0 + 1p1 + · · ·+ 100p100 = a.
By the method of Lagrange multipliers we need to solve this system
of equations:
Hp0 = λgp0 + µhp0
Hp1 = λgp1 + µhp1
...
Hp100 = λgp100 + µhp100
g(p0, . . . , p100) = 1
h(p0, . . . , p100) = a.
Here λ, µ are the Lagrange multipliers, which we will re-write below
and find a solution for; and Hpk , gpk , hpk are the derivatives of the
functions H, g, h with respect to the variable pk.
We obtain that, for k = 0, . . . , 100,
pk = exp(−λ− µk − 1),
which we can rewrite simply as
pk = Cr
k,
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This reduces to finding the roots of the 100-degree polynomial
(a− 100)r100 + (a− 99)r99 + · · ·+ (a− 1)r + a = 0.
Note that for a ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 99}, the coefficients of this polynomial,
placed in the order of its descending powers as above, have only one
sign change, between coefficients a − (a + 1) and a − (a − 1). Then,
by Descartes’ rule of signs, the polynomial has exactly one real root.
(Note that if a ∈ {0, 100}, the polynomial has no positive real roots.
This means that this maximisation problem will not give us answers
if these are our beliefs and so we cannot apply the model.) Having
found r, we find the value of C. We can then calculate the maximum
entropy distribution for each value of a between 1 and 99 (or rather:
such distribution for b̂ having mean equal to a), and having done this,
find the value of x that maximises the expected gain from the bet. This
is best done numerically. The values obtained are plotted in Figure
4.2. The expectation being maximised here is the following:
EA =[−x(1− a) + (1− x)a]P (b̂ < x) + [x(1− a) + (x− 1)a]P (b̂ > x)
+ [−x(1− a) + (1− x)a]P (betting on E|b̂ = x)
+ [x(1− a) + (x− 1)a]P (betting on ¬E|b̂ = x).
If it happens that b = x, the bookie could decide to swing the
bet either way, since maximising his expected gain cannot guide him
(recall that his expected gain was either b − x or x − b). Having no
information whatsoever about what would happen if b = x, an agent
might invoke the maximum entropy principle again, to get
P (positive stake|b̂ = x) = P (negative stake|b̂ = x),
therefore reducing the expectation to:
EA = [−x(1− a) + (1− x)a]P (b̂ < x) + [x(1− a) + (x− 1)a]P (b̂ > x)
= (a− x)(F (x)− px) + (x− a)(1− F (x))





DeFinetti’s opposition to the adoption of countable additivity (CA)
as an axiom of probability is one of the things he is best known for.
Two of his main objections to CA (see Section 5.5) form the basis
of the discussion below, but his own position, about which he wrote
prolifically and consistently throughout his career, will not be focused
on here. Instead, I will employ (what I take to be) a de Finettian
philosophical methodology to propose a way to move the debate on CA
forward in a broad sense, and attempt to make a specific contribution
in that vein.
My specific contribution will be to propose reasons why two of the
major approaches in objective Bayesianism (I will look at Edwin T.
Jaynes and Jon Williamson) are justified in adopting CA as an axiom;
these reasons are different from the ones they give themselves, which,
I think, can be improved on. The broader point will be that a general
solution to the debate on CA, one that satisfies all the participants
in it, is impossible. I support this conclusion in Sections 5.3 and 5.5.
What is possible, however, is finding case-by-case solutions: we may
or may not want CA as an axiom in different approaches and in differ-
ent uses of probability theory, and we may or may not be justified in
adopting it. My discussion of objective Bayesianism below is an appli-
cation of this idea. And my general methodology here is inspired by
de Finetti in this sense: he takes seriously the fundamentals of what
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he takes probability to be, and what he expects from a formal model
of it; this informs his mathematical choices throughout. When we get
deeper into discussions of objective Bayesianism we will be well out
of de Finetti’s territory, and we will be applying this general idea to
things he strongly disapproved of, but this method of relating funda-
mentals to formalisations will be the guide.
5.1 Introducing the debate on countable
additivity
Philosophers cannot agree on whether the rule of Countable Additivity
(CA) should be an axiom of probability. There is broad consensus on
the fact that probabilities should lie between 0 and 1, and that if A
and B are two incompatible events, then the probability of their union
A∪B, should be the sum of their individual probabilities: this rule is
Finite Additivity (FA). CA is the extension of this property to count-
ably infinite sequences of events. Although frequently used in much of
modern probability theory, it remains philosophically contentious.
E.T. Jaynes, in Chapter 15 of his seminal 2003 book Probability
Theory: The Logic of Science, attacks the problem in a way which
is, to my knowledge, original to him and which has been passed over
in the current philosophical debate about the principle.1 Although
his target audience might be mathematicians and other practitioners
(as opposed to philosophers), I think a discussion of his position can
bring a valuable contribution to the philosophical debate. Jaynes says
the debate rests on an erroneous use of mathematical infinity by the
authors who participate in it, and the claim is that his approach, in
avoiding such mistakes, is not afflicted by the problem. I reconstruct
from this the solution to the FA versus CA debate that emerges from
the text, which is, quite simply, to avoid the mistaken use of math-
ematical infinity that Jaynes points out. I argue, though, that this
solution fails: these alleged misuses of infinity seem to be independent
of the question of additivity in probability. The spirit of the more
1 The closest it goes to being mentioned are: Hájek (2011) refers the reader
to Jaynes’s sections 15.3-5 for a discussion of conglomerability; and in a recent
paper Myrvold (2015) cites section 15.7 of Jaynes’s book on the Borel-Kolmogorov
paradox. The discussion on CA is in section 15.6.
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general point he is making in the book, however, can be salvaged,
and it can inspire a positive contribution to the philosophical debate
about the principle. In particular, it can be fruitfully applied to a
recent theory of objective Bayesianism, by Jon Williamson: I think
Williamson’s adoption of CA can be given a different and improved
justification thanks to the arguments I put forward below.
I start, in Sections 5.2 and 5.3 by introducing the problem. Then I
analyse Jaynes’s proposal in Section 5.4, and suggest a new solution to
the debate, in the spirit of Jaynes’s work in Section 5.5. In the section
that follows, 5.6, I focus on Williamson’s work on the CA debate. My
conclusions are in Section 5.7.
5.2 Mathematicians on Countable Additivity
Let P be a function which assigns, to a certain class of events, real
numbers between 0 and 1. Then FA is the following requirement:
Definition 1 (Finite Additivity). Let A,B be mutually exclusive events,
then:
P (A ∪B) = P (A) + P (B). (5.1)
Finite Additivity can be iterated to apply to any finite sequence of
mutually exclusive events. Importantly, however, this does not mean
that we could iterate FA a countably infinite number of times, with
the rule still being valid. This would be a net strengthening of FA: it
would be Countable Additivity. Here is a statement of the property:
Definition 2 (Countable Additivity). Let {An}∞n=1 be an infinite se-












2 If a measure is countably additive, then it is also finitely additive. Let P be a










A1, . . . , An pairwise disjoint. We can extend this sequence by a countably infinite
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CA allows for a powerful mathematical theory of integration and,
while a theory of integration which uses only finitely additive mea-
sures is also fully developed3, most mathematicians adopt CA and
consider this justified by its highly desirable consequences (Bingham,
2010, pp. 3-4). For classic expositions that adopt the principle of CA
see, for example, the following chronological progression, which is also
interesting as an indication of the attitude of mathematicians on the
matter: Andrey Kolmogorov writes (on the axiom of continuity, which
he then immediately shows to be equivalent, together with the other
probability axioms, to countable additivity):
Since [the axiom of continuity] is essential for infinite fields
of probability only, it is almost impossible to elucidate its
empirical meaning [. . . as can be done for the finitary ax-
ioms]. For, in describing any observable random process
we can obtain only finite fields of probability. Infinite
fields of probability occur only as idealised models of real
random processes. We limit ourselves, arbitrarily, to only
those models which satisfy [continuity]. This limitation as
been found expedient in researches of the most diverse sort.
(Kolmogorov, 1933/1956, p. 15, emphasis in original).
Paul Halmos writes the following when defining probability measures:
The general condition of countable additivity is a further
restriction on [probability functions]—a restriction with-
out which modern probability theory could not function.
It is a tenable point of view that our intuition demands
infinite additivity just as much as finite additivity. At any
rate, however, infinite additivity does not contradict our
intuitive ideas, and the theory built on it is sufficiently far



















For an example of a probability function which is FA but not CA, see function Q
below.
3See, for example Dunford & Schwartz (1958, Chapter 3), or de Finetti (1972,
Chapter 6)
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developed to assert that the assumption is justified by its
success. (Halmos, 1974, p. 187)
And more recently, Donald Cohn dedicates the following passage to
the finite versus countable additivity question:
Finite additivity might at first seem to be a more natural
property than countable additivity. However, countably
additive measures on the one hand seem to be sufficient
for almost all applications and, on the other hand, support
a much more powerful theory of integration than do finitely
additive measures. Thus we will follow the usual practice
and devote almost all of our attention to countably additive
measures. (Cohn, 2013, p. 7)
Even though this succession of quotes makes compelling reading,
the tone going from tentative (Kolmogorov) through bullish (Hal-
mos) to accepting (Cohn’s following of the “usual practice”), I don’t
mean the progression to be taken too seriously as ‘good’ history of
mathematics—other views have certainly existed and exist. But the
above are important texts in mathematical probability, and I take this
sample to be representative of mathematicians’ general attitude to the
matter: countable additivity greatly increases the power of the theory
of probability, and the bulk of the theory, in the way it is generally
taught today, depends on it.
5.3 The philosophical status of Countable
Additivity
Among many philosophers, however, the axiom of CA is contentious.
All participants in the debate see the technical advantage of adopting
the principle, but many feel this is not justification enough. The main
contention, as far as this discussion is concerned, is that CA seems
to have significant consequences when we use probability to model
epistemic attitudes. These are such that an independent, not merely
technical reason for taking CA as an axiom of probability is sought.
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De Finetti has been the most famous and vocal critic of CA4, and he
is the main target of Jaynes’s critique. The two main issues de Finetti
found with CA are specified below in Section 5.5, and responded to in
what I take to be a ‘Jaynesian’ spirit. For now, it will be enough to
present the problem in the simplest form in which it arises, that of the
infinite lottery.
A crucial reason why the matter of CA versus FA is not yet settled
to this day is that there are powerful intuitions on either side of the
debate, both of which are appealing, but mutually incompatible in
the usual mathematical framework. It is in the context of the infinite
lottery that Wenmackers & Horsten (2013) make this observation, and
it seems to me that this conclusion could be broadened to encompass
a lot of the discussion on CA, at least within the realm of epistemic
probability. It seems that any number of arguments that support one
side of the debate ultimately clash with those intuitions which favour
the other side of the debate, and the former are unable to overpower
the latter, thus leaving the debate open. It might be because these
intuitions are more profound ideas on what probability is, or how it
should be thought of.
The infinite lottery is a perfect test case for these intuitions.5 In
this thought experiment we imagine a lottery over all the natural num-
bers, each number representing a ticket. One, and only one, ticket will
be picked. Suppose we attach a probability to each number in the
infinite lottery. (We assume that probabilities will be between 0 and
1 and finite additivity, but not countable additivity: the point of the
thought experiment is to test our intuitions about this very principle.)
What should the probability of a given ticket winning be? Should it be
possible to consider all numbers equally probable? Suppose we answer
yes to the second question. Any positive real number is too big: how-
ever small we choose these positive probabilities, by summing them we
will eventually, in a finite number of steps, achieve a number greater
than 1. So, if we want to preserve the fact that all numbers are equally
4For other important contributions to this lively philosophical debate, see,
amongst others, the following: Levi (1980), Seidenfeld & Schervish (1983), Kadane
et al. (1986/1999), Kadane et al. (1996), Kelly (1996, Chapter 13), Howson (2009).
5I explored this also in my unpublished MSc thesis (Elliot (2014)), and some
of the passages in this section are from or based on that work.
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probable, they must all be assigned probability 0. This is fine if we
apply FA only: nowhere does the principle state that an infinite union
of exclusive events must have the same probability as the infinite sum
of the probabilities of the single events. This assignment respects the
following fundamental intuition, which I call IFA:
IFA: We should be able to assign equal probability to all events, in-
cluding in a countably infinite setting.
While this is compelling, it is also clear that the solution of assigning
0 probability to all events, when their union has probability 1, is also
counter-intuitive: we lose the idea that the total probability is the sum
of its component parts; and we would have a union of probability-0
events making up a certain event. The intuition it contradicts can be
expressed thus:
ICA: The probability of a union of events should be equal to the sum of
the probabilities of the events that make up the union, including
in a countably infinite setting.
For a countably infinite number of probabilities to add up to 1, they
must form a convergent series. This implies that the probabilities must
form a sequence converging to 0. This in turn means that, whatever
sequence we choose to adopt, we will always have the vast majority
of the probability assigned to a finite set of numbers in the lottery.
This contradicts the first intuition above. The two intuitions are in-
compatible in a countably infinite setting, and we must choose which
one to adopt and which one to drop. One way to proceed, adopted
by Bartha (2004) and Wenmackers & Horsten (2013) is to abandon
the usual mathematical framework in which probability is studied,
transfer to an analogous problem in non-standard analysis, and solve
that problem. In non-standard analysis intuitions equivalent to the
two above can be satisfied at the same time (Wenmackers & Horsten
(2013)). Here I shall remain, as Jaynes and Williamson do, within the
usual realms of standard analysis. I come back to the standard infinite
lottery below. Next, I analyse Jaynes’s contribution to the debate, and
propose a new one, inspired by him.
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5.4 Jaynes on Countable Additivity
Jaynes shows little patience for philosophical arguments of the sort
sketched above, as he does for measure theory, which is the branch of
contemporary mathematics in which probability is studied (this point
is also noted in the reviews by Diaconis (2004) and Faris (2006)).
Perhaps because of this, he dismisses the debate, arguing that CA must
be adopted in order not to violate a principle of classical mathematics.
According to Jaynes, there is a proper way of working with infinite
objects, and an improper way. The proper way is this:
Apply the ordinary processes of arithmetic and analysis
only to expressions with a finite number n of terms. Then
after the calculation is done, observe how the resulting fi-
nite expressions behave as the parameter n increases indef-
initely (Jaynes, 2003, p. 452).
Jaynes’s example of this methodology is how, by definition, we
calculate infinite series: we do all the necessary work on the finite
sums of up to n elements of the series first, and only then do we
attempt to pass to the limit for n → ∞ (Jaynes, 2003, p. 452). As
Jaynes points out, it is easy to make mistakes when attempting to
work directly on infinite objects. There is no doubt that this is sound
mathematical advice. Unfortunately, however, it is not immediately
clear how to apply this principle to the case of FA versus CA, and
Jaynes’s use of the principle is not always transparent. Simply put,
just by using probabilities which are merely finitely additive, we do
not seem to generate any mistaken use of infinity.
The following passage by Jaynes is particularly significant:
it is a trivial remark that our probabilities have ‘finite ad-
ditivity’. As n→∞ it seems rather innocuous to suppose
that the sum rule goes in the limit into a sum over a count-
able number of terms, forming a convergent series; where-
upon our probabilities would be called countably additive.
Indeed [. . . ] if this should ever fail to yield a convergent
series we would conclude that the infinite limit does not
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make sense, and we would refuse to pass to the limit at all
(Jaynes, 2003, p. 464).6
Jaynes writes that most accounts of probability theory do not respect
the basic rules on how to handle mathematical infinity, which is why
they then grapple with issues of finite versus countable additivity.
Now, to solve the issue of FA versus CA probability we would need
something like the following argument: only if we do not operate cor-
rectly with mathematical infinity, then probability functions which are
finitely, but not countably, additive, will arise. But even in the absence
of this claim, which is not explicitly made by Jaynes, a connection be-
tween specific uses of infinity and FA-probability would be a valuable
insight. Unfortunately, I think this doesn’t quite work. But what are
these mistaken uses of mathematical infinity? I explore, then respond
to, Jaynes’s points in the following paragraphs.
The warning in the quoted passage above is an example of Jaynes’s
“finite-sets policy” on how to handle limits (Jaynes, 2003, p. 44). Note
that in what follows, when I talk of infinite sets, I will always be re-
ferring to intervals on the real line which have an infinite Lebesgue
measure. This seems to me the best understanding of Jaynes when
he writes that supporters of finitely additive probability are “con-
cerned with additivity over propositions about intervals on infinite
sets” (Jaynes, 2003, p. 465, my emphasis). Jaynes then proceeds to
consider an example of an interval function, in which the number of in-
tervals and their Lebesgue measure are crucial. This discussion, which
I examine below, constitutes the central part of his argument for the
adoption of CA. In Section 5.4 below I discuss a different interpretation
of what Jaynes could be understood to be arguing.
It seems that Jaynes, in these passages, considers two different
kinds of limits. At one point (Jaynes, 2003, p. 464), he mentions
the number of events, which becomes infinite in the limit; further on
(Jaynes, 2003, p. 465), he mentions single events, which happen to
be represented by infinite sets. The first limit regards the number of
events, and the other the end-point of an interval on the real line,
6n here is the number of propositions treated; while Jaynes speaks of proposi-
tions, I will use the terms proposition and event interchangeably to mean elements
of the domain of the probability functions treated.
101
5. Countable additivity and objective Bayesianism
if we take, as Jaynes does in this section, such intervals to represent
our events. It is easy to see that these two limits need not be con-
sidered together: even just operating on the intervals of the real line,
we might have events represented by a finite number of infinite inter-
vals (say {(−∞, 0], (0,+∞)}), or we could have an infinite number of
events represented by an infinite number of finite intervals (for exam-
ple {. . . (−2,−1], (−1, 0], . . . }). I will thus examine them separately;
the mistakes to avoid, on the basis of the above reasoning, are the
following: mistake M1: assigning probabilities directly to an infinite
number of events, instead of starting from a finite number and observ-
ing the limit process; mistake M2: assigning probabilities directly to
infinite sets.
Avoiding mistake M2
M2 is at the same time both too strong. According to M2, we should
not assign probabilities to infinite sets directly. However, this is com-
monly done, without incurring any problems with countable additivity.
To see this, we can take any cumulative distribution function G; then
we consider the σ-algebra of sets generated on the set R by the sets
(∞, c]. We assign to each such left-infinite interval a probability as
follows: P ((∞, c]) = G(c). This probability measure is countably ad-
ditive, and yet it clearly commits mistake M2. (See also Kolmogorov
1933/1956, 18-19, for this construction.) Note that this is not the
only way to define cumulative distribution functions: they can also
be defined by a limit process that would not commit M2. However,
all that is important for my purposes is that it is possible, and it is
commonly done, to work directly with infinite sets, without worrying
about which limiting procedure gave us the set, and yet without run-
ning into contradiction or encountering a failure of CA. So M2 is too
strong, because it excludes common, unproblematic uses of probability
theory. M2 is also too weak, because avoiding it does not guarantee
that we will avoid merely finitely additive probability functions. Here
is an example: we define a function Q which avoids mistake M2 and
yet is finitely, but not countably, additive. Let A be the algebra of sets
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of all finite disjoint unions of intervals [a, b) ⊆ [0, 1), with a < b. For
I, J ∈ A, we define Q as follows7:
Q(I) =
{
1 if there is a y ∈ [0, 1] such that [y, 1) ⊂ I
0 otherwise
This function does not assign probabilities to infinite sets, avoiding
mistake M2. Q is finitely additive: take I, J ∈ A, with I∩J = ∅. With-
out loss of generality, suppose ∃y such that [y, 1) ⊆ I, so that Q(I) = 1.
This means that there can be no y′ for J such that [y′, 1) ⊆ J (since I
and J are disjoint), so Q(J) = 0. Because ∃y such that [y, 1) ⊆ I ∪ J ,
Q(I ∪ J) = 1. Thus Q(I ∪ J) = Q(I) + Q(J) = 1. Now suppose
@y such that [y, 1) ⊆ I and @y′ such that [y′, 1) ⊆ J . Then @y′′
such that [y′′, 1) ⊆ I ∪ J , and so Q(I ∪ J) = Q(I) + Q(J) = 0.












, . . . , Ak =
[
1− 2−k, 1− 2−(k+1)
)
, . . .
}
, and
note that Q (
⋃∞
i=0Ai) = Q([0, 1)) = 1, but
∑∞
i=0Q(Ai) = 0.
This shows that avoiding the assignment of probability to infinite
sets (which I called mistake M2) is neither necessary nor sufficient for
avoiding merely finitely additive probability functions.
Avoiding mistake M1
According to Jaynes, the other mistake to avoid is M1: to assign prob-
ability directly to an infinite number of events, instead of starting from
a finite number of events and then observing the limiting process. This
is more interesting, but it is not obvious what constitutes avoiding mis-
take M1. Function Q above, for example, gives a rule on how to assign
probabilities to intervals in [0, 1), so implicitly it assigns probabilities
to an infinite number of intervals. Note that Jaynes himself defines a
measure which he describes as correct in the following way: he starts
from a continuous, monotonic increasing cumulative density function
G, then defines a probability function F (my notation), which is count-
ably additive, in the usual way: F ((a, b)) = G(b)−G(a). This is also
a rule, which applies to an infinite number of intervals at once. How-
ever, it seems more charitable to go with a stricter interpretation of
7I am grateful to Jan Sprenger for suggesting this example.
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the avoidance of M1 which Jaynes proposes (Jaynes, 2003, p. 44,654),
even if Jaynes himself does not always seem to follow it. I use this in-
terpretation because it rules out function Q above as a counterexample
to Jaynes’s argument. This goes as follows: we always start from a
finite number of mutually incompatible events, say {A1, . . . , An}, and
assign a probability function Pn only to those events, and to those
which arise from the Boolean algebra (or algebra of sets, if we take
the Ai to be sets) that those events generate. Then, if the problem
requires it, we observe how this probability behaves as the number of
events increase in the limit n → ∞. Clearly, avoiding this version of
M1 is not necessary in order to avoid merely finitely additive proba-
bilities: F commits this version of mistake M1 and yet is countably
additive. But could it be sufficient? At least it rules out the problem-
atic function Q. As it turns out, it is not sufficient either: the problem
is that the limit lim
n→∞
Pn may not exist, or, worse, it may exist but not
be countably additive. As seen above, Jaynes says that if additivity
fails in the limit, i.e. if the probability measure, in the limit, is not
countably additive, “we would conclude that the infinite limit does not
make sense, and we would refuse to pass to the limit at all”. But this
begs the question. Suppose we start from the events {1, 2, . . . , n}, each
of which is assigned equal probability Pn(i) =
1
n , for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
This is well defined and finitely additive for each finite case, and the
limiting procedure, with which we extend this measure to apply to all





n = 0. This
respects all of Jaynes’s warnings, but the resulting limiting measure is
not countably additive: each natural number is assigned probability
0, but their countable union must be assigned probability 1.8 To say
that the limit does not make sense begs the question: Jaynes says that
merely FA probabilities arise from limits that do not make sense, but
the only way in which this limit fails to make sense is that it is not
countably additive.
The foregoing discussion shows that Jaynes’s warning to avoid the
mistakes I labelled M1 and M2 are neither necessary nor sufficient for
avoiding merely finitely additive probability functions. We can commit
8Note, however, that while this function exists, it is not trivial to define, if we
require it to be defined for all subsets of N: see Kadane & O’Hagan (1995) and my
discussion below.
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neither M1 nor M2 and end up with a finitely additive probability; and
we can commit either M1 or M2 (or both) and still have a countably
additive probability. There is, however, another way in which Jaynes
could be seen to be arguing, which is immune to some of the criticisms
levelled above. This has to do with what Jaynes calls the right order
of operations: we discuss additivity first, and only then pass to the
limit. I discuss this next.
Invoking continuity
Although Jaynes, in his section on countable additivity, considers in-
tervals infinite in number or with infinite Lebesgue measure, it may
be that this is merely to illustrate a broader point. In this section I
argue that this argument by Jaynes would be an appeal to the rule
of continuity, which, in the presence of the other probability axioms,
is equivalent to countable additivity; in fact, it is in this version that
the rule is first presented in Kolmogorov (1933/1956). The fact that
the continuity and CA are equivalent is not a problem in itself, since
we will need something at least as strong as CA in order to derive
it. But Jaynes is wrong in affirming that a function which does not
respect continuity represents a mathematical error, and his argument
amounts to stating that probability functions should respect conti-
nuity (and hence CA). Since he offers nothing more, and since there
is nothing mathematically wrong with functions that do not respect
continuity, the door remains open to a position such as de Finetti’s,
which I describe below in Section 5.5: some probability functions are
continuous, others not; the first are a special case, but not the only
admissible ones. Jaynes (along with many other authors) is opposed to
this, and so another motivation for adopting CA, and thus excluding
functions which are merely finitely additive, must be given. I propose
one such motivation below. Before this, I substantiate my claim that
this second interpretation of Jaynes’s argument amounts to an appeal
to continuity.
The broader point that Jaynes might be orienting towards is that
when assigning a probability to a set which is expressible as a count-
ably infinite union of it subsets, we should not be able to do this
independently of the probabilities of those subsets. In particular, the
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probability of the union-set should result from a limit process involv-
ing the probabilities of the constituent sets. Failing to do so would be
failing to respect the proper order of operations (Jaynes, 2003, pp. 464-
466). Here, as I explain above, Jaynes tries to draw a parallel between
the correct order of finding the limit of a series and countable addi-
tivity. He writes that we should treat the question of additivity first,
and only then pass to the limit. How this works in practice, however,
is that Jaynes requires that the “sum rule [go] in the limit into a sum
over a countable number of terms”. For a function P , FA (the sum



















































This property is called continuity, and it is possible to show that, if
taken together with the other Kolmogorov axioms of probability, it
is equivalent to CA. So Jaynes is wrong not to see a “substantive
issue” here. The issue of whether, for a given probability measure, the
rule of FA goes into the limit to become CA, is just as substantive as
the issue of whether such probability measure is countably additive:
the two matters are equivalent.
To sum up, in this section I have argued that Jaynes’s arguments for
the adoption of CA as an axiom of probability, seem to fail. Nonethe-
less, there are some valuable observations to be made on the issue, in
what I take to be the spirit of his book. I expand on this below.
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5.5 A model for common sense and
‘adequate’ operations
There are two positive contributions on the CA versus FA debate which
I wish to take from Jaynes. They do not come from his explicit treat-
ment of the topic (which, I argued, is flawed), but are from, or in the
spirit of, other arguments that are put forward in his book. The de-
fence of these contributions is mine, and relies partly on facts about
the Axiom of Choice and the constructibility of mathematical objects.
Here are the two main problems with CA that de Finetti high-
lights: firstly, it is always possible to extend a coherent FA-probability
assignment on a collection S, to a coherent assignment on an arbi-
trary algebra of sets A ⊃ S (de Finetti, 1972, p. 78). If we do the
same operation with a CA probability, there can exist elements (called
non-measurable sets) for which for such CA probability is not defined.9
Because in applying CA we can get non-measurable sets, it seems that
the rule of CA is forbidding us from assigning probability to some
events—perhaps an overreach for what is supposed to be a rule used
only for technical convenience (de Finetti, 1972, p. 75). I call this issue
A.
Secondly, and as a consequence of the preceding point, there must
exist a coherent merely FA probability function which assigns equal
probability to all natural numbers, thus respecting the intuition IFA
outlined above, we should be able to assign equal probability to all
events, including in an infinite setting, and which also extends co-
herently to the power set of N. CA cannot even get off the ground
in accommodating intuition IFA, let alone include this in a globally
coherent probability function. Again, it might be seen as an over-
reach, for a merely technical rule such as CA, to rule out seemingly
sound epistemological states such as that expressed in this intuition
(de Finetti, 1974/1990, pp. 118-128). I call this issue B.
I argue that Jaynes doesn’t need to worry about these issues. As
I suggested in Section 5.3, and will expand on below, I don’t think it
is possible to make these issues go away, but it is possible to give a
9For example, the Vitali sets are members of the power set of [0, 1] ⊂ R for
which the Lebesgue measure is not defined.
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principled justification for adopting CA, if we consider carefully what
Jaynes sets out to do in his treatment of probability.
Jaynes need not worry about issue A: he studies probability the-
ory as a “model for common sense”, which can hopefully also act as
its “powerful extension” (Jaynes, 2003, p. 7). Inspired by Cox (1961),
his theory is an attempt at finding quantitative rules for plausible
reasoning, of the kind we need to do in practical and scientific prob-
lems (Jaynes, 2003, pp. 3-4). Now, because the proof of existence of
non-measurable sets requires the Axiom of Choice, an explicit, con-
structible example of them cannot be given (Fraenkel et al., 1973,
p. 70). Given this, it seems reasonable to say that a non-measurable
set of this sort will never appear in a practical problem dealt with the
way Jaynes deals with it: we will not have a scientific hypothesis, say,
which necessitates being represented by a non-measurable set. So a
Jaynesian account can escape worry A by saying that it does not apply
to what they want to do.
Issue B is harder to avoid, and I think Jaynes, and whoever else
wants to apply CA, must simply bite the bullet: given CA (and within
standard analysis) it is impossible to model an agent that has an equal
credence in a countable infinity of mutually exclusive and exhaustive
propositions. There is no way around this. But Jaynes can give a
principled reason for deciding to bite this bullet. Of course, it boils
down to intuition ICA that the probability of a union of events should
be equal to the sum of the probabilities of the events that make up the
union, including in an infinite setting, but it comes from a different
and more informative angle. It comes from a principle which says
something like this: ICAJ : if we know the probabilities of the elemen-
tary events, we should be able to know the probability of the compound
events they form. This is close, although perhaps in structure alone,
to the principle of compositionality : this is the idea that “the meaning
of a complex expression is fully determined by its structure and the
meanings of its constituents” Szabó (2017). And, closer to home, it is
exactly what follows from (Boole, 1854/1958, p. 10), when he points
out that the assignment of probabilities to compound propositions,
given the probabilities of the elementary propositions that make them
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up, is one of the problems his theory of probability allows us to solve.
I think we should extend this principle to the countable setting.
Before I discuss the application and justification of this principle,
I will note four preliminary things.
Firstly10, the principle ICAJ , that if we know the probabilities of
the basic events we should know the probabilities of all the compound
events they can form, only works in lotteries or equivalent cases in
which the generators (or basic events) of the Boolean algebra are all
mutually incompatible. It can be argued, however, that these have no
real claim to being more fundamental than other sets of generators.
The set of ‘lottery tickets’ may have the appearance of being a privi-
leged set of generators, and they are by construction mutually indepen-
dent, but in fact they occupy no special role. A different set of gener-
ators can give rise to the same Boolean algebra, with the ‘tickets’ now
appearing as compound events. If these new generators are not all mu-
tually independent, however, ICAJ will fail. Here is an example. Let
the generators of Boolean algebra A be {{1}, {2}, {3}, {4}}. These
are the classic lottery tickets: mutually incompatible. If we know the
probabilities of each lottery ticket, we can compute the probability of
any combination of them. However, A can also be generated by the
following set: {{1, 2, 3}, {2}, {3, 4}}. In this case, knowing the proba-
bilities of these basic events, plus the application of the union and in-
tersection rules for probability, does not give us the probabilities of all
compound events. For example, P ({4}) = P ({3, 4} \ {1, 2, 3}), which
is not something we are able to calculate. While the latter might seem
purposefully muddled up, a simple relabelling changes this perspec-
tive. Let {A = {1, 2, 3}, B = {2}, C = {3, 4}}. Now the second set of
generators is {A,B,C}, while the first is {A\(B∪C), B, A∩C, C\A}.
Now, the latter set is supposed to be privileged, because its generators
are mutually incompatible. But this relabelling doesn’t make clear
why this, and not the more ‘basic’-looking set of generators should be
chosen as fundamental, such that principle ICAJ should apply. This
suggests that ICAJ is applied somewhat arbitrarily.
This point helps in delimiting the scope of the principle ICAJ : it
will only be applied to sets of incompatible events or propositions, and
10I owe this point to Alberto Mura.
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the Boolean algebra they go on to generate. These are the cases to
which finite and countable additivity apply, where for incompatible
events the probability of their union is the sum of their probabilities.
These cases have a good claim to being ‘basic’ in the cases I treat here.
It is not a general principle, however, that whichever set of generators
of a Boolean algebra appears to be most basic should have this special
compositionality property.
Secondly, ICAJ is not explicitly applied by Jaynes to countable
additivity. Jaynes, as I specify and criticise above, thinks that rules on
finite cases plus a correct application of mathematics will result in CA.
Necessarily, then, this will be an extension of his work in this direction.
Jaynes sets out a clear and well-reasoned role for formal models, and
he positions and delimits it with respect to human reasoning. I think
this is valuable, and the idea in this chapter is to work within that
framework to try and ground the principle of CA.
Thirdly, here the principle is only applied to finitely or countably
many propositions. This is all we encounter in a Jaynes-like approach.
The principle does not work in cases with an uncountable infinity of
basic events, but that is not a problem here. 11 Jaynes writes that
finitely many propositions is “all we ever need in practice” (Jaynes,
2003, p. 107) and that “limiting our basic theory to finite sets of
propositions has not in any way hindered our ability to deal with
continuous probability distributions” (Jaynes, 2003, p. 108). For a
continuous distribution f , for example, he considers events such as
F ′ ≡ (f ≤ q), F ′′ ≡ (f > q). But even when a continuous distribu-
tion might be mathematically handy for modelling a certain problem,
this is just a convenient intermediate step: the fundamental proposi-
tions that give a true description of the problem are finite in number
(Jaynes, 2003, pp. 109-110). Further on (Jaynes, 2003, p. 466), Jaynes
is happy to consider as properly formed a probability function with a
11Principle ICAJ does not work, for example, for [0, 1] ⊂ R and the Lebesgue
measure. Every individual point x ∈ [0, 1] has measure 0, but the union of uncount-
ably many points can, of course, have positive Lebesgue measure: so knowing the
probabilities of the fundamental events is not enough to know the probability of the
event they make up as a union. If we wanted ICAJ to be true also in uncountable
settings we would be imposing what de Finetti calls “perfect additivity” (de Finetti,
1974/1990, p. 118).
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countably infinite number of basic propositions, obtained by starting
from n <∞ propositions, and then letting n→∞.
Finally, ICAJ is at least as strong as CA. This is an unavoidable
feature for any approach that seeks to derive CA from another princi-
ple; when we assume this stronger principle, we are already assuming
the seeds of what we want to obtain. All participants in the debate
acknowledge this circularity, which is present in de Finetti’s camp too.
The aim, in this endeavour, is to try and find a principle which might
be more intuitively accessible, or has some kind of independent fea-
sibility, or that we might believe for the right reasons, and that will
have, as one of its consequences, the desired axiom.
The application of the principle ICAJ works as follows: Jaynes
(2003, p. 35) writes that
just as conjunction and negation are an adequate set of
operations for deductive logic, the [. . . ] product and sum
rules are an adequate set for plausible inference, in the
following sense. Whenever the background information is
enough to determine the plausibilities of the basic conjunc-
tions, our rules are adequate to determine the plausibility
of every proposition in the Boolean algebra generated by
[propositions] {A1, . . . , An}.12
Strikingly, this is not true for a merely FA probability measure defined
on N—the natural extension, in the limit, of a probability measure
defined on a Boolean algebra such as the one in the quote. In this case,
we can know what the FA measure assigns to each mutually exclusive
proposition {A1, A2, . . . }, but still have no way of knowing what the
measure assigns to each combination of such events, if the only rules
we can use are what Jaynes calls the product rule (the basic property
of a probability function P : for events A,B, P (AB) = P (A)P (B|A) =
P (B)P (A|B)) and the sum rule (finite additivity).
12The property of operators in deductive logic Jaynes refers to is usually called
functional completeness: through conjunction and negation all other logical op-
erators can be expressed; it is not obvious that Jaynes’s “adequacy” property in
probability is a natural parallel, but this is unimportant for the present argument.
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Why is this? As Kadane & O’Hagan (1995) write13, suppose our
merely FA probability measure assigns 0 to each natural number; then
this tells us, by Finite Additivity, that finite unions of numbers must
have probability 0; again by FA, co-finite unions must have probability
1.14 But, for example, the probability of the set of even numbers
is not determined by the sum and product rule of probability: this
set is neither finite, nor does it have a finite complement. If we do
not have CA, the probability of the set of even numbers does not
need to be equal to the sum of the probability of each even number,
which would be just 0; in fact, the value of this probability is left
undefined by the rules adopted. Therefore, the sum and product rule
of probability, in Jaynes’s terms, are no longer adequate operations
for plausible reasoning. If we had allowed countable additivity, on
the other hand, the probability of any subset of N would have been
automatically defined by the sums of the probability of its constituent
incompatible events (Kadane & O’Hagan, 1995, pp. 626-627).
In a sense, then, by allowing the number of terms of the set
{A1, . . . , An} to grow to a countable infinity, without strengthening
the rule of FA to that of CA, we have radically changed the nature of
the problem. The rules that were painstakingly found to be necessary
and, in the sense defined above, sufficient, for plausible reasoning are
not sufficient any longer. The most obvious cure is to adopt CA: this is
the new adequate rule for cases in which we have a countable infinity of
events. If we do not, and insist on merely FA probability, then there is,
in fact, no rule that can give explicitly what Jaynes requires: namely,
that when we know the probability of all events {1, 2, 3, . . . }, we have
an explicit probability value for every member of the σ-algebra of sets
they generate. This, again, involves the Axiom of Choice: because the
existence of such FA-functions can only be proved using this axiom, an
13Kadane and O’Hagan treat probability distributions over the natural num-
bers: events are represented by the sets {1}, {2}, . . . , instead of propositions
{A1, A2, . . . }, but the argument is identical
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explicit example, giving its construction for every subset of the natural
numbers, cannot be given (Lauwers (2010)).
I now tackle some further issues that the choice of motivating CA
by ICAJ carries with it, and some replies available to a supporter of
having only FA as an axiom of probability; answering these will add
some depth to the position I defend here. Now, remember that having
only FA as an axiom of probability does not rule out countably additive
distributions. So a supporter of having only FA as an axiom could
point out that the result in Lauwers (2010) is true for distributions
which have FA but not CA; but if we want a model in which we
know the probabilities of all subsets in a distribution over the natural
numbers, then we will adopt a CA-distribution. De Finetti’s approach
would clearly allow this. Countably additive probability distributions,
de Finetti (1972, p. 121) thinks, should be considered as constituting
a special class, but not be exhaustive of the concept of mathematical
probability. But the uniform distribution over the natural numbers
that de Finetti allows is exactly of the kind that has FA but not CA,
and it is to these functions that Lauwers’ result applies. By adopting
the weaker FA as an axiom we have a larger set of functions which we
call probabilities. But in that added part, the functions which respect
FA but not CA, are all those functions that cannot give an explicit
value for each combination of the basic elements of the sample spaces
to which they are applied. Hence this could be seen as a dubious
gain. It is still to be argued why these functions should be excluded,
however.
In particular, we might wonder why we need to know the proba-
bility of every possible combination of the basic events that we know
the probability of. This might be seen as too demanding. By adding
certain assumptions we can keep FA and, for example, salvage the in-
tuition that the evens and odds have probability 1/2 and that the set
of the multiples of a number k has probability 1/k (see Wenmackers &
Horsten (2013, p. 42); these probability functions being merely finitely
additive, Lauwers’s result applies to them.) So we can have merely-
FA probabilities and also explicit results for some important sets of
naturals. Further support for the idea that requirement ICAJ might
be too demanding seems to come from Jaynes himself: although the
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sum and product rule for probability are enough to give values for the
entire Boolean algebra generated by our basic events, this is “almost
always more than we need in a real application”, where a “small part
of the Boolean algebra [. . . ] is of concern to us” (Jaynes, 2003, p. 35).
The pragmatic aspect of Jaynes’s thought was invoked above, and it
could be invoked again. I think, however, that this case is subtly, but
importantly, different from the above ones; I think it right to insist on
the full demands of ICAJ .
As I mention above, Jaynes (2003, p. 7) writes that probability is a
“mathematical model for common sense”, and that any such model is
successful if it acts as a “powerful extension of common sense in some
field of application. Within this field, it enables us to solve problems
of inference which are so involved in complicated detail that we would
never attempt to solve them without its help.” This is a foundational
idea, in Jaynes, of what probability should be. It is given before he
starts the derivation of the formal rules of probability, and I think it is
very useful to keep it in mind during this discussion. In particular, I
think the idea is to be applied as follows: if our theory of probability is
to act as an extension of common sense, then it should be able to tell us
the probability of all sets of which we can give an explicit description
of, which we understand and where we know the probabilities of the
elements that make them up. This extends what we know to something
that might not have been obvious. This demands the application of CA
in the case of the probability distribution over the natural numbers.
At the same time, it rules out merely finitely additive probabilities
because, instead of extending our common sense, they limit it. We
need assumptions additional to the probability axioms up to FA to
get any sort of result on sets such as the evens and the odds, and
however many assumptions we add, there will be subsets of the natural
numbers for which we can give no unique explicit result (for some
examples of possible assumptions and results which follow see Kadane
& O’Hagan (1995)). Would we encounter these sorts of subsets in
practice? We may or we may not, yet these cases are conceptually
different from having a hypothesis modelled by a non-constructible set.
The latter will never be encountered in practice; the former might,
and there is no reason why we should not be able to handle them.
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Note also that I am not saying that our formal model should produce
values identical to whatever our intuition demands. Intuitions can be
informed and modified by a successful formal model (Jaynes says we
should “educate” our intuition (Jaynes, 2003, p. 472, 486)), but this
case is different: where our intuition needs guiding, the formal model
can give no answers at all.
This argument would not persuade all writers on probability: de
Finetti, in particular, thought that the formal theory should not in-
form the content of our intuition in any way; apart from enforcing
probabilistic coherence, it should leave an agent maximal freedom in
how to distribute her degrees of belief. But Jaynes, as is highlighted
by the comments on educating our intuition, has different ends, and
allowing every possible coherent assignment of probability need not be
a high priority. A formal model for common sense, for Jaynes, must
be able to extend it, and so, as a minimum, it should be able to give
us results for things we understand and have complete information
about. Because of this, we must adopt CA; and if our intuition says
we should be able to adopt a uniform distribution over the natural
numbers, then, Jaynes might say, we should educate our intuition to
be otherwise.
To sum up the above: a follower of Jaynes need not worry about
issue A because non-measurable sets will not figure in her use of prob-
ability; and she must bite the bullet on issue B, but with good reason:
she is guided by the principle ICAJ : if we know the probabilities of
the elementary events, we should be able to know the probability of the
compound events they form. Without CA this is impossible, and so
she should adopt CA. In the current setting, this principle does the
same work as intuition ICA, but might be more easily acceptable.
Now, issues A and B are well-known arguments in favour of FA,
and because they express powerful intuitions directly (namely IFA
and related ones), it is not possible to refute them without denying
the underlying intuitions. If we try to counter these issues by simply
invoking intuition ICA we will most likely be met by simple rejection.
This clash of intuitions seems to be at the heart of the deadlock in the
existing debates on the principle of CA. This is why I do not attempt
to deny either ICA or IFA, or ideas which are related to them. Instead,
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my strategy is to argue that the motivation behind Jaynes’s objective
Bayesianism speaks in favour of CA—or at least of not worrying too
much about the negative consequences of adopting CA. Note that this
might not be true in other approaches: the various consequences of
adopting FA or CA will have different weights according to what we
take probability to be, or to what we wish to do with it. But given the
principles guiding Jaynes’s framework and his intended use of proba-
bility, I think, given my arguments above, that he is justified in using
CA.
I think the arguments in this section improve Jaynes’s account and
can be useful for other accounts either similar to or inspired by it. In
particular, they can be employed in the work of another well-known
objective Bayesian, Jon Williamson. The final part of this chapter
is dedicated to a brief analysis of his contribution to the FA vs CA
debate, and a suggestion to substitute parts of his argument with the
ideas defended in this section.
5.6 Williamson on Countable Additivity
Williamson (2010a, pp. 31-38) seeks a good motivating argument for
the fact that degrees of belief should be probabilities, the principle
known as probabilism. He points out that there are two ways of doing
this. The first is an argument “by derivation”: this kind of argument
“proceeds by making some assumptions [. . . ] and then showing that
[probabilism] follows by the laws of logic” (Williamson, 2010a, p. 31).
This was pioneered by Cox (1961): in a famous derivation, he attempts
to show that the usual rules of probability (up to FA but excluding
CA) follow from two qualitative rules for plausible reasoning. Jaynes
adapts Cox’s derivation, as does Paris (1994), who Williamson quotes.
The second kind of argument is by interpretation (Williamson,
2010a, p. 31): we “interpret, or explicate, the terms under consid-
eration in a plausible way, and then show that under such an interpre-
tation the norm must hold”. The classic example of the second kind of
argument is the interpretation of degrees of beliefs as betting quotients.
The Dutch Book theorem is about betting quotients, and it says that if
(and only if) a set of betting quotients respect the probability axioms,
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then there does not exist a combination of buying or selling these bets
that results in a certain loss (or gain). In the Dutch Book argument
for probabilism, degrees of belief are interpreted as betting quotients,
and the result then is interpreted as saying that if (and only if) an
agent has a set of degrees of belief that respect the probability axioms,
then she is not open to accepting system of bets that can bring her a
certain loss. This means that degrees of belief should be probabilities,
if the agent does not wish to be open to certain losses. Williamson
prefers the second kind of argument, and this is just as well: the ar-
gument by derivation he cites only goes as far as motivating FA; there
is no extension to it in the literature that successfully motivates CA
too, nor is one apparent to this author. He thus turns to the argu-
ment by interpretation, which is a Dutch Book argument. This, he
writes, “has the means to convince a sceptic”, contrary to arguments
by derivation, which only have “the potential to convince someone with
no prior opinion on the conclusion in question” (Williamson, 2010a,
p. 32). In Chapter 4 I argued that the relation between betting prices
and degrees of belief is not a necessary one, and should be taken as
definitional of the latter concept. I also noted, however, in Section
4.4, that Williamson’s objective Bayesianism emerges as more entitled
than other approaches, including de Finetti’s, to take for granted a
close association between betting prices and degrees of belief. This
is because for him the relation is an explication, so the former might
be allowed to be numerically different from the latter. What is more,
with a few additional assumptions, the difference is not very great.
A full defence of this idea is beyond the scope of the current work,
but I consider the arguments of Section 4.4 grounds enough to grant
the relation between betting prices and degrees of belief Williamson
claims, at least for the sake of the current argument.
Here is a sketch of one direction of Williamson (1999) Dutch Book
argument for CA. We are back in the infinite lottery, and we call event
‘n’ that event that occurs if ticket number n wins. When we place a
bet on n we pay a portion of the stake S on offer, and win the stake
S if the event occurs. The portion of the stake that we put down in
order to play is P (n) ·S, where P (n) is our betting quotient, or betting
price, for the bet on event n: the betting quotient is interpreted as our
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degree of belief in n occurring. The peculiarity of the set-up is that
we don’t know how large S is, and it could also be negative: in other
words, we don’t know if we are betting for the n winning or against
this. (This device is meant to force us to declare betting quotients
that reflect our sincere credence in the probability of n winning.) In
the Dutch Book for CA, we place a bet on each ticket simultaneously,
and each bet has the same stake S. Thus, if we pay S
∞∑
n=1
P (n) for this
combination of bets, the following is true: if (and only if)
∞∑
n=1
P (n) = 1,
it is impossible for us to lose out whatever happens, i.e. whatever
ticket turns out to be the winning one. An unfair system of bets
which leads to a net loss whatever happens is called a Dutch Book;
the idea behind the argument is that a rational agent should avoid
the possibility of being subjected to a Dutch Book. Only countably
additive betting prices guarantee this, Williamson points out. Once
we interpret degrees of belief as betting prices, we have our result: the
former should be countably additive because the latter must be.
This argument works, but note the following. In a passage by
de Finetti which unfortunately seems to have been mistranslated in
English15, the Italian author points out that an argument such as the
above assumes that we are happy to pay, for a countable collection of




P (n) for the combined bet on all tickets of the lottery
15De Finetti’s argument, re-translated from the Italian, is as follows (this is a
comment on a proof such as the above, where it is claimed that if our betting
quotients do not abide by CA, then we are open to a certain loss):
But this is a kind of a vicious circle, because only if I knew complete
additivity to be valid could I think of extending the notion of ‘fair
combination of bets’ to combinations of infinite bets, and of basing
them on the series of the betting odds (de Finetti, n.d., p. 12) [em-
phasis as in the original, which follows: Un motivo che tenderebbe ad
avvalorare l’additività completa: se le probabilità pn hanno somma
p < 1, stipulando tutte le infinite scommesse posso ricevere in ogni
caso 1 pagando p, e quindi avrei un’incongruenza. Ma è un po’
un circolo vizioso, perchè solo se sapessi valida l’additività completa
potrei pensare di estendere la nozione di ‘combinazione di scommesse
equa’ a combinazioni di infinite scommesse, e di basarle sulla serie
delle quote di scommessa.]
Howson (2008) studies this argument but is puzzled by it, as, he writes, are
many authors before him. In the English version quoted by Howson and others,
the word serie (series) is wrongly translated as ‘sequence’
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simultaneously. In order to prove Countable Additivity of degrees of
belief, we are assuming Countable Additivity of betting prices. This
argument by interpretation has elements of an argument by derivation.
Now, this is perfectly fine if we are happy with the general principle
from which we are deriving our desired result, but compare these two
principles: ICAJ : if we know the probabilities of the elementary events,
we should be able to know the probability of the compound events they
form. ICAW : betting prices should respect the rule of Countable Addi-
tivity. Both principles get you CA for degrees of belief (the second via
the interpretation of degrees of belief as betting prices), but I think
the first one is better. Principle ICAW invokes CA directly, albeit for
betting prices, and therefore seems tailored to showing that degrees of
belief are countably additive. Principle ICAJ has an epistemological
flavour that rules on bets simply do not have, and while it clearly bears
on CA, we can plausibly believe it for reasons which are independent
of CA. Williamson aims to persuade a sceptic that there is good reason
to adopt CA. Hinging on the countable additivity of bets will not do
the job; principle ICAJ just might.
It is worth pausing here to consider if de Finetti is right in stat-
ing that the only reason we would postulate the countable additivity
of bets is because we already have countable additivity of probabili-
ties in mind. In the de Finetti betting scenario, a Bayesian agent is
offering betting odds at which she would be happy to buy or sell a
bet on a given event; because the agent sets the prices, she is acting
more like a bookie than a bettor. So in the infinite lottery scenario,
if CA is not enforced, the agent could set her betting price for each
ticket as 0, but a price of 1 (to be multiplied by the size of stake to
calculate the final loss or gain) for the event that one ticket will be
picked. This means that her opponent could place bets on every single
number and pay 0 for each bet, while, since one number will be the
winning one, winning the prize: a positive sum of money. This looks
like an appealing case for the enforcing of CA. We have to be very
careful, however, in noting precisely where the seemingly paradoxical
quality of this example creeps in, so we do not have the impression
of having gotten CA for free. Of course, the critical step is assuming
that because we paid 0 for each bet, we have paid 0 for the overall
119
5. Countable additivity and objective Bayesianism
bet, on all tickets. This is only true if the betting prices are count-
ably additive. I think that here intuitions about finite cases might be
guiding us: we can easily see the absurdity of allowing someone to pay
0 + 0 for a bet on heads and tails, and them winning the prize of 1
(say). But bringing this to bear on countably infinite cases would be,
in my view, a sleight of hand. Our intuitions about infinite objects
can be unreliable and conflicting—or, more charitably, they might be
just fine but are sometimes impossible to accommodate all together
in our usual mathematics, this very debate being a case in point. We
should also note that a similar reasoning process could be carried out
in support of allowing merely finitely additive probability functions.
In subjective Bayesianism, the betting procedure is a scheme that lets
agents pick which prices they desire for bets, in order to gauge the
strengths of their beliefs in the events occurring or not. Given this,
it seems clear that whichever non-self-defeating combination of prices
best reflects the beliefs of the agent should be available to her. So if the
agent thinks each ticket in the infinite lottery has equal an chance of
winning, she should be able to express this information in the betting
prices she offers. This brings us to accepting merely finitely additive
probabilities. But, of course, one could say there was a small sleight
of hand here too, since what is obviously always possible in the finite
case presents some strange consequences in the countably infinite case.
If it were impossible for an agent to express 50/50 probabilities for a
regular coin toss, then the betting elicitation method would have deep
flaws. But, once again, once we transfer this idea to the countably
infinite case, we have to face counter-intuitive facts: now all the bets
are priced 0.
Therefore, while de Finetti might have understated the case for
countable additivity of bets, I think he is right in highlighting that CA
depends on this principle, and questioning the fact that we then might
derive CA from it. Of course we can derive CA from the countable
additivity of bets, but I think we can do better. It seems to me that
all our intuitions about bets are necessarily related to finite cases, and
when we extend them to countably infinite cases we get shaky and
unreliable results. It is not clear to me that we would want to settle
this debate based on these shaky intuitions on bets. It might even be
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better to cut out the middle man and talk of probability on countably
infinite spaces directly. This brings us back to the familiar clash of
intuitions I outline above, but without the added baggage of ideas on
infinite bets. Alternatively, a good way to go in Jaynes’s framework is
to look to what I called ICAJ .
Now, Williamson would like to have an independent motivation
for why the rules of probability are also rules for correct reasoning.
But it is important to clarify what sort of ‘independence’ we have
in mind. Principle ICAJ is directly about probabilities: it cannot be
taken as an external argument for why degrees of belief should be
probabilities. Principle ICAW , on the other hand, is about betting
prices, and thus fits the bill. However, I have argued that countably
infinite bets are an unfamiliar hypothetical object, and that trusting
our intuitions about them in order to solve the debate might not be
the best way to go. Perhaps de Finetti is right in wondering whether
the countable additivity of bets would be so obvious if we did not have
CA in mind. In any case, an independence of this sort, i.e. something
which really has nothing to do with probability but can be brought to
bear on it, seems both hard to attain and not desirable: the axiom of
CA is technical in nature, and it will be an arduous task to find an
argument for it which makes no reference to something suspiciously
close to (something equivalent to) CA: in some way or another this
argument will involve countably infinite sums or countable unions.
Given this, the best available option is to give a justification for CA
which is internal to the framework itself, and yet more appealing than
merely adopting the axiom because it makes certain technical results
easier to prove. I think appealing to principle ICAJ can perform this
difficult balancing act: it is independent in the sense that it hinges
on epistemological intuitions on what we should be able to do with
knowledge of all the elementary probabilities.
When applied to Williamson’s general framework, the above con-
siderations could be implemented as follows. Williamson could use his
preferred argument by derivation or by interpretation in order to jus-
tify that degrees of belief should be probabilities, up to FA. In order to
justify the adoption of the stronger CA, I think an internal justification
will do: he can appeal to principle ICAJ above. It would go something
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like this: objective Bayesianism is a theory that tells us how much we
ought to believe certain propositions; therefore, it ought to be possible
to assign beliefs to propositions—not to all propositions necessarily,
but at least to those which we understand perfectly well as being made
up of elementary propositions of which we know the probability. A
supporter of FA could retort that we might know the probabilities for
all the tickets in the infinite lottery, and yet not know the probability
of an even-numbered ticket winning: this is simply undetermined, and
there is no inconsistency here. They could point out that Williamson
too says that sometimes probabilities are undetermined. While this
is a fair point, a possible response available to the objective Bayesian
who wishes to apply CA is as follows: we understand perfectly well
what the event “an even-numbered ticket will win” means, we know
it is made up of the tickets 2, 4, 6, . . . and we know the probability for
each of those tickets: it is only reasonable that we should also know
the probability of the event that an even-numbered ticket will win.
Summing up, in this section I have argued that Williamson wishes
to justify the adoption of CA in his objective Bayesianism with an
argument by interpretation. In this argument we show certain facts
about betting prices, we interpret degrees of belief as betting prices,
then we conclude that these facts must be true of degrees of belief as
well. But I have pointed out that an argument by interpretation such
as this relies on the principle of countable additivity of bets. This
means it is also an argument by derivation. Given that Williamson
derives CA from a stronger principle, he would do better by deriving
it from a principle which we have good reason to adopt. I think that
the ‘Jaynesian’ idea I expose above is better than countable additivity
of bets as a motivation to adopt CA.
5.7 Summary and conclusion
Jaynes thought he had an answer to the debate on countable versus
merely finite additivity in probability: he argued that the proponents
of the latter were making mistakes in the way they treated mathe-
matical infinity. I argue this is not correct: Jaynes’s warnings on the
use of infinity are neither necessary nor sufficient for avoiding merely
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FA probability functions. Nonetheless, there is still a positive, Jaynes-
inspired, contribution that can be made to the debate. I argue that
there is a sense in which what is seen by some as one of the most unde-
sirable characteristics of the adoption of CA, namely the existence of
non-measurable sets, does not concern Jaynes’s theory of probability.
Secondly, Jaynes has a principled reason for foregoing the possibil-
ity to model uniform distributions over countably infinite sets in his
framework. This is based on the idea that if we know the probabil-
ity of each single event of the sample space, then we should be able
to have an explicit, unique probability for any combination of those
basic events—or at least for those combinations for which we have
a clear understanding and description. This motivation for adopting
countable additivity works well for Williamson’s version of objective
Bayesianism too, and I have argued that this would be an improve-
ment on the argument he currently adopts. As I anticipated at the
beginning of the chapter, I think this has been an application of what,
to my mind, is one of the strongest aspects of de Finetti’s approach: a
tight and consistently developed relation between foundational aspects






This chapter concludes the thesis by summarising and discussing my
main arguments and sketching out some possible directions for future
work.
6.1 Summing up
In this thesis I put forward a unified and, in some aspects, novel, way
of placing de Finetti’s theory within the contemporary fields of formal
epistemology and philosophy of probability; I then develop two specific
arguments that take this picture of de Finetti’s theory as a starting
point. My overall view is that de Finetti created a theory in which the
mathematical and philosophical aspects of probability are developed
together, and that the former must have certain features which emerge
from an understanding of the latter. De Finetti saw probability as a
a primitive concept: the feeling of uncertainty experienced by human
agents. What he proposed was to study this primitive concept some-
thing like the way physicists do when they pass “from the ‘facts’ to
their mathematical translation” (de Finetti, 1974/1990, p. 256). This
approach results in operational definitions of the concept at hand, so
that meaningful statements can be made about it. All—and only—the
ones demanded by the intuitive understanding of the concept at hand
should be included in the formal/operational definition. Any rules
extraneous to this should not be added.
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The concept of meaning is understood in a pragmatist sense and is
weakly verificationist: a meaningful statement is one that we could, in
principle, check. The separation of the mathematical theory (which is
a model) from the primitive concept of probability (the target of the
model) means that the former is exempt from verifiability—this being
a crucial difference from Peirce’s, otherwise broadly similar, verifica-
tionism.
The foundational part of de Finetti’s project ends with a definition
and proper understanding of the correct axioms of probability. The
calculus of probability can now proceed, on these (purportedly) solid
philosophical foundations, without worrying about what it all means
at each step, but keeping in mind the foundational principles when
relevant. In particular, the calculus of probability, the way de Finetti
understands it, has nothing to say about which probability distribu-
tion is better (in whatever sense) than others. Since probabilities are
degrees of belief, the calculus of probability can thus help us to reason
correctly; this, though, is no theory of rationality: we can combine our
degrees of belief consistently, but there is nothing in the formal theory
that favours one degree of belief over another. This does not mean
that de Finetti is advocating that any belief whatsoever is rational:
that degrees of belief should respect the theory of probability is a nec-
essary, not sufficient, requirement for rationality; and although there is
much to say about the quality of an agent’s assignment of probability,
these arguments are not part of the mathematical theory and need not
necessarily appear in mathematical form. This, in a nutshell, is the
reading of de Finetti’s theory which I defend in this work. Below are
my main arguments.
Pragmatism and verificationism
I think the best way to understand de Finetti’s pragmatism and opera-
tionalism, aspects of his work that have puzzled contemporary writers,
is as an evolution and synthesis of the positions coming from Peirce,
Vailati and Calderoni on one side, and Einstein and Bridgman on the
other. What de Finetti does is to add operationalism to Vailati and
Calderoni’s reading of Peirce’s verificationism. This means that clas-
sifying him as a strict operationalist, as is often done—in particular
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by Eriksson & Hájek (2007)—is mistaken. A better reading is that
of seeing de Finetti too as a primitivist about degrees of belief. The
difference between the two positions, then, is that de Finetti sees prob-
ability similarly to an ontological primitive, which in the classification
by Eriksson & Hájek (2007) is a concept studied by science, as opposed
to one used by philosophers to order our reasoning.
Objectivity
De Finetti’s theory is often accused of lacking objectivity, in that it
purportedly calls all sorts of seemingly crazy beliefs rational. I have
argued that de Finetti’s is not a theory of rationality at all, so it makes
no sense criticising it for doing something badly that it never set out
to do in the first place. I see it as something of an accident of history
that de Finetti’s theory has ended up being studied and criticised
in the branch of formal epistemology where these sorts of questions
on rationality are addressed. On dissecting the different uses of the
concept of objectivity made by objective and subjective Bayesianism,
it can be seen how far apart the fields of inquiry of these approaches
really are.
In short, one isn’t forced to write a theory of rationality if one
doesn’t intend to. But a harder line of criticism is the following: since
de Finetti accepts that some formal rules should be respected in rea-
soning (namely the basic axioms of probability, up to finite additivity),
why these, and why only these? I think the theory can be defended
also from attacks from this angle; I think it is possible to draw a line
between rules that don’t affect the content of our degrees of belief
and rules that do—if that is what we wish to do. What isn’t clear,
however, is whether the theory emerges unscathed. In particular, the
normative status of the axioms of probability is not obvious. More
about this below.
Bets
I propose to abandon the betting definition of degrees of belief once and
for all. While there is, in the literature, the feeling that this definition
doesn’t work very well (de Finetti himself abandoned it), there has as
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yet been no thorough exploration of its problems. This exploration is
what I provide, and my conclusion is that the prospects for the betting
definition are not good. It very often gives results that deviate from
what would be the sincerely held degree of belief—something which is
essential to the whole endeavour, if we are to argue that probability
theory is a model of degrees of belief!—and, in order to save it, we
need to make assumptions that are so onerous that they take away the
need for the betting definition itself.
Countable additivity
Contra de Finetti, I argue that it makes good sense to adopt count-
able additivity in some philosophical understandings of probability. In
particular, I think that the objective Bayesian theories of Jaynes and
Williamson are justified in adopting the rule. This, however, is not for
the reasons given by the authors in question, which, I have argued, are
either flawed (in Jaynes’s case) or can be improved (in Williamson’s). I
propose to apply a principle of compositionality to lottery, and similar,
cases: if we know the probabilities of the basic events, then we should
know the probabilities of all the composite events they can form. I ar-
gue that it makes a lot of sense to adopt this principle in a theory, such
as Jaynes’s, in which probability is used as a powerful aid to common
sense. I think it also makes sense to adopt this rule in a theory, such
as Williamson’s, which seeks to tell us how much we ought to believe
certain propositions; it ought to be possible, here, to assign beliefs to
those propositions which we understand perfectly well as being made
up of elementary propositions whose probability we know.
My broader conclusion is that, within standard mathematics and
given the intuitions that lie at the basis of the disagreement on count-
able additivity, it is impossible to resolve the matter in general; only
case-by-case, theory-by-theory solutions will work. If, in the founda-
tional raison d’être of a theory, a good reason can be found for adopting
countable additivity, then this should be done; if, on the other hand,
the broad motivation of the theory points to a merely finite additiv-
ity, then this should be adopted instead. I see this chapter as an
application of de-Finettian methodology: that of keeping in mind the
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foundational motivation for a theory when it comes to deciding on its
formal features.
6.2 Dircetions for future work
This work seeks to furthering the discussion on certain issues, whilst
attempting to actually close the discussion on others. Nonetheless, I
think some questions emerge that deserve to be explored more thor-
oughly than they have been here. I shall now outline them.
De Finetti’s methodology
Above, I outlined the general methodology used by de Finetti in con-
structing a theory of probability, which he discusses in Part 1 of the
Appendix to Volume 2 of (de Finetti, 1974/1990, pp. 256-254) and puts
into practice in his book. This, as described above, involves construct-
ing a formal theory which models the primitive, intuitive concept of
probability. This model must respect its basic features and add noth-
ing extraneous to them. A comparison between de Finetti’s remarks on
methodology and those by Carnap on explication in (1950/1962, Chap-
ter 1), however, reveals not only some very interesting divergences, but
also that in the former case the methodology is described much less
explicitly. I think an explicit, full description of what I have taken to
be his methodology, and an exploration of the differences between this
and Carnapian explication, would be of interest. De Finetti’s project
is a sort of explication, in that we create a precise, quantitative con-
cept from a pre-scientific one, and use the former in science. In de
Finetti, however, the relation between explicatum and explicandum is
one of model to target. So there is another sense in which this is not
an explication at all, since the meaning stays with the primitive no-
tion, and we just create a formal model of it in order to have an object
that we can apply our calculus to. Another striking way in which
de Finetti’s project differs from Carnap’s explication is in the impor-
tance it gives to similarity between explicandum and explicatum. For
Carnap, the latter should attempt to be close to the former, but not
at the expense of any other positive features, such as simplicity and
fruitfulness, that the explicatum might have. For de Finetti this is not
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true: the formal definition of probability must contain no principles
which are extraneous to the ones dictated by the primitive concept at
hand. I shall attempt to make a proper exploration of the differences
between the two approaches, in such a way as to shed a light on de
Finetti’s methodology, in future work.
The normative status of the probability rules
The question I raised in Chapter 3 was about how to justify the nor-
mative status of the axioms of probability if one refuses to consider
accuracy as closeness to the truth. There, I argued that it can be
boiled down to the question of what sort of inconsistency incoherence
is supposed to represent, in an accuracy-oriented approach to prob-
abilism. It seems to me that there is much to be explored in this
direction.
Correcting incoherence
There are many different ways to show that being coherent (i.e. having
a set of degrees of belief that collectively respect the rules of proba-
bility) is better than being incoherent. It is also often conceded that,
as non-idealised human beings, we often make mistakes and are, in
fact, incoherent. The adoption of an accuracy-based argument for
probabilism allows us to address the following, under-explored ques-
tion: supposing an agent is incoherent, what is the best way to cor-
rect that incoherence? That is, what is the coherent set of degrees
of belief closest to her original, incoherent, set? The idea behind
seeking the closest coherent set is to respect the fact that the origi-
nal assessment contains some important information, even if the final
numerical expression of it was incorrect. The fascinating thing here
is that different indications of distance we can apply in an accuracy-
based approach bring about different proper scoring rules (I mentioned
the Brier and the logarithmic rules above in Chapter 3) and different
suggested corrections for the initial incoherent set. On an intuitive
level, this is clear: generally, different points will emerge as being the
closest according to the different measurement of distance. What is
more, different definitions of distance will preserve different mathe-
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matical relations between the original incoherent degrees of belief. For
example, let beli(E), beli(Ē), be the incoherent degrees of belief in
events E and Ē, and let belc be the coherent belief function. In this
case, the coherent assignment that is closest to beli according to the
Squared Euclidean Distance (SED), preserves the following relation:
belc(E) − belc(Ē) = beli(E) − beli(Ē). Hence, if we think that it was
important to preserve the relation beli(E)− beli(Ē), we should adopt
SED, which in turn induces the Brier scoring rule. On the other hand,
if we wish to preserve the relation beli(E)/beli(Ē), we should adopt
the Kullback-Leibler divergence, which in turn induces the logarithmic
scoring rule. Examining this from the point of view of Bregman di-
vergences, of which both distances given above are examples, gives us
a general formulation of which divergence (and so which scoring rule)
preserves which relation between the incoherent degrees of belief. I
plan to further expand and explore this result further in future work.
6.3 Final remarks
The aim of this work was twofold: to improve the understanding of
de Finetti’s theory and of how it fits with some of the current philo-
sophical debates, and to use this understanding to contribute to these
very debates. This process resulted, many times, in a defence of de
Finetti’s theory against what I argued was misguided criticism; but it
also resulted in a more effective criticism of the position. The results
in this thesis regarding countable additivity and the betting definition
of degrees of belief reflect this. I am not arguing that we should all
become subjective Bayesians in the style of de Finetti—but I hope,
if my aims in this work have been achieved, that even the staunch-
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delle probabilità totali alle classi numerabili. Rendiconti del R. Is-
tituto di Scienze e Lettere, LXIII(11-14), 1–5.
de Finetti, Bruno. 1931/1989. Probabilism: A Critical Essay on
the Theory of Probability and on the Value of Science. Erkenntnis,
31(2/3), 169–223.
de Finetti, Bruno. 1937/1964. Foresight: Its Logical Flaws, Its
subjective Sources. Pages 93–158 of: Jr., Henry E. Kyburg,
& Smokler, Howard E. (eds), Studies in Subjective Probability.
John Wiley & Sons.
de Finetti, Bruno. 1972. Probability, Induction and Statistics: The
Art of Guessing. John Wiley & Sons.
de Finetti, Bruno. 1974/1990. Theory of Probability: A critical
introductory treatment. John Wiley & Sons.
de Finetti, Bruno. 2008. Philosophical lectures on probability.
Springer. Collected, edited and annotated by Alberto Mario Mura.
Diaconis, Persi. 2004. Probability Theory: The Logic of Science by
E.T. Jaynes. SIAM News, 37(2).
Douglas, Heather. 2004. The Irreducible Complexity of Objectiv-
ity. Synthese, 138(3), 453–473.
Dunford, Nelson, & Schwartz, Jacob T. 1958. Linear Opera-
tors, Part I. Interscience publishers.
Elga, Adam. 2000. Self-locating belief and the Sleeping Beauty prob-
lem. Analysis, 60(2), 143–147.
Elliot, Colin. 2014. Countable Additivity in the Philosophical Foun-
dations of Probability. Master thesis.
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